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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the business history of William Davenport (1725-1797), a 
Liverpool slave trading merchant from 1748 until 1786. Through an examination of a 
recently discovered collection of Davenport‘s business papers and personal letters, 
this thesis places Davenport in the context of Liverpool‘s development as a slaving 
port, and the growth of the town‘s slaving merchant community. It explains how 
Davenport became one of the largest slaving merchants of his generation, and one of 
the wealthiest Guinea merchants in Liverpool‘s history. To explain Davenport‘s rise 
the thesis focuses on how he managed his slaving company. It studies two distinct 
areas of the Guinea coast where he traded for slaves—Old Calabar and Cameroon—
and demonstrates how he cultivated merchant partners, and developed a supply chain 
of trading goods, to suit the unique conditions of both African markets. The thesis 
also explores Davenport‘s business profits by examining his returns from several 
different areas of investment, including the slave trade, the ivory trade and his 
speculation in financial securities. By building a composite picture of Davenport‘s 
diverse business concerns the thesis argues that the profits of the slave trade were 
crucial to his financial success. Davenport‘s enterprising expansion of the slave trade 
into the Cameroon in the 1750s was decisive in generating his slaving profits, and 
ultimately his wealth.  
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Introduction 
 
 In October 2000 a remarkable set of merchant papers appeared on the BBC‘s 
Antiques Roadshow program. A farm worker had discovered them in a Cheshire barn 
during the 1950s, whilst clearing the structure. Thankfully he recognised that the 
papers may have historical significance and prevented them from being burned as 
useless. Comprising twelve leather bound volumes and thirteen bundles of loose 
letters, the collection contained a wealth of information on the management of a 
Liverpool slave trading firm, information that, as the appraiser commented, ―one 
dreams of finding‖.1 The BBC‘s antiques expert identified the papers as those of 
William Davenport, an eighteenth century Liverpool merchant, and conservatively 
valued them at £5,000.
2
  
When historians of Liverpool or the slave trade learned about the ―Davenport 
Papers,‖ they knew that this collection supplemented another set of papers that had 
been discovered earlier. In 1951 a substantial collection of William Davenport‘s 
trading accounts came to light in the Davies Davenport collection at Manchester‘s 
John Rylands library.
3
 The papers comprised accounts ledgers, a letter book and, most 
importantly, detailed trading accounts for nearly eighty slave trading voyages made 
from Liverpool to Africa between 1761 and 1784.
4
 This first set of Davenport‘s 
papers was the most detailed set of documents relating to Liverpool‘s slave trade ever 
found. No other Liverpool merchant accounts compare in size and detail with this 
collection: the papers of William Earle, a close associate of Davenport and another 
key slave trading merchant, contain no voyage accounts and no accounts ledgers; the 
Tarleton, David Tuohy, Case & Southwark, and Thomas Leyland papers, are much 
                                               
1 Anonymous, ―Antiques Roadshow UK: Broadcast Highlights, Biddulph‖, PBS, 2009, available from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/antiquesuk/highlights/113.html. 
2 Ibid. 
3 The papers were originally housed in the Davies Davenport section of the Bromley Davenport 
Muniments, John Rylands Library, Manchester University, England. They were subsequently moved to 
the Raymond Richards Collection at Keele University Library, Staffordshire, England, and are also 
available on microfilm from Microform Academic Publishing. 
4 In addition to the ship accounts, the collection contains the following accounts ledgers: ―Waste Book 
1745-1766‖, ―Account Book for Beads and Cowries 1766-1770‖, ―Letter and Bill Book 1747-1761‖, 
―Register of Bills of Exchange 1769-1787‖, ―Entry Book 1760-1775‖, ―Ledger Book 1763-1775‖, 
―Ledger Book 1788-1797‖. The ―Old‖ Davenport papers will be referenced using the abbreviation 
ODAV throughout this thesis. 
2 
smaller in scope and contain only thirteen voyages accounts.
5
 The Davenport papers 
exceed in size all of these other Liverpool merchant papers put together. 
William Davenport‘s career spanned thirty-eight years of the Liverpool slave 
trade from 1748 until 1786, during which time he invested £125,000 in the trade and 
owned shares in 163 individual ventures. In addition, Davenport supplied articles to 
slaving vessels including beads, iron goods and ships provisions. Davenport‘s large 
investment in the slave trade, coupled with his pioneering expansion of the trade east 
of Old Calabar in the 1750s, made him one of the most important Liverpool slave 
trading merchants of his generation. Appreciating Davenport‘s significance to the 
Guinea trade, the Merseyside Maritime Museum purchased the newly discovered 
papers for £25,000 in 2006, making them available to the public shortly thereafter.
6
 
Historians have used the ―Old‖ Davenport papers, those held first at the John 
Rylands Library, as the basis for a number of articles on William Davenport and the 
Liverpool slave trade. In 1951 Bradbury Parkinson published the first study of the 
Davenport papers, albeit a limited one, when he discussed the method of accounting 
used in the records, and contextualised them with other eighteenth century merchant 
accounts.
7
 Given Parkinson‘s interest in the history of accounting, he spent little time 
investigating the relevance of the papers to the slave trade. Two years later Parkinson, 
together with Francis Hyde and Sheila Mariner, used the Davenport papers to 
examine the organisation of the Liverpool slave trade in their 1953 article ‗The Nature 
and Profitability of the Liverpool Slave Trade‘.8 Their paper presented an overview of 
Davenport‘s trading career, analysed a limited number of his slaving voyages in 
detail, and used the papers to detail how the Liverpool slave trade operated, 
concluding with an assessment of its profitability. 
After Parkinson‘s initial studies, the Davenport papers were ignored until the 
mid 1970s, when economic historians renewed their interest in the collection. In 1975, 
Roger Anstey re-appraised the Davenport papers in conjunction with other extant 
merchant papers to determine an industry wide level of profits for the British slave 
                                               
5
 The Earle papers are held in the Merseyside Maritime Museum (MMM), Liverpool, England. The 
other four sets of merchant papers are housed in the Liverpool Record Office (LRO), Liverpool, 
England. 
6 Anonymous, ―Slave Trade Revealed in Historic Papers‖, BBC News, 2001, available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1718422.stm 
7 Bradbury B. Parkinson, "A Slaver's Accounts", Accounting Research, vol. 2, (Apr. 1951), pp.144-150 
8 Francis Edwin Hyde, Bradbury B. Parkinson, and Sheila Mariner, "The Nature and Profitability of the 
Liverpool Slave Trade", The Economic History Review, vol. 5, no. 3, (1953), pp.368-377  
3 
trade. Using data extrapolated from the merchant papers, Anstey established a method 
of calculating slaving profits that included deductions for credit transactions, the value 
of the slave ship, and the purchase of African produce. After accounting for these 
various charges, Anstey arrived at an average industry wide profit figure of 9.5 
percent, and concluded that the British slave trade was not ―profitable beyond the 
dreams of avarice.‖9  
A year later, David Richardson advanced the study of slaving profits in his 
significant paper ―Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade: the accounts of William 
Davenport, 1757-1784‖.10 In contrast to Anstey‘s calculation of industry wide slaving 
profits, Richardson focused solely on the seventy-four slaving voyages documented in 
the Davenport papers. He compared the cost of the ship and cargo to the returns from 
slave sales, and discounted for credit the outlays and returns, to give an adjusted 
venture profit for each of Davenport‘s voyages. Based upon his calculations, 
Richardson argued that Davenport‘s average profits from the slave trade were just 
10.5 percent, and also ―hard earned‖, indicating, like Anstey, that the Liverpool slave 
trade was not an automatic road to riches.  
In 1977 B.L Anderson used the bill book, a ledger recording Davenport‘s 
credit transactions from 1769-1786, to study the bills of exchange system used in the 
Liverpool slave trade. Anderson traced Davenport‘s sizeable web of customers, 
suppliers and factors throughout the Atlantic world and assessed Davenport‘s career 
by charting the returns he received from slave sales. Based upon Davenport‘s slave 
trading, Anderson concluded that: 
the ultimate yardstick of success or failure in the slave trade was not so much 
achievement of a healthy rate of return to the individual expedition but the 
ability of the trader to realise his net profit quickly and easily on a regular 
basis 
11
 
 
                                               
9 Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition 1760-1810, (London: 1975), p.46 
10 David Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade: The Accounts of William Davenport," in 
Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition, ed. Roger Anstey and Paul Hair, (Liverpool: 1979), 
pp.60-90; David Richardson also authored ―A Brief Introduction to the Microfilm Edition of the 
William Davenport Papers,‖ British Online Archives, 1998, available from 
http://www.britishonlinearchives.co.uk/9781851171767.php; and the Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography entry: ―Davenport, William (1725–1797)‖, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004, 
available from http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/55685 
11 B.L. Anderson, "The Lancashire Bill System and Its Liverpool Practitioners: The Case of a Slave 
Merchant," in Trade and Transport: Essays in Economic History in Honour of T.S. Willan, ed. W.H. 
Chaloner and B.M.  Ratcliffe, (Manchester: 1977), p.80 
4 
For a merchant such as Davenport, then, liquidity and the creditworthiness of his 
debtors were key considerations in his slaving business, not the achievement of large 
profit margins. 
Anstey, Richardson and Anderson‘s research into the Davenport papers 
reinvigorated a debate on the slave trade‘s profitability that began two hundred years 
ago. Even when the British slave trade operated legally, by sanction of Parliament, its 
profits had come under scrutiny from some MPs and pamphleteers.
12
 Caught up in the 
charged question of abolition, these eighteenth century commentators offered a 
variety of opinions. Some, like abolitionist Thomas Clarkson, suggested that the trade 
was, at best, marginally profitable, and more often than not a losing business.
13
 John 
Newton, an abolitionist and former slaving captain, described slaving profits as ―a 
lottery.‖14 Conversely, supporter of the slave trade James Wallace, author of a 1795 
history of Liverpool, and former slaving surgeon Elliot Arthy, claimed that the profits 
from the Africa trade were not only large, but also crucially important to Liverpool‘s 
growth. Wallace argued, for example, that thanks to the slave trade, a 
great annual return of wealth, may be said to pervade the whole town, 
increasing the fortunes of the principal adventurers, and contributing to the 
support of the majority of the inhabitants;
15
  
 
Using industry wide estimates, Arthy argued that each slaving vessel made a clear 
profit to her owners of £3,850, and that the ―repairing and outfitting‖ of Liverpool‘s 
slaving fleet employed twenty-seven different groups of tradesmen, six thousand 
seamen, and numerous manufacturers. In short, Arthy summarised that the slave 
trade‘s ―immense quantum of business‖ has ―doubtless, been the principal means of 
bringing [Liverpool] to its present and flourishing state‖.16 
Nineteenth century historians agreed with Wallace and Arthy‘s analyses that 
slaving enriched individual merchants and Liverpool. Liverpool historian Richard 
Brooke wrote in 1853 that a ―large number of Liverpool persons… made their 
                                               
12 ―Estimates of Profits under Regulated Trade‖ in Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the 
History of the Slave Trade to America: The Eighteenth Century, 4 vols., vol. 2, (Buffalo, NY: 2002) pp 
578-581; See also the testimony before Parliament of slaving merchants James Jones (PP 68 (1789), 
p.44), John Tarleton (PP 68 (1789), pp.47-48), and Robert Norris (PP 68 (1789), p.8). 
13 Thomas Clarkson, An Essay on the Impolicy of the African Slave Trade : In Two Parts, 2nd ed., 
(London: 1788), pp.27-32 
14 Testimony of John Newton (PP 73 (1790), p.145) 
15 James James Wallace, A General and Descriptive History of the Ancient and Present State, of the 
Town of Liverpool, (Liverpool: 1795), p.229 
16 Elliot Arthy, Introductory Observations in Favour of the African Slave Trade, (Liverpool: 1804),  
pp.28-50  
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fortunes in the African slave trade, and some of them acquired by that odious traffic 
considerable wealth.‖17 At the end of the century, Gomer Williams and ―A Genuine 
Dicky Sam‖ both quoted Wallace‘s profitability calculations verbatim in their 
respective accounts of the slave trade.
18
 Williams also attempted to build on 
Wallace‘s claims by analyzing the accounts of six slaving voyages, five of them 
financed by Liverpool mayor, banker and millionaire Thomas Leyland.
19
 After 
extrapolating the data from the accounts, Williams found that each vessel made 
approximately 80 percent profits.
20
 He ended his analysis with Elliot Arthy‘s industry 
wide profits, data that clearly showed a ―handsome profit‖ to Liverpool‘s slaving 
merchants. 
The contention that slaving profits were both large and crucial to Liverpool‘s 
development formed a central idea in Eric Williams‘ influential work Capitalism and 
Slavery published in 1944. Using individual voyage accounts, Williams posited that 
voyage ―profits of 100 percent were not uncommon in Liverpool, and one voyage 
netted a clear profit of at least 300 percent.‖21 Williams also used James Wallace‘s 
data to argue that industry wide profits sustained the growth of Liverpool itself: ―The 
story of the increase in the slave trade is mainly the story of the rise of Liverpool.‖22 
Thus, 150 years after Wallace first published his history, his remained the orthodox 
view: that the slave trade had been a lucrative commerce, and one that had been the 
backbone of Liverpool‘s eighteenth century prosperity. 
The research in the 1970s on the Davenport papers argued that the slave trade 
was a marginally profitable and highly volatile business—contrary to Wallace (1795) 
and Williams (1944)—did not remain uncontested. Complaining in 1981 that the 
―pendulum of scholarship has swung too far towards the position that the profits from 
slaving were small.‖23 Joseph Inikori attempted to redress the balance and contend 
                                               
17 Richard Brooke, Liverpool as It Was During the Last Quarter of the Eighteenth Century, 1775 to 
1800, (Liverpool: 1853), p.236 
18 Anon., Liverpool and Slavery: An Historical Account of the Liverpool- African Slave Trade. Was It 
the Cause of the Prosperity of the Town? By a Genuine Dicky Sam, (Liverpool: 1884), pp.100-112  
19 Gomer Williams, History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque : With an Account of the 
Liverpool Slave Trade, 1744-1812, (Liverpool: 1897), pp.594-608  
20
 In 1931, Dumbell showed that Williams had made some serious errors in his interpretation of the 
accounts, the result of which was an overstatement of profits by 50 percent (Stanley Dumbell, "The 
Profits of the Guinea Trade", Economic History Supplement to Economic Journal, vol. 2, (1931), 
pp.254-257). 
21 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, (London: 1989), p.36 
22 Ibid., p.34 
23 J.E. Inikori, "Market Structure and the Profits of the British African Trade in the Late Eighteenth 
Century", The Journal of Economic History, vol. 41, (Dec. 1981), p.745 
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once again that most slaving merchants earned large profits. Using Wallace‘s history 
as his starting point, a work Inikori complained had been ―completely neglected by 
modern writers‖, Inikori argued that the Liverpool slave trade was highly competitive 
and, as a result, concentrated in the hands of less than a dozen rich merchant houses.
24
 
These firms, Inikori stressed, possessed a comparative advantage in the slave trade 
and hence they managed to accrue exceptionally high profits.  
Turning to the Davenport papers, Inikori questioned Richardson‘s 
methodology, specifically his use of discounted venture profits.
25
 Taking no account 
of credit transactions, Inikori suggested that Davenport received a much higher 17.9 
percent return from his slaving ventures, supporting his argument that the Liverpool 
slave trade was a highly lucrative business for its large merchant investors.
26
 
Richardson, supported by Anderson, debated the profitability question with Inikori in 
a series of rejoinders and rebuttals within The Journal of Economic History.
27
 Neither 
scholar managed to decisively establish their calculations as definitive, and hence the 
question of the Liverpool slave trade‘s profitability continues to be a source of 
controversy.  
Interpretations of slaving profits remain controversial because the slave trade‘s 
profitability is an important and politically charged question. If, as Wallace, Williams 
and Inikori suggested, the Liverpool slave trade was highly profitable, then it would 
follow that these profits were channelled into, and fuelled the growth of Liverpool. If 
on the other hand the trade‘s profits were marginal and broadly comparable to other 
businesses, as Anstey, Richardson, and Anderson suggested, then the slave trade 
would be just one of several sources of investment for the town. These considerations 
are of interest beyond academic history. Modern reparations movements are keenly 
aware of the need to trace the proceeds of the slave trade and assess slavery‘s impact 
on the growth of Britain‘s ports and industries. In this way activists seek to quantify 
                                               
24 Ibid., p.749  
25 Ibid., pp.767-768 
26 Ibid., pp.769-773 
27
 See B.L. Anderson and David Richardson, "Market Structure and Profits of the British African Trade 
in the Late Eighteenth Century: A Comment", The Journal of Economic History, vol. 43, no. 3, (Sep. 
1983), pp.713-721; J.E. Inikori, "Market Structure and the Profits of the British African Trade in the 
Late Eighteenth Century: A Rejoinder", The Journal of Economic History, vol. 43, no. 3, (Sep. 1983), 
pp.723-728; B.L. Anderson and David Richardson, "Market Structure and Profits of the British African 
Trade in the Late Eighteenth Century: A Rejoinder Rebutted", The Journal of Economic History, vol. 
45, no. 3, (Sep. 1983), pp.705-707; J.E. Inikori, "Market Structure and Profits: A Further Rejoinder", 
The Journal of Economic History, vol. 45, no. 3, (Sep. 1985), pp.708-711. 
7 
the financial gains of the slave trade, and make reparations claims upon the individual 
governments, companies and towns to whom these benefits accrued. 
Jane Longmore and David Pope‘s 2007 studies demonstrate the difficulty in 
tracing the profits generated by the slave trade to the development of Liverpool and 
north western England. Longmore sought to investigate the ―cultural, physical and 
economic impact of the slave trade on late eighteenth century Liverpool‖ by tracing 
the investments of slaving merchants in the port‘s commercial and financial 
infrastructure in her paper ―Cemented by the Blood of a Negro?: The Impact of the 
Slave Trade on Eighteenth-Century Liverpool.‖28 In the same edited collection, 
Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, David Pope explored Liverpool‘s leading slave 
traders‘ investments in estates and properties around Merseyside, and their attempts to 
better themselves through marriage. As part of his study, Pope examined the wills of 
178 leading slaving merchants to gauge the earnings made by Liverpool‘s Africa 
men.
29
 Pope and Longmore established that Liverpool‘s Guinea merchants invested 
heavily in the town and clearly possessed a great deal of property, but both studies 
also attached the same caveat: without looking at the merchant‘s entire investment 
portfolios one cannot attribute their gains solely to the slave trade.  
There have been numerous histories of individual Liverpool slaving merchants 
to date, but none have been able to quantify their diverse business concerns. 
Historians have studied, for example, Sparling & Bolden, Foster Cunliffe & Sons, 
John Earle and his family, John Bolton, Robert Bostock and, of course William 
Davenport, in addition to a number of other individual merchants and slaving 
captains.
30
 Moreover, histories have been produced of industries in which slaving 
                                               
28 Jane Longmore, "'Cemented by the Blood of a Negro?' the Impact of the Slave Trade on Eighteenth 
Century Liverpool," in Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, ed. David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz, 
and Anthony Tibbles, (Liverpool: 2007), p.227 
29 David Pope, "The Wealth and Social Aspirations of Liverpool's Slave Merchants of the Second Half 
of the Eighteenth Century," in Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, ed. David Richardson, Suzanne 
Schwarz, and Anthony Tibbles, (Liverpool: 2007), pp.208-215 
30 M.M. Schofield, "The Virginia Trade of the Firm of Sparling and Bolden, of Liverpool 1788-99", 
Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 116, (1969), pp.117-165; John 
W. Tyler, "Foster Cunliffe and Sons: Liverpool Merchants in the Maryland Tobacco Trade, 1738-
1765", Maryland Historical Magazine, vol. 73, no. 3, (Sept. 1978), pp.117-165; Dawn Littler, "The 
Earle Collection: Records of a Liverpool Family of Merchants and Shipowners", Transactions of the 
Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 146, (1996), pp.93-106; Godfrey W. Matthews, 
"John Bolton: A Liverpool Merchant, 1756-1837", Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire 
and Cheshire, vol. 93, (1941), pp.98-115; Denise M. Jones, "The Business Organisation of the 
Liverpool Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century: A Case Study of Robert Bostock" (MA, University 
of Liverpool, 2006) 
8 
merchants invested in such as the coal, earthenware, banking and salt trades.
31
 We do 
not know, however, the level of investment or the returns received from these trades. 
Nor do we know how the profits from these trades compare to those from the slave 
trade.  
 
The main difficulty in painting a full picture of a merchant‘s business concerns 
has been a lack of sources. Few merchant papers remain, and those that do are all far 
from complete. The Old Davenport papers, discovered in the 1950s, are no exception. 
The papers only contain one set of letters from Davenport himself, most of which 
were letters of instructions to slaving captains and West Indian merchants detailing 
how cargoes of slaves should be sold, 1748-1759.
32
 The format of these letters 
changes little over time, and hence they contain few insights into Davenport‘s 
decision making, or the financial performance of his firm. Moreover, the vast majority 
of the ship accounts and ledgers within the Old Davenport papers concern the period 
1765-1775, an important decade for Davenport but only a quarter of his thirty-eight 
years trading as a merchant. Commenting on his detailed research into the Davenport 
papers, David Richardson noted that whilst the ―range of records that have survived 
relating to Davenport‘s business activities is remarkable and far fuller than that for 
any other eighteenth century British slave trader‖33 the records ―concerning 
Davenport‘s commercial activities other than slave-trading is on the whole 
comparatively slight.‖34 Consequently historians researching Davenport‘s career have 
had to work from a substantial but far from complete collection.  
The ―New‖ Davenport papers, discovered in 2000 and made available to 
researchers in 2006, fill in many of the blanks in William Davenport‘s career. One of 
the twelve bound volumes is the ―Ivory Book‖ detailing Davenport‘s ivory trading for 
                                               
31 T.C. Barker, "Lancashire Coal, Cheshire Salt and the Rise of Liverpool", Transactions of the 
Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 103, (Feb 1951), pp.83-101; T.C. Barker and J.R. 
Harris, Merseyside Town in the Industrial Revolution: St. Helens, (London: 1959); Peter Hyland, The 
Herculaneum Pottery: Liverpool's Forgotten History, (Liverpool: 2005); John Hughes, Liverpool 
Banks and Bankers, 1760-1837 : A History of the Circumstances Which Gave Rise to the Industry, and 
of the Men Who Founded and Developed It, (Liverpool: 1906); B. L. Anderson, "Financial Institutions 
and the Capital Market on Merseyside in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in Commerce, 
Industry and Transport : Studies in Economic Change on Merseyside, ed. B. L. Anderson and P. J. M. 
Stoney, (Liverpool: 1983), pp.26-53 
32 Letter and Bill Book 1747-1761, Liverpool, ODAV 
33 David Richardson, ―A Brief Introduction to the Microfilm Edition of the William Davenport Papers,‖ 
British Online Archive, 1998, available from 
http://www.britishonlinearchives.co.uk/9781851171767.php, p.3 
34
 Richardson, "The Accounts of William Davenport," p.63 
9 
the period 1763-1785.
35
 Davenport carried on a substantial trade in ivory throughout 
his career, and the Ivory Book shows the exact size, weight and price, of the tusks he 
bought and sold. The Ivory Book also contains copies of Davenport‘s outgoing letters 
for the period 1779-1783. These letters are far more detailed than those found in the 
Old papers and shed light on Davenport‘s financial performance throughout the 
period. In particular, the letters discuss numerous slaving voyages made during the 
American War, a crucially important phase of Davenport‘s career, and one in which 
he earned exceptional profits and suffered massive losses from his ventures.  
Complementing the letters within the Ivory Book are thirteen bundles of 
correspondence sent and received by Davenport in the period 1767-1794, but 
particularly concentrated for the years 1774-1784.
36
 The letters cover a variety of 
subjects including Davenport‘s bead trading, his administration of a prominent 
London banker‘s estate, and the collection of debts from West Indian factors during 
and after the American War.
37
 Moreover, eight bundles of the letters concern specific 
slaving vessels and detail the trading conditions on the African coast, an area only 
scantily covered by the Old Davenport papers.
38
 Trading accounts detailing six 
slaving voyages made during the American War add to the letters on Davenport‘s 
individual ventures.
39
 
In addition to the Ivory Book, letters, and ship accounts, the New Davenport 
papers contain numerous other ledgers that are crucial to a reconstruction of 
Davenport‘s business history. Of most use are a personal cash book for 1747-1760, a 
cash book for Davenport‘s bead company, 1766-1776, a waste book (a memorandum 
ledger into which sales are entered), 1766-1780, and an account book detailing 
transactions with other merchants.
40
 The waste book is particularly useful as it is 
                                               
35 Ivory Book 1763-1785, Liverpool, D/DAV/1 
36 The bundles of letters were not given titles or references by Davenport. As a result the MMM 
assigned a system of referencing using the suffix D/DAV/. This system be used throughout this thesis.   
37 Letters Regarding Bead Business 1767-1768, Liverpool, D/DAV/5; Letters to William Davenport & 
Company Regarding Beads 1768-1777, Liverpool, D/DAV/6; James Morson, Vance Caldwell & 
Vance 1775-1781, Liverpool, D/DAV/8; Letters, Bills etc Voyage of Barque Prince George from 
Dominica 1777-1778, Liverpool, D/DAV/12; John Robinson trustee of Vance‘s estate 1787, Liverpool, 
D/DAV/16; Estate of Thomas Wycliffe 1777-1782, Liverpool, D/DAV/18; Estate of Jos. Wimpey 
1772-1793, Liverpool, D/DAV/19; Davenport Family 1794, Liverpool, D/DAV/20 
38 Badger’s 3rd Voyage 1774-1776, Liverpool, D/DAV/7; Paper‘s Ship new Badger’s inward acco 
1777, Liverpool, D/DAV/10; Hector’s Voyages to Africa & Dominica 1777, Liverpool, D/DAV/11; 
Essex’s second voyage to Africa and the Caribbean 1783-1785, Liverpool, D/DAV/13 
39 Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
40 Personal Cash Book 1747-1760, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; Personal Ledger 1763-1772, Liverpool, 
D/DAV/2; Bead Cash Book 1766-1776, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; Waste Book 1766-1780, Liverpool, 
D/DAV/2 
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contiguous to an earlier waste book within the Old papers for the period 1745-1766.
41
 
By combining the two books, a continuous run of transactions from 1745 to 1780 can 
be reconstructed, giving a detailed picture of Davenport‘s business concerns. The 
period not covered by the ledgers and waste books, 1780-1783, is covered by the 
letters contained in the Ivory Book, and the last years of Davenport‘s life, 1788-1797, 
are described in an account ledger, allowing us to see how Davenport spent his 
retirement.
42
 Thus, the ―Old‖ and the ―New‖ Davenport papers in combination 
provide an almost complete picture of the trading concerns and business practices of 
William Davenport.  
Research performed for this thesis has uncovered additional manuscripts, 
further filling in the gaps in Davenport‘s career. The most important new document is 
Davenport‘s residuary settlement, a small book detailing the value of his estate upon 
his death in 1797, located within the Bromley Davenport Muniments (BDM) in the 
John Rylands Library, University of Manchester.
43
 To date, a difficulty when studying 
Davenport has been a lack of detail concerning the value of his estate. As a result, 
exact calculations of his ultimate gains from the slave trade have been impossible. 
Both Richardson and Inikori suggested that Davenport made little from the slave 
trade. Richardson stated, for example, that ―the evidence of [Davenport‘s] own 
accounts and papers suggests that, for all his dedication and enterprise in the pursuit 
of the slave trade, he was not one of the fortunate few.‖44 The discovery of 
Davenport‘s residuary settlement allows us to challenge this assumption, and 
contextualize him with his contemporaries using Pope‘s extensive research on other 
slaving merchant‘s wills. The BDM also contains a number of letters from Davenport 
to his family in the early years of his merchant career which help to establish why he 
chose to move to Liverpool, and what his apprenticeship entailed. Taken together, the 
manuscripts contained in the John Rylands Library helps to fill in blanks at both the 
beginning and end of William Davenport‘s life.  
Finally, Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database documents all of 
Davenport‘s known slaving investments. Originally published in 1999 as a CD-ROM, 
                                               
41 Waste Book 1745-1766, Liverpool, ODAV 
42 Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV 
43 Residuary Settlement of William Davenport, Liverpool, c.1797, Box 19, Bromley-Davenport 
Muniments, John Rylands Library, Manchester Univeristy, England (hereafter BDM) 
44  Richardson, ―Introduction to the Davenport Papers,‖ p.6; Inikori also stated that ―the history of the 
Liverpool slave trade does not know William Davenport as one of those who made fortunes from the 
trade.‖ (Inikori, "Market Structure and the Profits ", p.770). 
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and subsequently updated and released online in 2008, Voyages contains 34,940 
documented slaving voyages, including 4,974 departing Liverpool.
45
 The database 
compiles these voyages from extant shipping records, newspapers, published and 
unpublished secondary sources, and private notes and collections. Voyages is 
particularly detailed for the British slave trade in the period 1750-1807, and includes 
virtually complete ship-owner data for Liverpool slaving vessels. Moreover, the 
database can produce graphs and tables to interpret ownership information, and 
changes in the volume and structure of the slave trade over time. As such it is the 
most complete guide to the Liverpool slave trade available today, allowing us to 
assemble, for the first time, Davenport‘s complete slaving investment pattern, and 
compare that pattern to other Liverpool slaving merchants. 
* 
This thesis will use the recently discovered New Davenport and Bromley 
Davenport Muniments, in combination with the Old Davenport papers and the 
Voyages Database, to examine the life and career of William Davenport, Liverpool 
slave trading merchant. It will provide the most complete picture to date of 
Davenport‘s biography, his place in the Liverpool merchant community, his business 
history and his ultimate success or failure in the slave trade. 
Chapter one will sketch the biography of William Davenport and place him in 
the wider context of Liverpool‘s merchant community. Using the information 
available from the Bromley Davenport Muniments, we will consider Davenport‘s 
motive in migrating to Liverpool and his decision to enter the slave trade. We then 
establish Davenport‘s status in the slaving merchant community by examining his 
financial investment in the trade vis-à-vis both his contemporaries, and those 
merchants who succeeded him.  
Chapter two will analyse how William Davenport managed his slave trading 
firm by focusing on his trade to Old Calabar and Cameroon, two slaving markets in 
the eastern Bight of Biafra. Using the detail in the Davenport papers, we will ascertain 
how the slave trade operated at both ports, paying particular attention to the differing 
consumption patterns of each market‘s African traders. We then will study the steps 
                                               
45 Available from www.slavevoyages.org. The Voyages dataset will be used throughout this thesis, and 
any slaving voyages mentioned will use the unique voyage identification number taken from the 
database, with the prefix ―Voyages Database” 
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Davenport took to overcome the two regions‘ differences by investigating his 
partnership formations and business strategies in Liverpool.  
Chapter three will consider the controversial profitability question by 
comparing and contrasting Davenport‘s investments and profits from a number of 
different industries. We will begin by analysing how Davenport organised his firm to 
maximise his slaving profits. We then will assess Davenport‘s slave trading profits by 
calculating returns from 110 of his slaving voyages. In the final section, Davenport‘s 
slaving profits will be compared to his earnings from non-slaving investments 
allowing us, for the first time, to consider the investment portfolio of a Liverpool 
slaving merchant. 
Finally, we will question whether Davenport‘s career is representative of 
Liverpool‘s wider merchant community. Can Davenport be considered an exemplar of 
a ―typical‖ slaving merchant? If so can we consider Davenport‘s slaving profits and 
business model as indicative of Liverpool‘s entire slaving industry? Alternatively, 
was Davenport an exceptional character, completely unrepresentative of the Liverpool 
slaving merchant community? 
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Chapter One: William Davenport and the Liverpool Slaving 
Merchant Community 
 
William Davenport was born on 8 October 1725 into a gentry family 
established in Cheshire since the Norman conquest. Aged sixteen, Davenport 
apprenticed to Liverpool merchant William Whaley, with whom he served a seven 
year indenture, training in the grocery and Africa trades. At the end of his service in 
1748, Davenport established himself as an independent merchant, and for the next 
forty years he specialised in the African slave trade, with the 1760s and 1770s 
marking the peak years of his career. After the American Revolutionary War, 
Davenport reduced his investments, finally retiring in 1786. He died eleven years 
later, a bachelor aged seventy-three, and bequeathed his fortune to his brother, 
nephew and niece.  
William Davenport was one of Liverpool‘s most important slave trading 
merchants. Throughout his thirty-eight year career as a ship owner, he invested in 163 
slaving ventures, more than any other merchant in the history of the Liverpool slave 
trade. These vessels carried nearly 40,000 Africans to the Americas, and involved a 
personal investment from Davenport of £127,000, equivalent to £10 million sterling 
today.
1
 Davenport‘s lengthy involvement in the slave trade, coupled with his 
substantial personal investment made him one of the largest and most ubiquitous 
slaving merchants of his day.  
Focusing on Davenport‘s life and business career, this chapter will place 
William Davenport in the context of the rise of Liverpool and the growing size and 
wealth of the town‘s slaving merchant community. We will begin by charting the 
growth of Liverpool during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
showing how the town emerged as a slaving port. We then will chronicle Davenport‘s 
life and career, from his youth, to his apprenticeship and career as a slaving merchant, 
and then eventually to his retirement and death. Finally we will establish Davenport‘s 
place in the Liverpool slaving merchant community by considering his status 
compared to both his contemporaries and those merchants who succeeded him.  
* 
                                               
1 Laurence H.Officer, ―Purchasing Power of British Pounds from 1264 to Present,‖ Measuring Worth, 
2009, available from http://www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/ 
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Had William Davenport been born in 1625, rather than 1725, he would have 
not have chosen Liverpool as a place to make his fortune. In the early seventeenth 
century, Liverpool was a fishing hamlet nestled on the muddy banks of the Mersey 
and peopled by just 2,000 people.
2
 The only advantage Liverpool possessed was its 
position ―commodiously seated on the goodly river Mersey‖ giving it easy access to 
the Irish Sea.
3
 As a result, trade with Ireland, and to a lesser extent France, formed the 
backbone of Liverpool‘s early commerce. Liverpool‘s vessels freighted textiles, salt 
and manufactures abroad, in exchange for leather, grain, butter, wine and, most 
importantly, linen yarn—a crucial commodity for Lancashire‘s budding textile 
industry.
4
 However, this small amount of trade, carried out by just ten ships per month 
even as late as the 1660s, formed but a fraction of Britain‘s overseas commerce, with 
London‘s shipping dwarfing that of the ―outport‖. Liverpool, then, was little more 
than a village for much of the seventeenth century.  
The expansion of neighbouring Lancashire and Cheshire‘s industries in the 
1670s spurred Liverpool‘s expansion beyond its humble beginnings. Cheshire had 
long been a centre for British salt production, and Liverpool merchants had exported 
the commodity to the Newfoundland fisheries as early as 1600.
5
 In 1670, the 
discovery of rock salt at nearby Marbury created a surge in the industry.
6
 Liverpool 
offered the ideal outlet for Cheshire‘s salt to be processed and then exported to the 
rest of Britain and her colonies thanks to its proximity to the salt fields and to Ireland. 
As a result, Liverpool‘s salt exports increased ten fold between 1670 and 1700.7 As 
salt boilers demanded fuel for their fires, an expansion in the Lancashire coal industry 
                                               
2 Brian Refford, "The Bonds of Trade: Liverpool Slave Traders, 1695-1775" (PhD, Lehigh University, 
2005), p.10; William Enfield, An Essay Towards the History of Leverpool, 2nd ed., (London: 1774), 
pp.12-14  
3 Quoted in Jenny Kermode, Janet Hollinshead, and Malcolm Gratton, "Small Beginnings: Liverpool 
1207-1680," in Liverpool 800 : Culture, Character and History, ed. John Belchem, (Liverpool: 2006), 
p.109 
4 H.R. Fox Bourne, English Merchants: Memoirs in Illustration of the Progress of British Commerce, 2 
vols., vol. 2, (London: 1866), p.45; James A. Picton, Memorials of Liverpool, Historical and 
Topographical, Including a History of the Dock Estate, 2 vols., vol. 2, (London: 1873), p.4 
5 Thomas Baines, History of the Commerce and Town of Liverpool and of the Rise of Manufacturing 
Industry in the Adjoining Counties, (London: 1852), p.9 
6 Barker, "Lancashire Coal, Cheshire Salt and the Rise of Liverpool", p.84 
7 Salt exports rose from 26,000 bushels in the period 1670-79, to 30,000 bushels in 1680-88 and then to 
239,000 bushels in 1689-96 (Paul Clemens, "The Rise of Liverpool, 1665-1750", The Economic 
History Review, vol. 29, no. 2, (May 1976), p.212).  
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also occurred, so that by the late seventeenth century Liverpool exported large 
quantities of coal and salt throughout Britain and northern Europe.
8
    
The 1670s also witnessed Liverpool‘s shift into the burgeoning Atlantic 
plantation markets. Taking advantage of an increasing demand for sugar, coupled 
with a rapidly falling price, Liverpool traders dispatched ships to the West Indies, 
principally to Barbados, to freight sugar back to markets in northern England. Crucial 
to this development was Liverpool‘s long standing ties to Ireland because, as Paul 
Clemens has shown, in the late seventeenth century ―Ireland‘s human and agricultural 
resources proved increasingly critical to West Indian planters.‖9 Liverpool merchants 
took advantage of these resources by creating a ―triangular pattern‖ whereby their 
vessels exchanged Liverpool‘s traditional exports—salt, coal and manufactures—in 
Ireland for produce and indentured servants, and then carried them to the West Indies 
to be traded for sugar.
10
 Using this same triangular route, Liverpool also shifted into 
the Virginia tobacco trade, transporting indentured servants to frontier lands in the 
Middle Colonies, and returning with lower grade, but still marketable, leaf tobacco.
11
  
Liverpool‘s hasty transformation into an international trading port created a 
shipping boom. In 1672, 2,600 tons were registered to the port, almost all of which 
engaged in the Irish trade. Thirty years later, that figure had tripled to 8,600 tons, with 
many of those vessels being larger brigs or snows destined for the Atlantic seaboard.
12
 
The Liverpool town council highlighted the growth of Liverpool and her shipping in a 
1699 petition to the King, requesting that the town be designated a separate parish 
from neighbouring Prescott: ―Liverpool was formerly a fishing village… but has now 
the third part of the trade of England, and pays upwards of 50,000l. per annum to the 
King.‖13  
To accommodate this expansion in shipping Liverpool‘s common council 
ambitiously voted in 1709 for the construction of the world‘s first commercial wet 
dock. For the relatively small port town of Liverpool to finance the first wet dock 
ahead of London, Bristol, and the other bustling ports of Europe, required, as 
                                               
8
 Ibid., p.217 
9 Ibid., p.214 
10 Kermode, Hollinshead, and Gratton, "Liverpool 1207-1680," p.86; Francis Edwin Hyde, Liverpool 
and the Mersey: An Economic History of a Port, 1700-1970, (Newton Abbot: 1971), p.12  
11 Clemens, "Rise of Liverpool", pp.214-215 
12 Jane Longmore, "Civic Liverpool: 1680-1800," in Liverpool 800 : Culture, Character and History, 
ed. John Belchem, (Liverpool: 2006), p116; a snow or ―snauw‖ is a large two-masted sailing vessel.  
13
 Quoted in Bourne, English Merchants, p.46 
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Longmore rightly argues, ―Entrepreneurial flair, embryonic civic pride, political skill, 
and self-interest.‖14 The dock scheme‘s ambition matched the scale of proposed work: 
the wet dock comprised a large self contained water filled concrete basin, measuring 
195 yards by 95 yards, constructed near the water so as to allow an outlet to the sea. 
The project took seven years and nearly £50,000 to complete, a substantial sum 
mortgaged on Liverpool‘s common property.15 The town council‘s gamble paid off 
when a new district of streets, warehouses and industry sprung up around the Old 
Dock site, transforming the formerly water logged area into a flourishing commercial 
district, and marking Liverpool as an ambitious and forward looking city.
16
  
Liverpool merchants looked to the African slave trade to further expand the 
town‘s horizons. In 1699 John Earle and William Clayton financed Liverpool‘s first 
Guineamen, the ship Union.
17
 At least seven further vessels plied the Guinea trade in 
1700-1702 before the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713).
18
 
However, competition hindered Liverpool‘s burgeoning African trade. London 
merchants maintained control over the seventeenth century slave trade thanks its 
government monopoly under the Royal Africa Company and a series of forts in the 
Gambia River, the Sierra Leone region, along the Gold Coast, and at Ouidah 
(Whydah). Once parliament opened the Africa trade to private enterprise in 1698, 
Bristol merchants pushed aggressively into parts of the Guinea coast where the 
Company did not maintain forts, such as the Bight of Biafra.
19
  
Lacking commercial networks on the African coast, Liverpool‘s entry into the 
slave trade began slowly: just nine vessels are known to have sailed to the Guinea 
coast in the first ten years of the eighteenth century. By dispatching ships to the less 
                                               
14 Longmore, "Civic Liverpool: 1680-1800," p.121 
15 Brooke, Liverpool as It Was, p.97; The cost of the works included £30,000 for the construction of the 
dock itself, and £20,000 ―for the building of warehouses offices, commercial buildings and dock 
appurtenances‖ (Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey, p.14) 
16 Hyde notes that this ―small building boom‖ engrossed private capital ―variously estimated at between 
£100,000, and £120,000.‖ (Ibid., p.14) 
17 There may have been two prior voyages before the Union (Voyages Database 24275) in 1696. 
However, the names of the ships and their masters are unknown (Voyages Database 21236 and 21237).   
18 There were three documented voyages in 1700 (Voyages Database 15122, 24240 and 25242), three 
in 1701 (Voyages Database 15124, 15123 and 20237), and only one in 1702 (Voyages Database 
15110). There appears to have then been a lull in the Liverpool slave trade until 1710, after which time 
the volume of slaving vessels substantially increased year on year. 
19 Parliament ended the Royal African Company‘s monopoly in 1698 by opening up the slave trade to 
―separate traders‖ —merchants unaffiliated to the company— on the proviso that they paid a ten 
percent duty on exports to Africa. After a 1709 Board of Trade enquiry found that the separate traders 
had exceeded the RAC‘s volume of slaves exported, the ten percent tax was allowed to lapse creating, 
in effect, a free trade (James A. Rawley and Stephen D. Behrendt, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A 
History, Rev. ed., (Lincoln: 2005), pp.140-141). 
17 
frequented, and hence lower cost, areas of the African coast, however, Liverpool‘s 
merchants rapidly expanded the town‘s share of the slave trade. In the 1720s forty-
two slaving voyages sailed for Africa, or seven percent of the national total. In the 
1730s Liverpool merchants outfitted 197 voyages, twenty-seven percent of Britain‘s 
Africa ventures.
20
 War with France and Spain in the War of the Austrian Succession 
(1739-1748) enabled Liverpool to gain ascendancy. The war proved a disaster for 
London and Bristol slaving merchants as their vessels left port into the privateer 
infested English Channel. Liverpool vessels, by contrast, enjoyed a relatively safe 
passage north of Ireland.
21
 As a result, Liverpool‘s share of the African slave trade 
rose from 8,000 captives shipped in 1740, to 11,000 in 1748, whilst Bristol‘s declined 
from 10,000 to 8,000 in the same period. London‘s fall was even more dramatic: the 
port‘s merchants carried off 3,400 African captives at the beginning of the war, and 
just 1,200 at its conclusion.
22
 As Rawley noted, 1744 marked ―the pivotal year… 
when the number of Liverpool ships clearing for Africa exceeded the number from 
Bristol, and every year thereafter Liverpool outdistanced Bristol.‖23 
In just seventy years from 1670 until 1740, then, Liverpool‘s merchants had 
expanded the port‘s commercial trade throughout the globe, and stood poised to 
aggressively overtake Bristol and London as the pre-eminent British slave trading 
port. Such was the rapid expansion of trade that in the period 1702-1744 Liverpool‘s 
tonnage tripled to 20,900 tons.
24
 The town‘s booming trading fortunes affected a 
physical transformation. Even at the turn of the eighteenth century the town‘s 
buildings had been crude, two storey stone structures with rough shingle roofs and 
dim windows, squeezed into a cramped footprint of just twenty-four streets by the 
Pool, an inlet of water running up from the river Mersey. Having only been declared a 
separate parish in 1699, Liverpool could count only one church—St Nicholas‘—and 
the other public buildings looked unsophisticated and ramshackle.
25
 Yet by the middle 
of the eighteenth century, the town could count no less than 222 ―streets, lanes and 
                                               
20 Kenneth Morgan, "Liverpool's Dominance in the British Slave Trade, 1740-1807," in Liverpool and 
Transatlantic Slavery, ed. David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz, and Anthony Tibbles, (Liverpool: 
2007), p.14 
21
 Ibid., p.20 
22 Slave volumes are taken from the Voyages Database 
23 Rawley and Behrendt, Transatlantic Slave Trade,  p.177 
24 Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey,  p.235-36 
25 As Kermode et al point out, Liverpool‘s ―principal buildings‖ in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century were in a poor state of repair: ―The castle was ruined, the More Old Hall antiquated 
and the chapel of St. Mary del Key decrepit‖ (Kermode, Hollinshead, and Gratton, "Liverpool 1207-
1680," p.109)  
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alleys‖, three new churches, a new exchange ―which…for its size is not to be 
paralleled in Europe,‖26 a new infirmary, and the large and imposing Blue Coat 
School (a charity home for children), in addition to numerous chapels and alms 
houses.
27
 Liverpool, declared the author of a 1753 guidebook to the town, was ―the 
most flourishing Sea-port, (next to [London]) in Great Britain.‖28 Inhabiting this 
―noisy, dirty, busy community‖ were 18,000 people, most of whom had come like 
William Davenport, to boom town Liverpool as migrants, enticed by the opportunity 
to make a trading fortune, and encouraged by the town‘s openness to strangers.29   
* 
Aged sixteen, Davenport arrived in Liverpool in May 1742 where he was to be 
―fitted for business & to make my fortune.‖30 Davenport had been born in Red Lion 
Square London in 1725, to Davies Davenport I and Phoebe Ward,
31
 the fourth of a 
brood that would eventually grow to eleven children.
32
 The Davenport family, a line 
of gentry reaching back to the Norman Conquest, held long standing ties to Cheshire 
in their capacity as the Chief Foresters of Leek and Macclesfield, and major 
landholders in the area.
33
 Capesthorne, a large country manor near Macclesfield, came 
into the Davenport family estate in 1726 through the death of Penelope Ward‘s 
brother John. When the Davenport‘s inherited the title, a new hall was already under 
construction at Capesthorne, work that would not be completed until 1732.
34
 It is 
hence likely that William Davenport was born in London, rather than Cheshire, 
                                               
26 R. Williamson, The Liverpool Memorandum Book; or Gentleman's, Merchant's and Tradesman's 
Daily Pocket Journal, (Liverpool: 1753), p.7 
27 Quoted in Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey,  p.22 
28 Williamson, The Liverpool Memorandum Book, p.7 
29 Population figures are taken from Enfield, History of Liverpool, p.28; Such was the influx of 
outsiders, that the migrant population quickly eclipsed the native Liverpudlians; throughout the 
eighteenth century migrants accounted for over two thirds of Liverpool‘s population growth 
(Longmore, "Civic Liverpool: 1680-1800,"  p.119). 
30 William Davenport to John Ward, Liverpool, 22 May 1742, BDM 
31 Sir Bernard Burke, A Genealogical and Heraldic Dictionary of the Landed Gentry of Great Britain 
and Ireland, 4th ed., 2 vols., vol. 1, (London: 1862), pp 343-44 
32 Genealogical information has been taken from a Davenport family tree produced from the resources 
available at www.ancestry.com. Davenport‘s siblings were, in order of age, John (1722-c.1724), Davies 
(1723-1757), Ann (1724-?), Philip (1726-1727), Phoebe (1728-1741), Richard (1729-1799), 
Christopher (1730-1793), Thomasina (1732-1766), Thomas (1733-1786), and Charles (1735-1767). 
33
 Richard Cavendish, "Capesthorne Hall, Cheshire", History Today, vol. 47, no. 12, (Dec. 1997), p.62; 
Stella Davies notes that the Davenports were the largest landholders in the Macclesfield region, a 
position they consolidated by substantially increasing their holding throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries so that by 1879 the family held 10,166 acres (C Stella Davies, The Agricultural 
History of Cheshire 1750-1850, (Manchester: 1960) pp.28-29; Keith Giles, The Bromley-Davenport 
Papers: The Tenants of a Cheshire Estate 1700-1900, (Auckland: 1999) p.5)  
34 Anonymous, ―Capesthorne Hall: History‖, Capesthorne Hall, 2009, available from 
http://www.capesthorne.com/history.html.  
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because Capesthorne Hall had not yet been completed. Alternatively, the family may 
have been in the capital so that William‘s father Davies could pursue his legal 
career.
35
 
At some point towards the end of the 1730s, possibly upon the death of his 
father Davies in May 1740, William Davenport returned to Cheshire and took up 
residence at Capesthorne.
36
 Little is known of William Davenport‘s youth there. It is 
likely, however, that he enjoyed a privileged upbringing. As the younger brother of 
Davies Davenport II, heir to the Davenport fortune, William could not remain at 
Capesthorne and enjoy the life of the landed gentleman. John Ward, Davenport‘s 
maternal grandfather and guardian following the death of his father, looked for a trade 
in which his grandson could make his fortune. Ward maintained a connection to 
Liverpool grocer William Whaley from whom he purchased imported luxury 
foodstuffs.
37
 When William Davenport came of age, Ward asked Whaley to take the 
young lad on as an apprentice in Liverpool and teach him the ―art, mastery and 
business‖ of merchant accounts.38 
William Whaley had himself come to Liverpool as a young Lancashire 
gentleman around the turn of the century.
39
 In addition to his grocery business, 
Whaley operated in the Chesapeake trade, shipping manufactured goods to the 
colonies in exchange for tobacco. He also speculated in the slave trade, sending a 
single vessel, Saint George, to the Guinea Coast every year to ship 150 enslaved 
                                               
35 Davies Davenport I is listed by Burke as a ―Barrister-at-law of the Inner Temple, London‖ (Burke, 
Genealogical and Heraldic Dictionary, p.311). 
36 Davenport‘s mother Phoebe died in November 1737. By age fourteen William Davenport was thus 
an orphan. 
37 The Davenport family were also connected to John Knight, one of Liverpool‘s principal slaving 
merchants in the 1750s and 1760s. In May 1752, for example, William Davenport wrote to his brother 
Davies that ―Messrs Whaley, Knight & [Edward] Dean‖ wanted to pay him a visit at Capesthorne 
(William Davenport to Davies Davenport, Liverpool, 8 May 1752, BDM).  
38 The phrase ―art, mastery and business‖ is taken from the apprenticeship forms of Christopher 
Davenport, William‘s younger brother, who came to Liverpool in 1747. The indenture was a standard 
legal document and therefore it is reasonable to assume that William Davenport‘s own apprenticeship 
would have the same phrase included. (―Indenture of Christopher Davenport‖, Liverpool, 29 August 
1747, BDM)  
39
 A receipt in the Clerk Hill Muniments at the Lancashire Record Office (DDG 1/3, 7/1/1722) states 
that William Whaley was living in Liverpool in 1722 when he received a £1,000 dowry from his 
marriage to Esther Baldwin. The same document describes Whaley as a ―merchant, son and heir of 
Ralph Whaley of Blackburn, gentleman.‖ Whaley must thus have come to Liverpool from Blackburn 
prior to 1722. The Lancashire parish records record Whaley‘s marriage to have occurred on 18 Dec 
1722 at St Mary the Virgin in Blackburn (―Ancestor Search in the County of Lancashire‖, Lancashire 
Online Parish Clerks, 2009, available from http://www.lan-opc.org.uk/Search/indexp.html) implying 
that Whaley maintained a close connection to his home town even after fixing himself in Liverpool.  
20 
Africans to the Americas.
40
 Whaley‘s participation in the tobacco and slave trades 
placed him in the upper echelon of Liverpool‘s merchant families as both trades 
required sums of capital. In the 1740s a hundred ton slaving vessel like Saint George 
required approximately £3,000 to purchase and fit out. Similarly the start up capital 
for a tobacco trading firm ranged from £5,000 to £10,000, sums that exceeded the 
means of even middling merchants, making the slave and tobacco trades the preserve 
of elite traders.
41
 William Whaley‘s firm, however, was by no means the largest or 
most prestigious in Liverpool. Foster Cunliffe & Sons, for example, owned shares in 
twenty-six vessels trading to Africa, the Americas, and Europe, in addition to five 
tobacco stores in Maryland ―remitting between 500 and 1600 hogsheads of tobacco 
annually‖; and the Gildarts‘ company exceeded Foster Cunliffe & Sons firm in size.42 
Even these great Liverpool houses were eclipsed by the tobacco firms in London, 
where merchant tycoons carried on a booming trade with the North American 
colonies. William Whaley‘s merchant house was thus in the upper reaches, but far 
from the summit, of Britain‘s trading hierarchy.  
Joining a prestigious trading firm such as Whaley‘s required substantial sums 
of money. Davenport‘s seven year apprenticeship cost £120, paid for by his 
grandfather, a fee that acted as a barometer to the quality of the apprenticeship.
43
 In 
London apprenticeship fees could reach as high as £500 to place an aspiring youth in 
the East India or Levant companies. These, however, represented the top fees: 
middling craft trades cost between £10 and £30 to join, just within the reaches of a 
well to do yeoman family.
44
 The sum of £120, by contrast, exceeded all but the richest 
families. Moreover, the initial fee did not include the maintenance of the apprentice, 
which added an extra £25 per annum to the apprenticeship, slightly more than the 
                                               
40Voyages Database 90056, 90057, 90058, 90059, 90054; Whaley‘s participation in the Africa trade 
may have been what attracted Davenport to his firm. For example, when considering a merchant house 
for his brother Christopher to serve his apprenticeship with, William Davenport wrote to his 
grandfather advising him that John Welch, a local linen draper and ―churchman,‖ would be ideal as he 
was ―pretty much concerned in the Guinea and West India trade, which may be further useful & 
beneficial to my brother‖ (William Davenport to John Ward, Liverpool, 6 June 1746, BDM). 
41 Jacob M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade: The View from the Chesapeake, 1700-
1776, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1980), p.41 
42 Tyler, "Foster Cunliffe and Sons", p 246-247  
43 Richardson, ―The Accounts of William Davenport,‖ p.61 
44
 Refford, "Bonds of Trade" p.118  
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wages of a common working man, but easily affordable sums for the wealthy 
Davenports.
45
  
Having fixed himself in Liverpool, Davenport began his training as a grocer. 
Although the term ―grocer‖ now refers to a retailer of any foodstuffs, the eighteenth 
century grocery trade only encompassed foreign produce such as sugar, tobacco, 
citrus fruit and tea.
46
 The luxury status of these items made the grocery trade the 
preserve of upper class traders.
47
 Moreover, the grocery trade provided an excellent 
education for an aspiring merchant. Adam Smith declared that ―Besides possessing a 
little capital‖ the grocer 
must be able to read, write and account, and must be a tolerable judge too of, 
perhaps, fifty or sixty different sorts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the 
markets where they are to be had the cheapest. He must have all the 
knowledge, in short that is necessary for a great merchant.
48
 
 
The skills learnt as a grocer transferred to the Africa trade. Slave trading merchants 
had to draw together trading assortments of thirty or more different commodities, and 
assess their quality and value to African middlemen. Like the grocer, the Africa 
merchant also had to correspond with traders spread throughout the globe: they 
communicated orders for goods to European manufacturers, sent specific instructions 
to ship captains, and arranged slave sales with American factors. 
As an apprentice in Whaley‘s merchant house, William Davenport became 
well acquainted with an intricate web of customers, suppliers and employees. 
Merchants expected their apprentices to accustom themselves with their business by 
spending as much of their time as possible in the company offices, dining with their 
                                               
45 The annual maintenance has been estimated from records of Christopher "Kit‖ Davenport‘s 
apprenticeship. William Davenport acted as Kit‘s purser, receiving cash from their grandfather John 
Ward and paying it over to Kit‘s creditors as and when needed. These payments are detailed in William 
Davenport‘s personal cash book, commencing on 1 June 1747. The first transaction is Kit‘s initial 
apprenticeship fee of £120. In addition to his fee, Kit‘s ―board and schooling‖ at a Mr Pulford‘s house 
cost the family £20 per annum. Kit also received French lessons from David Jefferies for just over £2. 
Finally, incidental expenditures such as the cleaning and mending of clothes cost an extra £3. 
Presumably William Davenport received the same schooling and allowance for his own apprenticeship. 
(Personal Cash Book 1747-1760, Liverpool, D/DAV/2, ff.4,10,17)  
46 Doctor Johnson defines the grocer as ―a man who buys and sells tea, sugar and plums for spices for 
gain‖ and grocery as ―tea, sugar, raisins, spice‖ (Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English 
Language, vol. 1, (London: 1755), p.944). 
47 In 1753, for example, Davenport was selling a pound of tea for nine shillings; one hundred oranges 
for two and a half shillings; and a pound of ginger for a shilling. Given that a common man could earn, 
on average, just under a shilling a day, these items were out of the reach of all but the upper classes 
(Waste Book 1745-1766, Liverpool, ODAV, ff.81,87,88). 
48 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, (London: 
1776), p.138 
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masters and running errands to their merchant associates. When not at work, masters 
made their apprentices fill their spare time reading through the firm‘s 
correspondence.
49
 Later in his apprenticeship Davenport would also have written to 
Whaley‘s correspondents in his own name. In this way Whaley ensured that 
Davenport achieved one of the crucial objectives of apprenticeship: developing a 
network of business contacts that he could draw upon once a merchant in his own 
right.  
Whaley further inducted Davenport into the Africa trade by encouraging him 
to invest in slaving vessels during the final two years of his apprenticeship. In April 
1747 Davenport wrote to John Ward that he was in ―ye latter end of my 
apprenticeship and am obliged to go into company pretty often.‖50 Four months later 
he requested money from his grandfather to make his first investment in the slave 
trade, writing that ―Mr Whaley tells me 7 or £800 will be enough and cannot do with 
less.‖51 Davenport‘s start up capital matched that received by other apprentices. 
Christopher Hasell, another Cheshire gentleman who apprenticed in 1753 to merchant 
John Blackburn, received £1,000 to fit him out for business.
52
 Similarly, George 
Clowes, another of Whaley‘s apprentices, was ―fitted out very handsomely‖ by his 
family.
53
 Davenport‘s £700 may have been a relatively minor investment in the slave 
trade given that vessels cost up to £5,000 to fit out, but compared to the average 
man‘s wages of just £20 per annum these were astronomical sums accessible to only a 
privileged few.  
Having received a cash injection from his family, Davenport invested his 
capital in the newly constructed ship Chesterfield, destined for Angola, and the Saint 
George, outfitting for Bonny. Davenport‘s investments in two slaving vessels at just 
twenty-two years of age was unusual. The vast majority of Liverpool merchants made 
                                               
49 The instructions for the employees and apprentices of Herries & Company of London had as general 
rule number seventeen, for example, ―In order to have a right Notion of the thread of the Business… 
they must at their spare moments read all the Letters received & wrote by the House‖ (Jacob M. Price, 
"Directions for the Conduct of a Merchant Counting House, 1766", Business History, vol. 28, no. 3, 
(1986), p.141). 
50 William Davenport to John Ward, Liverpool, 14 April 1747, BDM 
51
 William Davenport to John Ward, Liverpool, 29 August 1747, BDM; In addition to the money 
received from his grandfather, Davenport seems to have drawn heavily on his extended family by 
borrowing cash from them on interest. In October and November 1747, Davenport received from ―Mrs 
Egerton‖, his aunt, £450 ―on bond.‖ In October 1749 he took out a further mortgage of £300 from Mr 
John Broomfield (Personal Cash Book 1747-1760, Liverpool, D/DAV/2, ff.1,3,12). 
52 M.M. Schofield, "A Good Fortune: The Marriage of Christopher Hassell of Liverpool, Merchant 
1765", Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 138, (1989), p.85 
53
 William Davenport to John Ward, Liverpool, 14 April 1747, BDM. 
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their first slaving investment in their early to mid thirties, well after they had 
established themselves as resident merchants.
54
 Even men who apprenticed at a 
similar age to Davenport did not invest in the slave trade until later in their careers. 
The Heywood brothers Arthur and Benjamin, for example, came from their native 
Ireland in 1731 and 1741, respectively, binding themselves apprentice to Guinea 
merchants. Yet they invested in the slave trade at the ages of twenty-seven and thirty-
three. The sons of existing Liverpool slaving merchants were the exception to this rule 
whereby thirty was a benchmark age to first invest in the Guinea trade. The Earles, 
Tarletons and Crosbies all introduced the sons of the family to the business early, 
making them partners in vessels from as young as eighteen. Other young investors, 
such as Thomas Staniforth, Thomas Foxcroft, George Hutton and Richard Wickstead, 
came from affluent backgrounds being, like Davenport, the sons of gentlemen.
55
  
Davenport‘s family wealth played a crucial part in establishing him as a 
youthful Africa merchant. Without the support of his rich family, Davenport would 
have had to earn his slaving capital in another industry, preventing him from joining 
the slave trade until his late twenties or early thirties. With the backing of his 
grandfather, however, Davenport could establish himself as a partner in Whaley‘s 
firm, and hence gain a foothold in Liverpool‘s slaving merchant community from the 
age of twenty-two. Davenport‘s family connections would continue to serve him well 
throughout his career: younger brothers Christopher, Thomas and Richard Davenport 
each invested in their brother William‘s slaving ventures at various times, 
contributing as much as £40,000 in capital.
56
  
 
In September 1749 William Davenport received the freedom of Liverpool.
57
  
Freeman status allowed Davenport to cast a vote in elections and to trade in his own 
name, establishing him in Liverpool‘s small elite: in 1749 22,000 people populated 
                                               
54 The following is based upon the biographical data collected by David Pope in his study of 
Liverpool‘s leading slave traders (Pope, "Wealth and Social Aspirations," pp.194-207) combined with 
the ownership data from the Voyages Database.  
55 Ibid.,  
56 The brothers were involved in the following number of voyages, with their period of trading in 
parenthesis: Christopher, thirty-seven (1753-1777); Richard Davenport, eleven (1768-1772); Thomas 
Davenport, thirteen (1774-1780); (Voyages Database and Davenport papers).  
57 Davenport spent £1,1 on 15 September 1749 for ―Fine, Fees & treating officers at being sworn a 
freeman of Liverpool‖ (Personal Cash Book 1747-1760, D/DAV/2, f.19). 
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Liverpool, of whom just 2,000 possessed freeman status.
58
 Davenport continued to 
trade in partnership with Whaley after gaining freeman status. As Perry Gauci argues, 
new merchants faced the ―enormous task‖ of establishing themselves in a highly 
competitive and tightly intertwined commercial community.
59
 Remaining with one‘s 
master allowed the former apprentice to cultivate business contacts and to grow their 
often meagre capital into a sufficient sum to start up their own firm. Davenport 
certainly needed to improve his capital stock before he could strike out on his own. 
On the day he received his freedom Davenport held no more than £1,000 in liquid 
assets, and had £600 tied up in slaving vessels, more than enough to invest in further 
slaving shares, but an insufficient amount to secure goods on credit for an 
independent venture, an important factor in the Africa trade (see chapter three).
60
  
After a further four years and five slaving ventures, William Davenport, in 
1753, established his own trading partnership. In that year, William Davenport, 
together with his younger brother Christopher, Lawrence Spencer, Thomas Rumbold, 
and Thomas Foulkes, purchased the ninety-two ton ship Charming Nancy for the 
Gambia market.
61
 William Davenport & Company was by no means a large slaving 
firm. The Gambia market required a low level of investment, as small, inexpensive 
vessels of less than one hundred tons could trade at the river.
62
 As a result, minor 
traders and inexperienced partnerships seeking returns on speculative investments 
often traded there. Slaving firms trading to other, larger regions dwarfed Davenport‘s 
company. In the same year as Davenport sent Charming Nancy to Gambia for 170 
enslaved Africans, Liverpool‘s two largest slaving firms—John Knight & Company 
and John Welch & Company—each sent four large ships to the Guinea coast, carrying 
to the Americas 2,500 captives. At the same time, Knight and Welch each financed 
five vessels to sail directly to the Americas for sugar and tobacco. Davenport, by 
contrast, had no investments in non-slaving vessels.
63
 
Whilst small by contemporary standards, Davenport‘s firm was remarkable for 
the backgrounds of its investors. His partnership was comprised entirely of young 
                                               
58
 Population figure is from Enfield, History of Liverpool, p.28; The number of Freemen is from Picton, 
Memorials of Liverpool, p.202 
59 Perry Gauci, The Politics of Trade : The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660-1720, 
(Oxford: 2001), p.73 
60 Personal Cash Book 1747-1760, Liverpool, D/DAV/2, f.14 
61 Voyages Database 90478 
62 Refford, "Bonds of Trade" p.220 
63
 Williamson, The Liverpool Memorandum Book, pp.17-19 
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men his own age; none of the partners were older than thirty-one.
64
 The youthful 
character of William Davenport & Company made the firm something of an anomaly 
as slaving firms ordinarily contained a mix of experienced and inexperienced 
partners.
65
 Forming a company made up entirely of youthful merchants was, 
therefore, an ambitious step for both Davenport and his associates. Having limited 
experience in the Africa trade there was every chance that the vessels could be fitted 
out with a poor trading assortment, that they would choose unreliable West India 
factors, or that their captains would make a mediocre purchase on the coast, not to 
mention the risks of the sea. The fact that Davenport continued with the venture in 
spite of the risks demonstrates that he and his associates believed in their abilities, 
despite their youth.  
Soon after forming his own company, Davenport and Whaley parted ways. In 
1754, Edward Lowndes & Company, an eminent merchant house with whom Whaley 
was ―largely concerned in trade & liable to pay the partnership debts‖ folded.66 
Lowndes‘ collapse financially crippled William Whaley: prior to 1754 he had been 
one of Liverpool‘s principal slaving merchants, sending four vessels a year to Africa; 
after 1754, Whaley‘s only investment was a minor share in the Gambia ship 
Rainbow.
67
 With his finances in ruins, Whaley sold his shares in the slavers 
Chesterfield and Orrel, ending his twelve year association with William Davenport. 
Aged twenty-nine, William Davenport was now completely independent of his former 
master. 
 As an independent merchant William Davenport leased offices in Liverpool‘s 
Drury Lane, a narrow alley in the heart of Liverpool‘s commercial district.68 John 
                                               
64 When the Charming Nancy departed Liverpool on her first voyage on 26 July 1753, the ages of the 
partners were: William Davenport 27; Christopher Davenport 23; Lawrence Spencer 31; Thomas 
Rumbold 30; and Thomas Foulkes 26 (Voyages Database; Pope, "Wealth and Social Aspirations," 
pp.194-207). 
65 Davenport‘s previous investments in the Chesterfield and Saint George, for example, had been with 
Robert Hallhead and William Whaley, each of whom had twelve years experience in the trade; John 
Clayton, with nine years in the trade; Edward Lowndes, with seven years experience; Peers Legh, with 
six years experience; and John Williamson with three years (Ibid.).  
66 William Davenport to Davies Davenport, Liverpool, 15 February 1754, BDM 
67
 Voyages Database: 90465, 90466, 90467; Rainbow’s final voyage suffered a series of misfortunes 
that may have put Whaley off the Africa trade as it was his last slaving investment. (―Case of the 
Rainbow, 1758‖ in Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to 
America: The Border Colonies and Southern Colonies, 4 vols., vol. 4, (Buffalo, NY: 2002), pp.370-2) 
In 1759 Whaley disappears from Liverpool‘s slaving community. He died in 1762 (Voyages Database; 
Pope, "Wealth and Social Aspirations," p.206). 
68 Davenport moved into his Drury Lane address some time before 1766 when the first Liverpool 
directory lists him as resident there (J. Gore, The Liverpool Directory for the Year 1766, (Liverpool: 
26 
Dignan, in his 1847 satire The Slave Captain, described eighteenth century Drury 
Lane as consisting of ―the better class of private houses, mostly inhabited by captains, 
for the inroads of commerce had not changed the character of the locality.‖69  Dignan 
was correct, as no less than five captains inhabited the narrow street in 1766, in 
addition to four large slaving merchants.
70
 At its northern end Drury Lane adjoined 
with Water Street, one of Liverpool‘s major thoroughfares and ―a favourite place of 
residence for the higher class of Liverpool merchants‖ amongst whom were many of 
Liverpool‘s principal Guinea traders.71 Turning onto Water Street, Davenport‘s office 
was just one hundred yards from the Exchange, and from there the Old Dock, the 
mooring place of Africa ships, easily could be reached through the city centre.  
For the first nine years of his career as an independent merchant 1754-1763, 
Davenport invested relatively little in the African slave trade. From 1754, when he 
separated from Whaley, until 1763, when the Seven Year‘s War ended, he invested, 
on average, £1,278 per annum in slaving vessels (Figure 1). In the peak years of the 
war 1758-1760, Davenport moved away from slaving because French privateers 
captured nine of the ten vessels he held shares in.
72
 Once the war swung in favour of 
Britain, Davenport doubled his speculation in the slave trade. Even after increasing 
his slaving investment though, Davenport was still a bit player in the Liverpool slave 
trade because he worked as a general merchant, with the Africa trade forming just one 
of many investments in a varied portfolio (see chapter three). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
1766), p.10). It is reasonable to assume that Davenport moved into his own offices once he separated 
from Whaley. Hence he likely took up residence in Drury Lane some time in the mid to late 1750s. 
69 John Dignan, The Slave Captain; a Legend of Liverpool, (London: 1847), p.6 
70 The slaving merchants were Isaac Blackstock, Thomas Middleton, John Parker and Samuel Shaw. 
Parker was a close associate of Davenport, and invested alongside him on thirty-six occasions (Based 
upon the ownership data in the Voyages Database; Gore, Liverpool Directory 1766) 
71 Quoted in Picton, Memorials of Liverpool, vol.2, p.86  
72
 Based on Davenport‘s documented investments in the Voyages Database   
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Figure 1: Pounds sterling invested per annum by William Davenport in the 
Liverpool slave trade 1748-1786 
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Source: Voyages Database and the Davenport Papers. 
 
Davenport continued to operate as a small merchant in the slave trade until 
1766—the key year in his slaving career. From then onwards he substantially 
increased his speculation in the Guinea trade so that by 1771 he had tripled his slaving 
investment from its 1766 level. Specialisation played a crucial part in Davenport‘s 
rapidly expanding slaving business. By marketing his slaves to the Ceded Islands, 
French possessions handed to Britain in the peace of 1763, and shifting focus in 
Africa to the larger Bight of Biafra region, Davenport became a true specialist in the 
slave trade. At the same time he geared his Liverpool business specifically towards 
the Africa market and committed all of his resources to the slave trade (see chapter 
two). As a result, the mid 1770s marked the peak years of his slaving career, with 
£7,592 invested in slave ships in 1774 alone. Davenport‘s growing stature reflected 
itself in his physical assets: during the 1770s his company operated from a large office 
and warehouse on fashionable King Street, a wine vaults on Harrington Street, and 
from his residence in Drury Lane.
73
 
The American War abruptly halted Davenport‘s ambitions. The American 
embargo on British imports, coupled with a collapse in planter credit put Liverpool‘s 
―once extensive trade to Africa…at a stand.‖74 Although many Liverpool merchants 
                                               
73 John Gore, Gore's Liverpool Directory, for the Year 1774, (Liverpool: 1774), p.16; J. Gore, Gore's 
Liverpool Directory for the Year 1777, (Liverpool: 1777), p.23; J. Gore, Gore's Liverpool Directory, 
(Liverpool: 1781), p.24 
74
 Anon. Liverpool General Advertiser, Liverpool, 29 September 1775 
28 
quickly abandoned the slave trade, Davenport continued to fit out slaving vessels in 
1776. Davenport perhaps took an overly optimistic view towards the American War, 
in the expectation that the army would bring a quick resolution to the conflict, an 
opinion in keeping with his family‘s Tory background.75 In November 1775, for 
example, a West Indian factor described Davenport as being ―upbeat with generosity 
and confidence.‖76 His 1776 ventures were all financial failures, however, causing 
him to rapidly withdraw his capital from the trade. Just as Davenport‘s slaving 
business had more than quadrupled in size during the boom years 1766-1776, so it 
quickly shrank during the war, from £7,787 invested in 1776 to £2,051 in 1777, and 
then to zero in 1778. In February 1777 he wrote to his West India factors that ―I have 
not a ship out nor a share in any, but a very small one in the Dalrymple as a privateer 
[and slaver], & she has been unsuccessful, & her cruize very near over.‖77 With no 
further investments in the slave trade, 1778 marked the lowest ebb of Davenport‘s 
slaving career. 
Davenport‘s absence from the Liverpool slave trade was short lived. 
Suspecting that the West Indian planters would readily purchase enslaved Africans, 
and that they could be acquired cheaply on the Guinea coast, Davenport joined with 
his close associates to fit out three slaving ventures in 1779. Davenport‘s intuition 
proved correct: the voyages proved a great success. Taking advantage of the favorable 
market conditions, Davenport quickly re-kindled his slaving career, joining in an 
upsurge in the Liverpool slave trade upon the peace of 1783.
78
 From 1783 to 1786 he 
invested in thirteen slaving ventures, the last being the ship Essex.
79
 When the Essex 
arrived in Liverpool on 12 August 1786, however, Davenport then aged sixty had 
decided to end his career in the British slave trade. 
                                               
75 Davenport‘s grandfather John Ward (1670-1749) was ―a leading Hanoverian Tory‖ Member of 
Parliament for Thetford, Norfolk (Romney Sedgewick, The History of Parliament : The House of 
Commons, 1715-1754: Members E-Y, 3 vols., vol. 3, (London: 1970), p.99). His brother Thomas 
Davenport also sat as MP for Newton, Cheshire in the period 1780-1786 and supported Tory leader 
Lord North, ―both in office and opposition‖ (Lewis Namier and John Brooke, The History of 
Parliament : The House of Commons, 1754-1790: Members a-J, 3 vols., vol. 2, (London: 1964), 
pp.302-303).   
76
 James Merson to William Davenport, Dominica, 28/11/1775, DDAV7 
77 William Davenport to Vance, Caldwell & Vance, Liverpool, 28 February 1779, D/DAV/1 
78 For example, in 1783 Liverpool slaving vessels embarked 17,396 slaves, and in 1784 29,634 (based 
upon slave embarkation volumes in the Voyages Database). 
79 Voyages Database 82974; Davenport held a 3/16ths share in another slaving vessel Perseverance 
until 1792 when he sold it to Thomas & William Earle. However, the vessel completed its last slaving 
voyage in 1785 (Voyages Database 83063), so it may have lain up, or been engaged in freighting to the 
West Indies.  
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Davenport does not state why he decided to retire in mid-1786. Perhaps he 
acted in response to the campaign to abolish the slave trade. In 1786, when 
Davenport‘s last ships were at sea, pamphlets circulated in Britain condemning the 
slave trade‘s cruelty, and in 1787 the abolitionist Thomas Clarkson visited Liverpool 
to investigate the town‘s links to the triangular trade. There he met two of 
Davenport‘s key merchant partners: Ambrose Lace and John Copeland (also spelled 
Coupland). After his meeting with the two men, Clarkson:  
began to perceive that I was known in Liverpool, as well as the object for 
which I came [abolition]. Mr. Coupland, the slave-merchant… had given the 
alarm to those who were concerned in the trade, and Captain Lace, as may be 
now easily imagined, had spread it.
80
   
 
Given Davenport‘s close ties to Copeland, Lace, and the wider merchant community, 
he undoubtedly became aware of Clarkson‘s presence in Liverpool and his designs 
against the trade. Moreover, Davenport maintained a family connection to the 
notorious Zong case that had acted as a spark for the abolitionist campaign. 
Davenport‘s younger brother Thomas had acted as a defence lawyer for the Zong’s 
insurers in 1783, and had argued that the vessel‘s owners had no right to claim 
reimbursement for the slaves cast overboard to their death.
81
 Through his brother‘s 
involvement in the Zong case, and Clarkson‘s Liverpool visit, Davenport must have 
been well aware that the building campaign against the slave trade would impact upon 
his livelihood, and perhaps result in slurs upon his character should he remain in the 
trade. 
Age also played a part in Davenport‘s retirement. At sixty Davenport was by 
now an old man, making the role of managing partner of slaving vessels a difficult 
one; having to coordinate the financing, cargo and direction of a slaving vessel was a 
taxing proposition even for a young man. Age had also taken its toll on Davenport‘s 
former partners. William Earle, with whom Davenport had invested in over fifty 
                                               
80 Thomas Clarkson, The History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the 
African Slave-Trade by the British Parliament, (London: 1808), p.380 
81 Gregson v. Gilbert (1783), 99 English Reports 1378-1865, p.629; Thomas Davenport was part of the 
firm of Davenport, Pigott & Heywood, defence attorneys for the insurers Gregson & Company; He was 
certainly not acting out of altruism towards the murdered slaves. He himself had held shares in thirteen 
of his brother William‘s voyages, the last of which was the Ann, Captain Brancker (Voyages Database 
80251), that returned to Liverpool in June 1782, just under a year before the Zong case was heard in 
court. Thomas Davenport appears to have been connected to Liverpool‘s merchant community through 
his marriage to the daughter of Robert Seel, an eminent tobacco trader in the town. 
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voyages, had retired from the trade in 1785, and died in 1788. Ambrose Lace, another 
of Davenport‘s key partners, retired in 1786, shortly before his meeting with 
Clarkson. Other partners had retired during the war such as Patrick Black, Alexander 
Nottingham, Felix Doran, John Parker and Thomas Hughes.
82
 Davenport‘s family 
members had also ceased their investment in the trade. Christopher Davenport left 
Liverpool in 1777 and took up residence in Bath after suffering financial losses and 
poor health;
83
 Richard and Thomas, William‘s other two younger brothers, had ceased 
their speculative investment in the Africa trade to pursue their legal and political 
careers.
84
  
Changes in the structure of the Liverpool slave trade may have also prompted 
Davenport‘s retirement. The period 1783-1785 saw a huge increase in the number of 
Guineamen trading from Liverpool, as the town‘s merchants sought to benefit from 
the West Indian planters renewed demand for slaves.
85
 The rush of ships to the 
Guinea coast placed a considerable strain on African markets. Peter Potter, captain of 
the Essex—Davenport‘s last venture in the slave trade—reported back to his owners 
that trade was ―very slack‖ because of the number of slave ships at Old Calabar. 
Furthermore, the 319 enslaved Africans that Potter purchased were ―old & thin‖ with 
the result that he ―had the misfortune to bury ninety‖, and twenty-four of the 
remainder were either ―in the doctors list‖ or ―thin or under size.‖86 The Essex’s 
voyage became a complete disaster for Davenport when Potter and his second mate 
were found guilty in Dominica of murdering one of the crewmen.
87
 With his only 
                                               
82 Based upon the ownership data in the Voyages Database  
83 Davenport wrote to his banker in 1779 that ―My Bro[ther] Christopher is still in Bath for his health‖ 
(William Davenport to Joseph Denison & Company, Liverpool, 26 December 1779, BDM); He 
remained there until his death on 23 May 1793 (Ledger Book 1788-1797, ODAV, ff.5,38). 
84 Both Richardson and Anderson state that Richard Davenport lived in Liverpool alongside his 
brothers William and Christopher. They presumably base this assumption on a Richard Davenport 
listed in the Liverpool directories as the owner of a mug warehouse. However, there is no evidence to 
support this assertion in the Davenport papers. In fact, Richard Davenport appears to have lived in 
London for most of his life before relocating to a substantial property at Court Garden House, Great 
Marlow, Buckinghamshire, in 1789, where he had been elected High Sheriff. Richard Davenport died 
in 1799 (Waste Book 1745-1766, Liverpool, ODAV; Waste Book 1766-1780, Liverpool, D/DAV/2). 
85 In 1780, for example, Liverpool merchants financed seventeen slaving voyages. In 1783, that number 
grew to forty-six. And in 1785, there were eighty-five Liverpool voyages (based upon the number of 
Liverpool clearances documented in the Voyages Database). 
86 Elijah Cobham to William Davenport, Dominica, 1 February 1786, D/DAV/15; Peter Potter to 
William Davenport, Dominica, 3 May 1786, D/DAV/15 
87 Potter seems to have escaped physical punishment for his crime as Lawrence Karberg wrote 
Davenport that ―Judgement was obtained [against] them[,] what the Damages may be will not be 
determined until our next Court, wch will be March or April[;] it will be a very expensive Business‖ 
(Cobham & Karberg to William Davenport & Company, Dominica, 3 July 1786, D/DAV/15). Potter 
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remaining investment in the slave trade proving fruitless, the abolitionist campaign 
gathering pace, and his own advancing years, it is hence not surprising that Davenport 
retired from the trade in 1786. 
Upon his retirement Davenport removed himself to Matthew Street in the 
north east of Liverpool, a new residence away from the bustle of the docks area but 
still close to the commercial hub of the town.
 88
 Davenport‘s decision to remain in the 
modest surroundings of Matthew Street marks him out as something of an oddity 
among the slave trading fraternity. Many of his associates moved to the ostentatious 
villages of Everton or Kirkdale upon their retirement; others marked their ascendancy 
by purchasing manors in the surrounding countryside.
89
 These Liverpool merchants 
used their wealth to mimic the aristocracy, making a clear point that they had elevated 
themselves in the social hierarchy to a position of respectability on par with the 
nobility. Davenport, by contrast, had no such need to prove his aristocratic 
credentials, given his family‘s noble birth. 
William Davenport provided himself a sizeable pension by carefully investing 
his trading fortune after his retirement. In 1786 he held £25,000 in assets, a portfolio 
that provided an annual pension of £1,200, an income placing him in the top five per 
cent of British society.
90
 Wrapping up his commercial career required little of 
Davenport‘s time. Each year he sent out drafts to former associates, settled his former 
trading debts and received cash from his own debtors. It is therefore likely that 
Davenport lived out his final years enjoying the fruits of his trading career.
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must have escaped Dominica before then because he was in Liverpool in March 1787 at the helm of the 
Iris, his last slaving voyage (Voyages Database 81913). 
88 Davenport‘s residence is listed as 40 King Street in the 1790 directory by Wosencraft, but this is 
probably his old counting house (Charles Wosencraft, The Liverpool Directory, for the Year 1790, 
(Liverpool: 1790), p.19). Gore lists Davenport‘s address in the same year as 16 Matthew Street, but 
makes no mention of his King Street address (J. Gore, Gore's Liverpool Directory, (Liverpool: 1790), 
p.45).  
89 In his description of Liverpool circa 1775, Brooke comments that ―At Everton there were a few large 
houses, some of which had been erected by merchant of opulence;‖ (Brooke, Liverpool as It Was,  
p.155). Amongst these ―merchants of opulence‖ were Africa traders Gill Slater, James Bridge, Joshua 
Rose, and William Gregson, who was ―one of the earliest merchants to reside in the outskirts of the 
town‖ (Hughes, Liverpool Banks & Bankers, p.viii). The gentrification of Liverpool‘s suburbs is clear 
from Horwood‘s map of 1803. Large residences with attendant gardens are shown belonging to John 
Backhouse, William Harper, William Earle Jr. and John Tarleton, all principal slave traders of the 
period.  
90 Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV, ff.2,3,33,34,36,37,39,40; Laurence H.Officer, 
―Purchasing Power of British Pounds from 1264 to Present‖ Measuring Worth, 2009, available from 
http://www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/ 
91 Davenport‘s chief expenses in this period were dining at £60 per annum, and £30 per annum playing 
the lottery with his brother Christopher (Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV). 
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 William Davenport died on 31 August 1797, aged seventy-two. In a town 
where only one in fifteen men could expect to live beyond seventy, he had enjoyed a 
long and prosperous life.
92
 His obituary in Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser read:   
On Thursday last, in the 73
rd
 year of his age, William Davenport, Esq. 
formerly an eminent merchant of this town. He was deservedly successful in 
his commercial pursuits which were always conducted with pleasant manners, 
strict probity and excellent punctuality.
93
 
 
Costing just ten pounds, Davenport‘s funeral was held at St. Nicholas‘ church, 
Liverpool.
94
 By the time of his death few of his business associates survived. His 
family too had been reduced to just Richard, his younger brother, and Davies, his 
nephew, both of whom inherited Davenport‘s estate. His funeral must thus have been 
a small affair attended by his few surviving friends and relatives.
95
  
* 
Viewing Davenport‘s career in its entirety, we can gauge his status in the 
Liverpool slaving merchant community by comparing his level of investment in the 
slave trade to that of his contemporaries. Two historians have recently performed 
studies of the Liverpool slave trading community. In his 2005 PhD dissertation Brian 
Refford documented the familial links, trading partnerships and status of the town‘s 
slaving merchants using the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database CD-ROM.
96
 Two 
years later, David Pope also shed new light on Liverpool‘s merchants when he 
compiled and analyzed the biographical data of 178 leading slave traders.
97
 Both 
Refford and Pope gauged the relative size and status of each merchant using the 
number of their slaving voyage investments. Using this criterion, William Davenport 
was the largest slave trading merchant in the history of the Liverpool slave trade, 
having made 163 voyage investments during his career, twelve more than his closest 
rival William Boats (Table 1). Davenport‘s large number of investments places him, 
                                               
92 Statistics are from Enfield, History of Liverpool, p.34 
93 Anon., Billinge’s Liverpool Adverstiser, Liverpool, 28 August 1797 
94 Residuary Settlement of William Davenport, Liverpool, c.1797, BDM; Richardson notes that 
Davenport was buried at St. Nicholas‘ Prescott but there is no record of this in the Lancashire Parish 
Records. 
95
 Davenport‘s funeral was especially frugal compared to that of John Bolton—an investor in 120 
slaving voyages during 1783-1807—who died in 1837. Bolton‘s coffin was ―covered with rich black 
velvet studded with silver nails‖ and accompanied by a procession of ―three hundred boys… two 
hundred and fifty Gentlemen on foot… sixty gentlemen on horse back; thirty gentlemen‘s private 
carriages in a line‖ and a number of coaches (Matthews, "John Bolton: A Liverpool Merchant, 1756-
1837", pp.112-113). 
96 Refford, "Bonds of Trade"  
97
 Pope, "Wealth and Social Aspirations,"  
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according to Refford, into a category of slaving merchants known as ―super-traders, a 
handful of merchants who participated in more than 90 slaving ventures each.‖98  
William Davenport was also one of the most committed slaving merchants 
with a career spanning thirty-eight years, a feat exceeded by just three other slaving 
merchants: William Gregson, Francis Ingram and William Boats. The length of 
Davenport‘s career is particularly impressive because it spanned two wars. Ordinarily, 
wars culled a large number of slaving merchants as heavy financial losses bankrupted 
over exposed traders. During the American War, for instance, forty-one of 
Liverpool‘s leading slaving merchants left the trade—from a pre-war merchant 
community of 158 traders—and never invested thereafter.99 Amongst the casualties 
was William James—the largest pre-war investor in the slave trade—and Thomas 
Rumbold, both of whom quit the slave trade during the war. Samuel Sandys and Miles 
Barber were less lucky: both were bankrupted.
100
 Davenport, by contrast, maintained 
his connection to the Guinea trade throughout the war, and increased his slaving 
investments in its wake.  
Although useful, viewing merchant status solely by their career length and 
number of voyage investments distorts their importance. Slaving firms ranged in size 
from sole traders to large partnerships of eight or more investors. Holdings in slaving 
vessels altered accordingly, from a one thirty-second share all the way to a whole 
share, whereby the entire cost of the voyage was met by a single merchant. Using the 
number of voyage investments as a criterion of status, a merchant taking one eighth 
shares in eight different voyages would be given eight times the importance of a 
merchant taking a whole share in a vessel. A better measure of merchant status is the 
actual amount of capital they invested in the slave trade. The level of investment for 
each merchant can be imputed by calculating an average cost per ton to outfit a 
slaving vessel, and then multiplying that cost by the total tonnage a trader invested in 
per the Voyages Database. By dividing the total voyage cost by the number of voyage 
investors, assuming that each investor takes an equal share in the vessel, we arrive at a 
total sterling investment for each slaving merchant.  
Roger Anstey is the only historian to have performed a similar exercise. As 
part of his calculation of industry wide slaving profits, Anstey used data provided by 
                                               
98 Refford, "Bonds of Trade" p.192 
99 Based upon the ownership data in the Voyages Database 
100 William Bailey, Bailey's List of Bankrupts, Dividends, and Certificates, from the Year 1772, to 
1793, vol. 2, (London: 1794), p.81 
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British slaving merchants to Parliament in the 1780s to arrive at a cost per ton of a 
slaving vessel: £25.2 per ton in 1761-1770; £28.4 in 1771-1780; £28.7 in 1781-1790; 
£30.2 in 1791-1800; and £29.3 in 1801-1807.
101
 Anstey‘s figures will be utilized, in 
addition to a pre-1761 outfitting cost of £20.7 per ton, based upon extant outfitting 
records.
102
 By utilizing Anstey‘s data in combination with the ownership information 
in the Voyages Database, we can, for the first time, assess Davenport and his 
contemporaries‘ actual sterling investments in the slave trade. 
Before we proceed, it should be pointed out that assuming an equal division of 
shares in a slaving vessel and utilizing an average outfitting cost is admittedly 
problematic because some partners took out larger shares than others, and outfitting 
costs sometimes fluctuated between ventures and slaving regions. However, we can 
gain some idea of the above calculation‘s accuracy by comparing William 
Davenport‘s sterling investment per his records, which detail actual sterling costs and 
partnership shares for 110 of his 163 voyages, to his investment in the same  voyages 
using the above calculation. On this basis, William Davenport‘s imputed sterling 
investment is £92,919, compared to his actual outlays of £96,371, yielding only a 3.5 
percent margin of error. On the assumption that the calculation is accurate, we can use 
the ownership data in the Voyages Database, and summarises the career information 
of William Davenport and the nine largest slaving merchants of his generation -
defined here as those merchants born after 1715 but before 1740, and trading between 
1740 and 1790 (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
101 Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition 1760-1810, pp.43-45; The figures Anstey 
used in his original calculation have been divided by 1.81 to account for a difference in the system of 
tonnage used in the Voyages Database. 
102 The figure is based on the trading accounts of the Chesterfield (1757); Calveley (1760); Eadith 
(1760); and Tyrell (1760)—the only extant Trading accounts from the period—all of which are in the 
Davenport papers.  
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Table 1: Ten Largest Liverpool Slave Trading Merchants, Trading c. 1740-1790 
 
Name Yr of Yr of Career  Career  Career  No.   Solo  Total £  
 Birth Death Begin End Length Inv Inv Inv 
James, William 1734 1798 1759 1777 18 140 84 519,509 
Boats, William 1716 1794 1753 1795 42 154 33 444,322 
Barber, Miles 1733 1795 1758 1788 30 74 27 206,911 
Gregson, Wm 1721 1800 1745 1793 48 142 0 155,702 
Ingram, Francis 1739 1815 1761 1804 43 109 0 131,171 
Copeland, John 1727 1792 1760 1793 33 84 15 131,467 
Davenport, Wm 1725 1797 1748 1786 38 163 0 127,044 
Rumbold, Thomas 1724 1791 1754 1783 29 75 4 112,464 
Sandys, Samuel 1732 1819 1770 1776 6 47 6 103,051 
Earle, William 1721 1788 1754 1788 34 117 0 98,700 
      1105  2,030,341 
 
Source: For Biographical information Pope, ―Wealth and Social Aspirations,‖ pp.194-210; for 
career and investment information, the Voyages Database. 
 
Using the criterion of actual capital invested, William Davenport was the 
seventh largest slave trading merchant of his generation. Slaving kingpins William 
James and William Boats dwarfed Davenport, outstripping his investment by a factor 
of four, despite investing in slightly fewer voyages. Miles Barber—a merchant 
described in 1776 as managing ―the greatest Guinea House in Europe‖—also outlaid 
seventy-five percent more on the slave trade than Davenport.
103
 James, Boats and 
Barber far exceeded Davenport because they traded in small partnerships. William 
Boats, the second largest slaving merchant by sterling investment, typically invested 
alongside just one or two other merchants: until 1777 with William Gregson; and 
from 1787 with James Percival and Thomas Seaman.
104
 Similarly, William James 
invested alongside other merchants in only one out of three ventures, and acted as a 
sole owner for a majority of his eighty-four ventures. Barber too preferred to trade 
alone or in small partnerships, and rarely partnered with more than three men. 
Davenport, by contrast, never acted as a sole trader, and typically invested alongside 
six or more other merchants, taking on average an eighth share in each voyage. As a 
result he speculated less on the slave trade, whilst at the same time backing a much 
larger number of voyages than his contemporaries.  
Davenport also invested less in the slave trade because of his specialisation in 
the Old Calabar and Cameroon markets in the eastern Bight of Biafra. These regions, 
                                               
103 Quoted in Melinda Elder, "The Liverpool Slave Trade, Lancaster and Its Environs," in Liverpool 
and Transatlantic Slavery, ed. David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz, and Anthony Tibbles, (Liverpool: 
2007), p.121 
104
 Based on the ownership data in the Voyages Database 
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although much more expensive to trade to than the small Gambia region, were 
overshadowed by the capital intensive Bonny and Gold Coast markets. At these latter 
trading locations, large burthen ships carried off sizeable cargoes of captives to be 
sold in the Americas. Gold Coast slaves, in particular, traded at a hefty premium—
often as much as twenty percent—because they were ―almost universally esteemed‖ 
in the Americas, and because British forts exercised a monopoly on their export.
105
 
Boats, Gregson and Thomas Rumbold all traded to Gold Coast or Bonny throughout 
their career, which helps to explain their leading position in the Liverpool slave trade. 
The other traders also differed in their patterns of specialisation. James and Barber 
both favoured the Sierra Leone region and Windward Coast, a stretch of coastline 
visited by smaller burthen, but still relatively expensive vessels due to the need to 
load large quantities of rice. Only William Earle matched Davenport‘s trading pattern 
with his specialisation in the Old Calabar market.  
Whilst Davenport invested less in the slave trade than many of his 
contemporaries, he was ultimately much more successful in his pursuits. When 
William Davenport died he left an estate worth £34,000, far more than any of his 
contemporaries: William Gregson had the second largest estate at £10,000, followed 
by John Copeland, Thomas Rumbold and William Earle, each of whom possessed 
£5,000; Francis Ingram owned just £1,500 on his death bed.
106
 The value of James, 
Boats, Barber and Sandys‘ estates are unfortunately unknown. We can, however, 
conjecture that Miles Barber and Samuel Sandys‘ fortune cannot have been 
particularly great because of their bankruptcy. Equally, due to financial losses in the 
American War, William James probably passed away with little to his name. William 
Boats, by contrast, was perhaps the only one of the top ten merchants to come close 
to, or even exceed, Davenport‘s sizeable estate: he willed his two daughters £13,000 
each, and probably gave his son Henry Ellis an even greater sum.
107
  
William Davenport was thus one of the most financially successful slaving 
merchants of his generation, and indeed in the entire history of the Liverpool slave 
trade: only nine of the merchants in Pope‘s analysis had estates exceeding £30,000, all 
of whom traded for slaves during the twilight years of the Liverpool slave trade, 
1788-1807. Davenport‘s longevity and broad investment in the trade seems to have 
                                               
105 Rawley and Behrendt, Transatlantic Slave Trade, p.234 
106 Residuary Settlement of William Davenport, Liverpool, c.1797, BDM; Pope, "Wealth and Social 
Aspirations," pp.208-215 
107
 Frances Wilkins, Manx Slave Traders, (Kidderminster: 1999), p.24 
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been the key to his success. Other merchants such as James, Barber and Sandys who 
attempted to push heavily into the trade in a short a period of time failed miserably 
and were hence forced to leave slaving. Davenport and the other successful merchants 
of his generation, such as Boats and Gregson, carefully spread their investment over a 
lengthy career and in doing so ensured that they would not be caught out by seismic 
shifts in the slave trade, such as the onset of war.  
Regardless of their level of success in the Africa trade, very few of the 
principal slaving merchants committed time to public service. Only William Gregson 
played a significant role in the public sphere when he served as mayor of Liverpool in 
1762-1763 and Justice of the Peace in 1769.
108
 William Boats and Thomas Rumbold 
also served upon Liverpool‘s Common Council, but their ambitions reached no higher 
than the position of Alderman. Moreover, few of the merchants volunteered for the 
numerous positions at the custom house, docks, and charitable institutions: only 
Gregson, Rumbold and Copeland served in the posts, most of which seem to have 
been filled by lesser merchants. In 1774, for example, half of the public positions 
were filled by merchants with small investments in the slave trade.
109
  
The senior merchants‘ commitment to the slave trade appears to have kept 
them out of the political sphere. Each of the leading slavers acted as managing 
partners of their vessels a task requiring a considerable amount of time, as they co-
ordinated, directed and organised the voyage (see chapter two). Davenport and 
William James, in particular, must have had few diversions outside the counting 
house given that they personally managed up to ten vessels per annum in the peak 
years of their career 1770-1775.
110
 Boats, too, managed almost all of his slaving 
voyages. Given the amount of time needed to remain highly committed to the slave 
trade, it is not surprising that we see so little of the principal slaving merchants in the 
public sphere. 
Although most of the principal slaving merchants seem to have avoided 
distractions from business, William Davenport in particular is notable for his 
reluctance to involve himself in political machinations affecting the slave trade. 
Davenport, unlike his contemporaries, never entered the Company of Merchants 
                                               
108 Hughes, Liverpool Banks & Bankers, p.109; Gomer Williams asserts that William James was an MP 
for ―some years‖. However, there is no record of this in any other history of Liverpool, or the House of 
Commons. (Williams, Liverpool Privateers, p.557) 
109 Gore, Gore's Liverpool Directory, for the Year 1774, pp.67-69 
110
 Based upon the ownership data in the Voyages Database 
38 
Trading to Africa, a body that met regularly to manage the trade. Neither did he apply 
his name to the petitions sent from Liverpool to London in support of the trade.
111
 
Such was his reluctance to involve himself in politics that in 1777, when Davenport 
numbered amongst the few merchants still trading to Africa, he refused to join the 
African Committee, a society chaired by William Gregson that considered ways to 
save the trade from ruin.
112
  
Davenport is also something of a peculiarity given his lifelong bachelorhood. 
Most of the other slaving merchants married, often choosing spouses to cement 
commercial ties. For example, William Earle married Anne Wynstanley, a union that 
connected him to fellow slaving merchants John Copeland and Robert Jennings, both 
of whom also married a Wynstanley sister.
113
 William Boats used his marriage to 
Elizabeth Brideson to bolster his trading connection to her father Paul, the leading 
importer of Guinea goods on the Isle of Man.
114
 Earle, Boats and Francis Ingram also 
used their trading wealth to improve the social standing of their offspring. In Earle‘s 
case his two sons Thomas and William Junior became scions of Liverpool‘s merchant 
elite, trading extensively with Europe and the Americas, and inducting their own sons 
into the ranks of the landed gentry.
115
 William Boats' son, Henry Ellis Boats, elevated 
himself to become an MP after attending Oxford University; similarly, Francis 
Ingram‘s son John became a lawyer after attending Cambridge.116 Despite 
Davenport‘s eligibility owing to both his wealth and birth, he had neither a wife nor 
children, and thus he left no legacy in Liverpool or Cheshire. 
 Having kept aloof from politics and without a familial legacy, William 
Davenport, unlike his contemporaries, rapidly faded into obscurity after his death. In 
1852 Clarke Aspinall released Liverpool a Few Years Since, a personal history filled 
with descriptions of Liverpool‘s burghers.117 A year later, Richard Brooke published 
Liverpool As It Was, 1775 to 1800, a vivid history of the town and its inhabitants, 
                                               
111 Richardson, "The Accounts of William Davenport," p.63; A single exception is a petition Davenport 
signed in support of the extension of Douglas Harbour, Isle of Man, in 1757 (Wilkins, Manx Slave 
Traders, p.37).  
112 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, p.562 
113
 The Wynstanley family was connected to the slaving merchant community through Daniel and 
Samuel Wynstanley, investors in eleven voyages from 1757-1761 (Voyages Database; Refford, "Bonds 
of Trade" pp.102-103). 
114 See Wilkins, Manx Slave Traders,  pp.17-24 for a detailed study of Bridson and his relationship 
with Boats. 
115 Littler, "The Earle Collection", pp.96-97  
116 Pope, "Wealth and Social Aspirations," p.180 
117
 Clarke Aspinall, Liverpool a Few Years since by an Old Stager, 3rd ed., (Liverpool: 1885) 
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compiled from his aging father‘s memories and records from the municipal archives. 
Despite Brooke and Aspinall‘s books containing colourful descriptions of many 
leading slaving merchants, both failed to make a single reference to Davenport.
118
 
Similarly, three nineteenth century historians of Liverpool Thomas Troughton, 
Thomas Baines and James A. Picton, made no mention of William Davenport.
119
 
Even Liverpool and Slavery, a book that purposely set out to detail Liverpool‘s 
slaving history, ignored Davenport. Only Gomer William‘s 1897 History of the 
Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque made reference to William Davenport, 
and then only to note him as the owner of a number of slaving vessels and a 
privateer.
120
 Not until 1951, with Parkinson‘s first academic study of the newly 
discovered Davenport papers, did historians turn their attention to William 
Davenport‘s career. 
 Davenport‘s private nature explains his lack of attention from historians. In his 
small and anonymous house in Drury Lane, Davenport quietly conducted his 
business, never raising his voice in Liverpool‘s political forums, and never 
establishing a family in Liverpool to carry on his trading legacy or cement his ties to 
the city. Unlike his contemporaries, he never invested in land around the town, and 
hence no street bore his name.
121
 Neither did Davenport donate any of his fortune to 
charitable institutions such as the infirmary, library, hospitals or work houses. In 
short, Davenport was a transient member of Liverpool‘s community who felt no need 
to actively participate in the town‘s development.  
Davenport also has been overlooked because he was eclipsed by merchants of 
a later generation. John Dawson, a privateering captain-cum-merchant, was probably 
                                               
118 Aspinall mentioned John Bridge Aspinall, John Bolton, Moses Benson, Thomas Leyland, George 
Rowe, William Harper, Arthur Heywood, Hugh Crowe, William James, Patrick Black, and Thomas 
Staniforth. Brooke‘s history included a tour through the town, describing each of Liverpool‘s streets 
and their ―principal inhabitants‖ circa 1775. As part of his tour, Brooke at least mentioned every one of 
the principal slavers except Davenport (Brooke, Liverpool as It Was, pp.464-478). 
119 Thomas Troughton, History of Liverpool, (Liverpool: 1810); Baines, History of the Commerce and 
Town of Liverpool, ; James A. Picton, Selections from the Municipal Archives and Records of the City 
of Liverpool from Ad 1700 to the Passing of the Municipal Reform Act, 1835, vol. 2, (Liverpool: 1886); 
Picton, Memorials of Liverpool,  
120 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, pp.253-254, 669 
121 Liverpool still contains Ashton Street, Blackburne Place, Blundell Street, Bold Street, Cropper 
Street, Cunliffe Street, Earle Road, Parr Street, Sir Thomas Street and Tarleton Street, all named after 
slave trading merchants or their families. In most cases, land was purchased by the trader who then laid 
out a street and named it after themselves. (Westgraph, Laurence, ―Read the Signs: Street Names with a 
Connection to the Transatlantic Slave Trade and Abolition in Liverpool,‖ English Heritage, 2008, 
available from http://www.englishheritage.org.uk/server/show/nav.18287). 
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the largest slaving merchant in the history of the trade.
122
 He invested substantial 
amounts of capital in the late 1780s after signing the asiento with the Spanish, a 
contract to ship eight thousand slaves per annum to their American colonies.
123
 In 
1790 Dawson petitioned parliament against the abolition of the slave trade, claiming 
that he owned nineteen slave ships worth £157,000, most of which visited the Gold 
Coast where he also maintained factories.
124
 Dawson‘s speculation for this single year 
thus matched Davenport‘s entire career investment. Thomas Leyland also easily 
exceeded Davenport‘s slaving speculation after dispatching seventy-two slaving 
vessels to Bonny and the Congo River from 1783 until abolition in 1807 an outlay of 
£280,000.
125
 These two merchants are just two examples of the large slave traders 
who began to dominate the trade from the 1780s until the turn of the nineteenth 
century, many of whom comfortably exceeded Davenport‘s investment in the trade. 
Hence these men were, as Gomer Williams wrote in 1897  
the focus of scorching censure, while the older offenders, left far behind in the 
race for pelf, are comparatively forgotten, and their exceeding weight of guilt 
overlooked.
126
 
 
When we include later slaving merchants such as Leyland and Dawson, 
Davenport was probably in the range of the fifteenth to twentieth largest trader in the 
history of the Liverpool slave trade. Davenport was hence a large, but by no means 
the largest, of Liverpool‘s slaving merchant. We must bear in mind, however, that the 
period after the American War resulted in a large restructuring of the British slave 
trade. The passage of the Dolben Act and the parliamentary debates surrounding 
abolition substantially increased the size of slaving vessels.
127
 At the same time the 
volume of the Liverpool slave trade increased, reaching its peak in the years 1795-
1805 when Liverpool slaving ships embarked approximately 300,000 enslaved 
                                               
122 As captain of the Mentor privateer, Dawson captured Carnatic a French East Indiaman valued at 
£400,000 including a box of diamonds worth £135,000, ―the richest prize every taken… by a Liverpool 
adventurer.‖ Dawson used his share of the booty to establish himself as a slaving merchant (Williams, 
Liverpool Privateers, p.239). 
123 Rawley and Behrendt, Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp.186-187 
124 F.E. Sanderson, "The Liverpool Delegates and Sir William Dolben's Bill", Transactions of the 
Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 129, (1972), p.83, n.61 
125 Voyages Database; When Leyland died in 1828 he possessed £600,000, the largest estate of any 
slaving merchant in Liverpool‘s history. Leyland‘s success stemmed in large part from his banking 
business Leyland & Bullins, a firm eventually absorbed by the Midland Bank/ HSBC group in 1908 
(A.E Phillips, ―Leyland and Bullins‖, British Banking History, 2003, available from 
http://www.banking-history.co.uk/leyland.html). 
126 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, pp.594-595 
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Africans.
128
 This relentless pressure on African markets forced up slave prices so that 
between 1795 and 1807 the ―average price paid for slaves by British traders at the 
African coast rose from £15-16 per slave to £29-35 per slave.‖129 As a result, slaving 
merchants trading at the end of the eighteenth century required a much larger capital 
base than Davenport and his contemporaries.  
Given the shift in the financial organisation of the Liverpool slave trade, 
historians prior to the discovery of the Davenport papers ignored him in favour of the 
large traders such as Leyland and Dawson; men who traded at the end of the 
eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. This should not lead us 
to conclude that Davenport was unimportant in the history of the slave trade. As we 
have seen William Davenport was one of the longest serving, largest and ultimately 
most successful slaving merchant of his generation. Davenport‘s partnership 
investments in the slave trade thus masks the fact that he was one of the most 
significant slaving merchants in Liverpool‘s history. His significance is most 
important in the eastern Bight of Biafra markets of Old Calabar and Cameroon, which 
feature in chapter two on Davenport‘s marketing strategies in Africa. 
 
 
 
                                               
128 Based on the volumes of slave exports documented in the Voyages Database 
129 David Richardson, "Prices of Slaves in West and West-Central Africa: Toward and Annual Series, 
1698-1807", Bulletin of Economic Research, vol. 43, (1991), p.35 
 Chapter 2: William Davenport’s African Marketing Strategies: Old 
Calabar and Cameroon 
 
 Though Liverpool slaving merchants wrote about ―Africa‖ or ―Guinea,‖ they 
understood that there were numerous distinct markets along the 3,500 mile African 
Atlantic coastline from Senegal to Angola. In 1752, for example, a year before 
Davenport organised his first slaving venture, Liverpool slaving ships traded at eight 
different African markets.
1
 Some markets were regions, such as the Windward Coast 
or the Gold Coast. Others were ports such as Bonny and Old Calabar, both in the 
Bight of Biafra.  
 William Davenport was unique in the Liverpool merchant community in 
trading almost exclusively to two markets in the eastern Bight of Biafra: Old Calabar 
and Cameroon, port communities managed by African middlemen traders. Though 
geographically close (one hundred miles), Old Calabar and Cameroon were distinct 
markets whose African merchants conducted business in different currencies and 
demanded different assortments of European and Asian consumer goods. Studying 
how Davenport met the challenge of trading in two different African slaving markets 
helps to explain how he established himself as one Liverpool‘s largest and most 
successful slaving merchants. 
 There is a veritable ―cottage industry‖ of studies on Old Calabar.2 By contrast, 
historians have mostly overlooked the smaller Cameroon trade, because there are few 
written sources about the area before 1850.
3
 Davenport‘s business accounts are an 
                                               
1 From west to east the markets were: Gambia, the Windward Coast, the Gold Coast, Benin, New 
Calabar, Bonny, Old Calabar, and Angola (Williamson, The Liverpool Memorandum Book, p.16-17) 
2 Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional 
Foundations of the Old Calabar Slave Trade", American Historical Review, vol. 104, (1999), pp.333-
355; Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, "Letters of the Old Calabar Slave Trade, 1760-1789," in 
Genius in Bondage: Literature of the Early Black Atlantic ed. Vincent Carretta and Phillip Gould, 
(Lexington: 2001)pp. 89-115; Randy J. Sparks, The Two Princes of Calabar: An Eighteenth-Century 
Atlantic Odyssey, (Cambridge, Mass.: 2004); Stephen D. Behrendt, A.J. Latham, and David Northrup, 
The Diary of Antera Duke: An Eighteenth-Century African Slave Trader (New York: Forthcoming); 
and Gomer Williams‘ chapter ―The Massacre at Old Calabar‖ in Williams, Liverpool Privateers, . 
3 Ralph A. Austen and Jonathan Derrick, Middlemen of the Cameroons Rivers: The Duala and Their 
Hinterland, C.1600-C.1960, African Studies Series, (Cambridge; New York: 1999); Ralph A. Austen, 
"Slave Trade and Memory on the Periphery of the Nigerian Hinterland," in Ports of the Slave Trade 
(Bights of Benin and Biafra): Papers from a Conference of the Centre of Commonwealth Studies, ed. 
Robin Law and Silke Strickrodt, (Stirling: 1998); and Jean-Pierre Warnier, "Traite Sans Raids Au 
Cameroun", Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, vol. 29, no. 113, (1989); are the only detailed studies of the 
Cameroon slave trade, with a  heavy focus in each case on the nineteenth century. There are several 
studies on Cameroon‘s ivory trade, including Marion Johnson, ―By Ship or by Camel: The Struggle for 
the Cameroons Ivory trade in the Nineteenth Century‖, Journal of African History, 19, 4 (1978), pp. 
539-549.  
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important exception. The ―New‖ Davenport papers include a number of letters from 
his captains trading to the Cameroon River, shedding light on how the slave trade 
operated there.
4
 The ―Old‖ Davenport papers also include ―Trading Accounts‖ of 
Davenport‘s slaving voyages detailing assortments of European goods shipped to both 
Cameroon and Old Calabar.
5
  
 Using the detail available in the Davenport papers, we will see how William 
Davenport created specialist cargoes and merchant partnership formations based on 
the unique trading conditions at Old Calabar and Cameroon. Section one presents an 
overview of the Davenport‘s African trading pattern, showing how he came to focus 
his trade in the eastern Bight of Biafra. Section two details the assortments of goods 
demanded by Efik (Old Calabar) and Duala (Cameroon) consumers in exchange for 
slaves and ivory. In section three and four, we will see how Davenport organised the 
human and financial resources of his Liverpool merchant house to the unique African 
trading conditions at both markets.  
* 
 In William Davenport‘s early career, his African trading pattern was dictated 
by his master William Whaley. For the first four years after his freedom, 1748- 1752, 
Davenport only invested in voyages managed by Whaley and, as a non-managing 
partner in the firm, he had no influence over the choice of African markets. Because 
so little is known about Whaley and the early Liverpool slave trade it is difficult to 
ascertain where he traded in Africa. However, we do know that by the late 1740s and 
1750, when Davenport has joined the firm, Whaley had focused his trade on two 
locations: Old Calabar, in the Bight of Biafra, and Gambia, on the Upper Guinea 
Coast.
6
 
 The Old Calabar and Gambia regions were very different slaving markets. At 
the Gambia small vessels purchased captives to be sold primarily to North American 
                                               
4
 The letters are in the vory Book 1763-1785, Liverpool, D/DAV/1; ―Badger‘s 3rd Voyage 1774-1776‖, 
Liverpool, D/DAV/7; and ―Papers Ship new Badger‘s inward acco 1777‖, Liverpool, D/DAV/10; 
―Essex and Christopher to Dominica,‖ Liverpool, D/DAV/15   
5 Within the ―Old‖ Davenport Papers there are accounts (with varying details) for thirty-seven Old 
Calabar and twenty-six Cameroon voyages. The ―New‘ Davenport Papers contain a single additional 
Cameroon account for the Rover’s 1782 voyage (Voyages Database 83413; ―Trading Accounts of the 
Rover‖ in Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, D/DAV/2).  
6
 Based upon the ownership data in the Voyages Database 
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rice and tobacco planters.
7
 At Old Calabar, two thousand miles further round the 
Guinea Coast, the slave trade was a high volume business, carried out by large vessels 
that shipped their enslaved cargoes principally to the West Indies. As a result, Gambia 
took more vessels, but exported fewer slaves than Calabar. In 1745-1765, for 
example, 144 slaving vessels embarked approximately 43,000 enslaved Africans from 
Calabar, an average of three hundred per vessel. At Gambia, 233 slaving vessels 
carried off 35,000 slaves in the same period, 150 per vessel.
8
  
 William Whaley fitted out ships for both Old Calabar and the Gambia in his 
capacity as ―ship‘s husband‖ for his ventures. As the husband, he bore responsibility 
for procuring the cargo, arranging the instructions for the ship‘s captain, attracting 
investment to the venture, and settling the accounts and finances at the end of the 
voyage.
9
 Fitting out a vessel took between two and seven months, and the husband 
had to liaise with numerous suppliers, each of whom dealt in specific commodities. 
Taken together, these tasks represented a time consuming and difficult process, and 
required knowledge of the specific trading assortments desired at each individual 
African markets. Because of the specialist knowledge required to be a ship‘s husband 
they numbered just fifty-four men in 1753, out of a community of approximately two 
hundred slaving merchants.
10
 Within this large cohort existed a smaller ―management 
elite,‖ as Richardson described them, of specialized Africa merchants numbering just 
fourteen men, Whaley amongst them, that managed half of the town‘s slaving 
ventures.
11
 
 As Whaley‘s protégé, Davenport received training managing slaving vessels 
and, crucially, learned the trading assortments desired at Old Calabar and Gambia. In 
1752, for example, he was ―very busy assisting [Whaley] to fit out the Chesterfield  
                                               
7 Lorena S. Walsh, "Liverpool's Slave Trade to the Colonial Chesapeake: Slaving on the Periphery," in 
Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, ed. David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz, and Anthony Tibbles, 
(Liverpool: 2007), pp.103-105 
8 Based on shipping and slave volumes documented in the Voyages Database 
9 David Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade: The Accounts of William Davenport," in 
Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition, ed. Roger Anstey and Paul Hair, (Liverpool: 1976), 
pp.67-68 
10
 The largest slaving merchants at the time were Foster Cunliffe, George Campbell, John Knight, John 
Welch, Richard Gildart and William Whaley (Williamson, The Liverpool Memorandum Book, pp.14-
15). 
11 For the period 1766-1774, David Richardson has estimated that just twenty merchants managed 70 
percent of Liverpool‘s slaving voyages. The lack of growth within the ranks of the ―management elite‖ 
implies that the knowledge needed to become a large slaving merchant was jealously guarded by its 
holders, and issued only to trusted associates and apprentices (Richardson, "The Accounts of William 
Davenport," p.68). 
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[for Calabar] and Orrell [for Gambia] with all expedition.‖12 Davenport applied his 
experience of fitting out slaving vessels when he started his own company in 1753 
and acted as the ship‘s husband for the Charming Nancy, the first time he had selected 
a cargo in his own name.
13
 After this foray into the Gambia, Davenport continued to 
press his investment in the region, and dispatched two more ships there in 1754.
14
  
 The Charming Nancy joined a shoal of Guineamen trading to Gambia. In 
1752, twelve slavers had purchased slaves at the market; in 1754 that number grew to 
twenty-five.
15
 Davenport received reports from his captains that the Gambia had 
become glutted with slaving vessels. In January 1755, he complained to Charleston 
slaving factor Henry Laurens that he was afraid the slavers would ―overdo that River‖ 
as ―17 ships sail for that place.‖16 Writing to a Bristol captain in June of that year, 
Laurens confirmed Davenport‘s complaints, informing him that  
Our Accounts from Gambia are very bad, Slaves scarse, upward of 20 Sail in 
the River and the small pox currant among them, we believe few Slaves will 
come from that Quarter
17
 
 
 Davenport had further cause to complain about the Gambia market after he 
lost two experienced slaving captains. In 1756 Captain Isaac Hyde died on his passage 
back to Britain, causing a ―great loss‖ to Davenport as ―no one was better acquainted, 
or understood the trade in Gambia better than himself.‖18 Two years later Samuel 
Sacherverell, a veteran of four slaving voyages to Gambia in the Charming Nancy, 
died ―soon after his arrival‖ in Liverpool. Sacherverell had made a poor voyage owing 
to the ―number of ships in the River‖, and hence Davenport and his associates ―put the 
vessel [Nancy] up for sale.‖19 
 
                                               
12 William Davenport to Davies Davenport, Liverpool, 31 December 1752, BDM 
13 Voyages Database 90478 
14 Voyages Database 90479 (Charming Nancy), 90552 (James) 
15 Based upon shipping volumes documented in the Voyages Database 
16 William Davenport to Henry Laurens, Liverpool, 28 January 1755, in Letter and Bill Book 1747-
1761, ODAV 
17 Henry Laurens to John Knight, Charleston, 26 June 1755 in Donnan, Documents: Border & Southern 
Colonies, p.321 
18 William Davenport to Captain Gilbert Rigby, Liverpool, 25 March 1756, in Letter and Bill Book 
1747-1761, ODAV; In 1752, Whaley lost a Gambia captain when Samuel Lacer and his first mate, both 
of the Orrell (Voyages Database 90297) were ―poisoned in the Gambia river by the King of Barra 
occasioned by some falling out they had with him‖ (William Davenport to Davies Davenport, 
Liverpool, 31 December 1752, BDM). 
19 William Davenport to Richard Evans, Liverpool, 10 April 1758, in Letter and Bill Book 1747-1761, 
ODAV 
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 The dire trading conditions at the Gambia forced Davenport to turn his gaze 
elsewhere on the Guinea Coast. From 1756 until 1764, Davenport invested in slavers 
to the Windward Coast, Malembo, Anomabu, Bassa and Bonny, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining an investment in the Old Calabar vessel Chesterfield.
20
 
As part of this shifting pattern of investment, Davenport looked to Cameroon, a 
region just one hundred miles from Old Calabar, as a potential alternative to the 
glutted Gambia. Davenport had probably heard about Cameroon through his friend 
John Knight who received a letter from Henry Laurens in 1755 telling of a ―Sloop of 
New York laden with Red Wood some Teeth and 30 Slaves‖ arriving in Charleston 
from Cameroon.
21
 In that same year another Guineaman (or perhaps the same one 
disposing of a portion of its cargo in the West Indies) sold a group of enslaved 
Africans from Cameroon in St. Kitts. These slaves, Davenport heard, were ―esteemed 
a very fine sort‖ and, as a result, worth above £26 Sterling per head, slightly more 
than Gambia slaves.
22
  
 Apart from these rumours surrounding the Cameroon, the region remained 
terra incognita to the Liverpool merchant community as the waters from Fernando Po 
to Cape Lopez had not been explored systematically. Despite the Liverpool 
merchants‘ ignorance, other Europeans had been trading with the Duala people of the 
Cameroon since the seventeenth century.
23
 From their home of Douala, at the mouth 
of the Wouri, Dibamba and Mungo rivers, the Duala people had profited from 
frequent trade with the Dutch whose ivory vessels arrived in numbers from the mid 
1600s. The Cameroon market remained an ivory export centre throughout the first 
half of the eighteenth century with Dutch vessels purchasing hundreds of tons of 
                                               
20 Based on the ownership data in the Voyages Database 
21 The New York vessel was the Polly, Captain Miller (Voyages Database 25375; Henry Laurens to 
John Knight, Charleston, 21 July 1755 in Donnan, Documents: Border & Southern Colonies, p.326). 
22 William Davenport to Mr Bezeliel Hodge, Liverpool, 15 September 1756, in Letter and Bill Book 
1747-1761, ODAV; William Davenport to Messrs Francis Delap & John & William Halliday, 
Liverpool, 24 February 1757, in Ibid.; For example, Davenport advised Captains Sacheverall, who 
traded to Gambia in 1754, that he could expect to sell his captives for £24 sterling per person (William 
Davenport to Samuel Sacheverall, Liverpool, 4 October 1754, in Ibid.,). 
23 The Portuguese had explored Fernando Po, a large island facing the mouth of the Cameroon River 
circa 1500. However, as Warnier states, ―before 1600, European techniques in naval construction and 
navigation prevented them from accessing the Coast of Cameroon.‖ After 1614, Dutch vessels 
regularly traded at Douala, and from 1650 a large and consistent trade was established (Warnier, "Slave 
Trade without Raids", p.8). 
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―elephants teeth‖, but just a thousand African captives.24 As a result the Cameroon 
slave trade remained under developed until late in the eighteenth century.  
 Suspecting that the untapped Cameroon could provide cheap and abundant 
slaves and ivory, Davenport fitted out a vessel for the market in the summer of 1756. 
The Racoon, a tiny fifty-ton sloop with just ten crewmen, sailed in September 1756 
under the command of Thomas Hughes, a captain with just one previous voyage to his 
name.
25
 Racoon followed Ferret, the first British slave ship for the Cameroon, 
dispatched by John Welch in November 1755, who was perhaps acting on the same 
intelligence as Davenport had received.
26
 Sending the Racoon was a calculated risk on 
Davenport‘s part. He did not know how the Duala would receive his unknown 
captain; there was every chance the ship could be cut off or return empty handed.
27
  
 Although the account books and letter of instruction for the Racoon are lost, 
we can piece together Hughes‘ orders from another of Davenport‘s pioneering 
ventures. In 1767 the King of Prussia, operating in combination with the Henry, went 
to scout out the potential markets of Cape Lopez, the River Nazareth and Gabon— 
three ports to the south of Cameroon.
28
 The investors in the voyage, Davenport 
amongst them, sent the brigantine Henry to São Tomé with a generic cargo of Africa 
goods. There, Captain Joseph White, sailing for the first time as captain, was to 
―procure a trader acquainted with Gaboon & Nazareth‖ and exchange the Henry’s 
goods for an assortment based on the local man‘s knowledge.29 Captain Samuel 
Richardson in the King of Prussia followed White to the coast in order to learn 
                                               
24 For a detailed account of the Duala‘s history see Austen and Derrick, Middlemen of the Cameroons 
Rivers, pp.26-31 
25 (Voyages Database 90652); Hughes‘ previous command had been in the Old Calabar sloop Tom, a 
thirty-eight ton vessel partially owned by Davenport (Voyages Database 90623).  
26 The Ferret displaced 110 tons and carried 148 enslaved Africans from the Cameroon (Voyages 
Database 90566). Her owners, John Welch & Company, immediately dispatched her back to the 
Cameroon (Voyages Database 90567). However, after she was taken by the French, he quit the region. 
John Bury, the captain of the vessel, returned to the Cameroon trade as ship‘s husband for two voyages 
in 1762 and 1763, implying he possessed valuable knowledge of the market. Bury briefly remained in 
the Cameroon trade as a minor investor until 1769 (Voyages Database 90951, 90952).  
27
 The partners in the Racoon’s voyages were William Davenport, Thomas Marsden, John Perkins, 
John Maddock, and Edward Cropper. Cropper and Maddock had both invested previously invested in 
Davenport‘s Gambia ventures (based on the ownership data in the Voyages Database). 
28 The King of Prussia was a 182 ton snow commanded by Samuel Richardson (Voyages Database 
91408). Her tender Henry was a smaller 128 ton snow commanded by Joseph White (Voyages 
Database 91082). 
29 Alexander Nottingham & Co. to Captain Joseph White, Liverpool, 10 July 1767, in Trading 
Accounts of the Henry 1765-1767¸ ODAV 
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exactly what trade goods these regions desired.
30
 Clearly this information was of 
some value to the other Liverpool slave traders, for Richardson was to  
[Furnish] us with an abstract for your cargo…refer[ing] us to the Numbers of 
the goods according to the invoice as it will prevent any one from taking an 
advantage shoud they have the curiosity to open the letter, & this … is what 
several times has been done, especially by Letters from a part of the Coast so 
unknown as Nazareth & Gaboon on which accot you cannot be too secret in 
your transactions.
31
 
 
Given that Cameroon was also ―unknown‖, coupled with Davenport requesting 
Hughes to send ―an abstract for the Cameroon by the first opportunity‖ in one of two 
letters that survive about the Racoon’s voyage, we can assume Hughes operated on 
the same scheme as Richardson and White: to explore the untapped Cameroon River 
and discover precisely what goods the Duala desired in exchange for their slaves.
32
   
 Hughes fulfilled his instructions by purchasing eighty-three slaves from the 
Duala and securing an ―abstract‖ for the Cameroon.33 He was, however, intercepted 
on his passage to Saint Kitts by the French, who took Racoon, but let the captain and 
crew go free.
34
 After returning to Liverpool, Thomas Hughes was placed in command 
of the seventy-four ton brig Calveley, and ordered to the Cameroon in September 
1757.
35
 Once again Hughes‘ vessel was captured by the French who took Calveley’s 
sixty enslaved Africans, but let the ship go free.
36
 Despite this second setback, 
Davenport sent Hughes back to Cameroon in the Union, a much larger vessel of 182 
tons.
37
 After fourteen months at sea, Davenport was greeted with the sight of the 
Union returning to port, the first of his Cameroon ventures to successfully complete 
their voyage. 
                                               
30 Thomas Staniforth & Co. to Captain Samuel Richardson, Liverpool, 11 Oct. 1767, in Trading 
Accounts of the King of Prussia 1767-1779¸ ODAV 
31 Ibid.; The King of Prussia and Henry venture returned a negligible profit to the owners (see 
Appendix B), and therefore Davenport and Company sent no further vessels to the Gabon region. 
32 William Davenport to Captain Thomas Hughes, Liverpool, 24 February 1757, in Letter and Bill 
Book 1747-1761, ODAV 
33
 Hughes must have learnt what the Duala desired because his cargo was correctly ―assorted‖ for 
Cameroon on the Calveley’s voyage (Trading Accounts of the Calveley 1759-1761, LRO, Liverpool, 
England). 
34 Hughes must have been released because he was back in Liverpool by September 1758 when he took 
command of the Calveley.  
35 Voyages Database 90745 
36 Williams, Liverpool Privateers,  p.667 
37
 Voyages Database 90905 
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 Despite his success in completing a Cameroon voyage, Davenport declined to 
send the Union back to the region until March 1764.
38
 Instead, Davenport continued 
to experiment with other slaving regions, each of which gave poor returns on his 
investment (which we discuss in detail in chapter three). Only the Dalrymple, the first 
Old Calabar vessel owned and managed by Davenport‘s company, proved a success.39 
In 1765 Davenport thus took a momentous decision when, weighing up his future 
investment options, he elected to push his trade firmly into the Old Calabar and 
Cameroon markets (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: William Davenport’s Trading Pattern by African Region, 1748-1785 (£ 
invested) 
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Sources: Ownership data from the Voyages Database; ―Old‖ Davenport Papers; ―New‖ 
Davenport Papers. 
 
Note: ―Other‖ is principally comprised of the Windward Coast, New Calabar, Bonny, and 
Benin. 
* 
 For the next twenty years, Davenport was the only British merchant to invest 
in multiple ventures to Old Calabar and Cameroon simultaneously. From 1765 to 
1785, Davenport held shares in two thirds of the Guineamen dispatched by slaving 
merchants—including those from other British and European ports—to Cameroon. 
Paralleling his Cameroon trading, Davenport possessed shares in a quarter of the 
                                               
38 Voyages Database 90906 
39
 Voyages Database 91016 
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vessels trading to Old Calabar in the same period—more than any other British 
slaving merchant.
40
 What makes Davenport remarkable is the fact that he managed to 
invest in both regions despite their marked dissimilarities. Because the Cameroon 
market was less developed, slaving merchants dispatched nearly two hundred fewer 
voyages to the region in the period 1756-1785: even in the peak years of Cameroon 
trade, 1770-1779, only a third as many Guineamen visited the region as they did Old 
Calabar. Cameroon vessels were also smaller, and carried fewer slaves than their Old 
Calabar counterparts. Cameroon was dwarfed by its neighbour as a slaving port, with 
the result that nearly five times as many enslaved Africans were carried from Calabar 
than Cameroon (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Old Calabar and Cameroon Slave Trades, 1756-1785 
          Average  
 Voyages Enslaved Africans Slaves per voyage Average tonnage 
Period Calabar Cameroon Calabar  Cameroon Calabar Cameroon Calabar Cameroon 
 
1756-1759 17 4 6,120 680 360 170 132 59 
1760-1769 108 21 32,312 3,743 299 178 128 84 
1770-1779 104 37 26,287 9,512 253 257 117 99 
1780-1785 38 13 12,691 3,475 334 267 167 108 
 
Totals 267 75 77,410 17,410 312 218 136 88 
 
 
Source: All data is derived from the Voyages Database. 
 
 Further, there were also significant differences in the goods assembled by 
Europeans to trade at Calabar and Cameroon. As David Richardson has shown, these 
―differences in West African consumption patterns appear to have had significant 
repercussions for the structure, organization and even profitability of English slave 
trading in the eighteenth century.‖41 Examining precisely how these African 
consumption patterns differed will illustrate how the slave trade operated at the two 
ports. Moreover, by analysing consumption patterns we will see how Davenport 
overcame the region‘s differences and maintained his position as the eminent 
Liverpool slave trader in the eastern Bight of Biafra region.  
                                               
40 In the period 1765-1785 there were sixty-one documented slaving voyages to Cameroon, of which 
Davenport held shares in forty-six. 207 slavers visited Old Calabar in the same period, of which 
Davenport invested in fifty (based on the ownership data in the Voyages Database).   
41 David Richardson, "West African Consumption Patterns and Their Influence on the Eighteenth-
Century English Slave Trade," in The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade, ed. H.A Gemery and Jan Hogendorn, (London: 1979), p.305 
51 
 As Davenport had learned under Whaley, the African middlemen of Calabar, 
the Efik, traded slaves primarily for luxury textiles imported from India, usually rolls 
and kerchiefs of checked cloth that could be fashioned into apparel. Finished goods, 
such as hats, jackets, and trousers, also featured in the mix of textiles, although to a 
lesser degree. The tiny percentage of textiles included in Cameroon cargoes, by 
contrast, consisted almost entirely of small quantities of cloth and finished outfits 
(Figure 3). Given the low value of textiles within Cameroon assortments, it is likely 
slaving captains gifted cloth to Duala merchants as a dash (gifts to win the favour of 
selected traders) but did not use them to purchase slaves or ivory directly. At Old 
Calabar, though, textiles formed one of the most important components of any 
slaver‘s cargo; captains who arrived with poorly assorted cargoes of cloth, or cloth in 
the wrong pattern or length, could expect difficult trade. Or as one Efik trader stated: 
if the ―Indgey goods be Right good,‖ slaving vessels would ―no stand long‖ in the 
river, an important consideration in the pestilential Calabar region.
42
 
 To spotlight the textile trade to Old Calabar, consider the goods received by 
Efik trader Antera Duke for the fifty slaves he sold from June 1769 to January 1770. 
Antera sold twenty-two men, eighteen women, five boys and five girls to John Potter, 
captain of Davenport and partners‘ ship the Dobson.43 According to the Dobson’s 
outfit, Potter bartered trading goods valued at approximately £430—yielding an 
average slave price of £8 12s. By value, sixty percent of the trading goods Antera 
received were East India and Manchester textiles. These included Indian photaes, 
chintz, chelloes, romals, cushtaes, nicanees and bafts—all told, 280 pieces of these 
various Indian cottons cost Davenport and partners £225, and luxury chintz, chelloes 
and romals cost almost £2 each—a sailor‘s monthly wage.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
42 Grandy King George to Ambrose Lace, undated Letters [c.1773], [Old Calabar], in Lovejoy and 
Richardson, "Letters of the Old Calabar Slave Trade," pp.106 
43 Voyages Database 91545 
44 Behrendt, Latham, and Northrup, Diary of Antera Duke, chapter two; Trading Accounts of the 
Dobson and Fox 1769-1771, ODAV 
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Figure 3: Trading assortments carried by Davenport’s slaving vessels at Old 
Calabar and Cameroon, 1757-1792 (by percentage of £ value) 
 
Note: ‗Other‘ goods include rice, hawks‘ bells, salt, knives, fish, sugar, cups, bellows, 
 earthenware. 
Sample: Twenty-seven cargoes to Old Calabar; twenty cargoes to Cameroon 
Source: Adapted from David Richardson, ‗West African Consumption Patterns and their 
Influence on the Eighteenth Century English Slave Trade‘, in H.A. Gemery and J.S. 
Hogendorn (eds.), The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic 
Slave Trade, (New York, 1979), pp. 313-315. 
 
 Because of the critical importance of textiles at Old Calabar, Davenport‘s 
captains usually travelled to Manchester and London to select different fabrics of 
varying colour and cut. Experienced captains ordered and/or purchased textiles for at 
least thirty-four of thirty-seven Davenport ventures to Old Calabar.
45
 Some of these 
senior men were now merchants in their own right. Patrick Black, who sailed four 
times to Old Calabar in the Chesterfield between 1753 and 1758, acted as a key 
partner in Davenport‘s Old Calabar ventures by investing in twenty-seven voyages.46 
Davenport utilised Black‘s knowledge of the Calabar trade by dispatching him to both 
London and Manchester, sometimes in the company of the ship‘s captain. Former 
                                               
45
 The captain took no part in purchasing the cargo for the 1761 voyage of the Tyrell, William Hindle 
master (Voyages Database 90858), or in two voyages of the Dreadnaught, John Cooper master, in 
1774 and 1776 (Voyages Database 91837, 91839). In all three instances the vessels carried a low value 
cargo; as a result, the partners may have purchased the textiles in conjunction with that of a larger 
vessel leaving in the same year (Trading Accounts of the Tyrell 1761-1762, ODAV; Trading Accounts 
of the Dreadnaught 1776-1777, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the Swift, Dreadnaught and Dalrymple, 
1772-1777, ODAV). 
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captain Ambrose Lace, another of Davenport‘s key Calabar partners, also took a hand 
in selecting textiles.
47
 
 We see the importance of captains‘ textile knowledge from analysis of the 
Liverpool slaver Dalrymple’s accounts, 1768-1777. In outfitting this ship to Old 
Calabar, Davenport sent his partners Patrick Black or Ambrose Lace and that year‘s 
Dalrymple captain to Manchester and/or London to choose and buy textiles. Travels 
to London generally totalled £10-13 per person—costs that included carriage transport 
and lodging near the East India warehouses. Twice, in 1768 and 1770, Patrick Black 
and the ship‘s captain travelled to London, and it is reasonable to suppose that Black 
instructed his protégés in how to negotiate with East India Company brokers and 
instructed captains on the best India textiles for the Calabar market (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Captains’ Journeys to Manchester and London to Purchase Textiles for 
Old Calabar, Liverpool Slaver Dalrymple, 1768-1777 
 
 Date Davenport account entry 
 
March 1768 P. Black & Capt Allanson‘s Expenses to London £25.7.6 to buy the 
Cargo 
 
March 1770 Pat Black & Capt Fairweather to London £25.14.7;  
 A Lace Cash for London £10.10. 
 
October 1772 Mr Black‘s Expenses to Manch[este]r £1.07  
 Capt Fairweather Expenses to London £12.12 
June 1773 Capt Fairweather‘s Expenses to London to Buy ye Cargo £12.12 
June 1775 Capt Fairweather‘s Expenses to London £10.10 
June 1777 Capt Fairweather‘s Expenses to London £12.12 
 
Source: Trading Accounts of the Dalrymple 1766-1771, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the 
Swift, Dreadnaught and Dalrymple 1772-1777, ODAV 
 
 Whereas luxury Indian textiles comprised key trading goods at Old Calabar, 
merchants organizing Cameroon ventures assorted mostly hardware, cowries and 
beads that combined, totalled almost sixty percent of the cargo outlay by value. Of the 
hardware shipped to Cameroon, ninety percent by value was brass neptunes, a trading 
                                               
47 Trading Accounts of the Dalrymple 1766-1771, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the Quixote 1783-
1785, ODAV 
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good not demanded by Efik merchants (Figure 4).
48
 Africans used these large pans—
measuring 35-42 inches in diameter and weighing up to twelve pounds—to make 
solar salt or to clean butchered livestock.
49
 Given the large number of neptunes 
imported to Cameroon (each ship brought between five hundred to nine hundred pans) 
and the importance of salt in the Bight of Biafra region, it is likely that the Duala used 
neptunes for salt manufacture on a large scale.
50
 Brass rods constituted the remainder 
of the hardware imported by the Liverpool vessels. Each rod weighed either 10.75oz 
or 12oz, making them slightly lighter than the manillas (copper bracelets or leglets) 
imported into other regions of Africa.
51
 The Duala seem to have taken brass rods in 
lieu of manillas, given that none of the vessels sampled carried the bracelets to the 
river, indicating they used brass rods for currency and manufacturing rather than as 
ornaments. 
 Metals shipped to Old Calabar were almost entirely copper rods, brass rods 
and manillas. Ship captains paid a quantity of copper rods as comey, port dues paid 
upon arrival at Calabar in return for a ―license‖ to anchor and trade in the river. In 
addition, captains included copper rods in their assortments to purchase slaves and 
ivory. As Henry Schroeder (a.k.a. ―William Butterworth‖) a mariner on the slave ship 
Hudibras, at Old Calabar in 1786, described:
 
 
The purchaser pays, in the first instance, with copper rods, about eighteen 
inches long and one inch in circumference, valued at about one shilling each. 
When the trader received the number of copper rods that he is entitled to, 
according to estimated value of the wretches he has trafficked away, he names 
the different articles he is in want of, for trade in the interior, such as 
gunpowder, calico, hardware, salt &c.
52
 
 
                                               
48 Neptunes were also called ―battery‖ because the pans were made by beating brass panels into shape. 
49 Davenport shipped fourteen tubs containing 700 ―narrow brimd Neptunes‖ on board the Badger in 
1772 (Trading Accounts of the Badger and Fox 1772-1778, ODAV). Their size implies that these were 
the large ―Scottish Pans‖ as opposed to the smaller Spanish neptunes, which measured less than a foot 
in width (Stanley B. Alpern, "What Africans Got for Their Slaves: A Master List of European Trade 
Goods", History in Africa, vol. 22, (1995), pp. 15-16). 
50 An anonymous Liverpool slave ship surgeon who made four voyages to the Guinea coast in the 
1770s and 1780s recounted how salt was manufactured in his unpublished account: ―[African women] 
bring the water from the beach, upon their head in kettles capable of holding two or three gallons: This 
they boil in large brass pans called neptunes until the aqueous particles are evaporated. What they thus 
procure may be considered as a course bay salt to refine which they reduce it into a powder,‖ (Anon., 
―West Africa,‖ (Unpublished: c.1784), pp.9-10). 
51 Brass rods were shipped in boxes, each box contained 125 rods. There were two sizes of rod, one 
weighed 94 lbs. per box, and the other 84 lbs. per box, making them the same weight as copper rods. 
Leg manillas, by contrast, weighed approximately 13 oz, and the smaller hand manilas 4 oz (Trading 
Accounts of the Tyrell 1761-1762, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the Preston 1780-1784, ODAV). 
52
 William Butterworth [Henry Schroeder], Three Years' Adventure of a Minor, (Leeds: 1822), p. 83 
55 
Schroeder‘s account highlights the importance of copper rods to the slave trade at Old 
Calabar.  Most ships carried 25-75 boxes, each containing 125 rods and thus totalling 
between 3,000 and 10,000 rods per voyage. Altogether, the rods comprised 10-15 
percent of the total cargo (and 60 percent of the hardware) by value. However, the 
true value of copper rods at Old Calabar is greater, since the rods functioned as 
currency and were included in almost all barters. Davenport also shipped brass rods, 
between twenty and thirty percent of his hardware, in addition to small quantities of 
manilas. African smiths likely reworked brass and copper rods into tools or jewellery, 
and the rods also functioned as currency.
53
 
 
Figure 4: Metals Shipped to Old Calabar and Cameroon, 1750-1783 (by 
percentage of £ value) 
 
Sample: Twenty-seven cargoes to Old Calabar; twenty cargoes to Cameroon 
Source: Trading Accounts for vessels destined to Old Calabar and the Cameroon, ODAV 
 
 Cowries (small sea shells imported from India) at Cameroon were as 
important as copper rods at Old Calabar. Captains paid for slaves with a combination 
of cowries and other trade goods, paying the small shells out in pint measures, with an 
approximate value of one and a half shillings sterling per pint. A series of letters from 
Peter Potter, captain of Davenport‘s Cameroon ship Bader, shows that between 1775 
                                               
53 For instance, when Antera Duke travelled from Duke Town to the west bank of the Cross River, he 
dashed Tom Curcock, a trader at Old Curcock Town, ―four brass rods and a case of brandy‖. Later, 
east of Duke Town, Antera dashed ―an iron rod and two copper rods‖ to Archibong Duke (Behrendt, 
Latham, and Northrup, Diary of Antera Duke, chapter four). 
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and 1776, each slave was worth 70-125 pints of cowries, a sterling value of £5.25- 
£9.40, somewhat lower than slaves at Old Calabar.
54
 A captain purchasing slaves in 
the river relied heavily on his cowries; once his supplies of these small shells ran out, 
his trade in the river effectively ended, regardless of what other trade goods he still 
had on board.
55
 It was in the captain‘s best interest, then, to keep his cargo ―well 
assorted‖ by not allowing his cowries to be depleted out of proportion from the rest of 
his trading goods.  
Captains trading to Cameroon also traded for the region‘s abundant ivory. 
Ivory had the advantages that it stored well, took the place of potentially unruly 
slaves, and was available throughout the year. Cameroon in particular was  
celebrated for its ivory, which is of a very superior quality, being less porous, 
and more free from flaws than that which is obtained [elsewhere on the 
Guinea Coast]
56
 
 
Davenport‘s captains at Cameroon purchased ivory along with slaves, quantities and 
numbers depending on prices and individual barters.
57
 For example, in 1776 Captain 
Peter Potter had on board ―81 slaves paid for and 3943 Lb Ivory‖ after three months 
in the river.
58
 Similarly, during Potter‘s 1775 voyage he had on board ―16 slaves paid 
for & twelve hundred [pounds] of Ivory‖ after two weeks in the river.59 Both these 
examples suggest that the purchase of ivory proceeded alongside the purchase of 
slaves, emphasising the Cameroon‘ importance as a port in the ivory trade. 
We know from Potter‘s letters to Davenport that the assortment of goods 
traded for ivory varied from those traded for slaves at Cameroon. In August 1777, 
Potter sent a summary of the goods he had traded in exchange for 6,279 pounds of 
tusks. Potter‘s account indicates that neptunes and iron bars played an important part 
in the ivory trade, giving some explanation for their predominance in Cameroon 
                                               
54 Peter Potter to William Davenport, Cameroon, 23 June 1775, D/DAV/7; Peter Potter to William 
Davenport, Cameroon, 13 July 1775, D/DAV/7; Peter Potter to William Davenport, 15 October 1776, 
D/DAV/10 
55 Peter Potter to William Davenport, Old Calabar, 23 July 1785, D/DAV/15 
56
 John Adams, Remarks on the Country Extending from Cape Palmas to the River Congo, (London: 
1823), p.171 
57 Kenneth Morgan‘s research on the Bristol trade to Old Calabar, based on the Rogers‘ papers, 
suggests that in that market Bristol captains traded for ivory with ―trade goods left after slaves had been 
purchased‖ (Kenneth Morgan, "James Rogers and the Bristol Slave Trade", Institute of Historical 
Research, vol. 76, no. 192, (May 2003), p.203). 
58 Peter Potter to William Davenport, Cameroon, 15 October 1776, D/DAV/10 
59
 Peter Potter to William Davenport, Cameroon, 23 June 1775, D/DAV/7 
57 
assortments (Table 4). Cowries, the main currency used for purchasing slaves, seem 
to have been seldom used, as Potter paid less than the price of one slave in cowries. 
 
Table 4: Liverpool Slaving Ship Badger’s Barter Transactions for 415 Slaves and 
6,279lb of Ivory at Cameroon, 1777 
 
Type of Goods 415 Slaves 6,279lb Ivory
1
 
Cowries £3457 53.7 % £6 1.4 % 
Hardware
2
 634 9.8 % 194 44.0 % 
Iron 575 8.9 % 114 25.9 % 
Beads 444 6.9 % 59 13.4 % 
Textiles 253 3.9 % 16 3.6 % 
Arms 158 2.5 % 0 0.0 % 
Gunpowder 69 1.1 % 0 0.0 % 
Liquor 34 0.5 % 0 0.0 % 
Miscellaneous 820
3
 12.7 % 52
4
 11.8 % 
 £6,444 100.0 % £441 100.0 % 
 (93.6%) (6.4%) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: 1 approximately 340 tusks weighing about 18lbs/tusk 
 2 neptunes (large brass basins) comprised £679 of the £874 outlay on hardware. 
   Brass rods made up a further £117. 
3 miscellaneous goods traded for slaves included: rice, salt, tankards, knives, stockfish, 
  chests, pease, and tobacco. 
4 miscellaneous goods traded for ivory include: ―yellow bottles‖ (£18), ―funnels‖ (£8), 101 
dozen knives (£7), and salt (£6). 
 
Sources: Peter Potter to William Davenport, ―Account of Ivory Bought at the Cameroon in Exchange 
for Goods 1776‖ [ca. Sept 1776–Jan 1777], D/DAV/10 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
The assortment of bottles, funnels, knives, salt and clothing in Potter‘s ivory 
assortment appears irrelevant, given their low value. Both Potter and his later consort 
John Howard note in their letters that the trinkets, however, and particularly salt, were 
important trade items for ivory. Howard complained, for instance, about the loss of 
some salt from Potter‘s ship, which had been washed out by a leak: ―I could have 
bought one ton more of ivory with that Salt.‖60 Moreover, when former (1790s) 
slaving ship captain John Adams listed the goods necessary to buy one ton of ivory at 
Cameroon in 1823, he included fifteen tons of salt and an assortment of minor cloths. 
Adams also noted ―Guns, Gunpowder and Neptunes, and mock Coral [a type of bead], 
                                               
60
 John Howard to William Davenport, Old Calabar, 4 November 1785, D/DAV/15 
58 
always in great demand.‖61 It appears, then, that neptunes and salt remained crucial 
trade items in the Cameroon ivory trade throughout the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.  
 The large quantities of ivory exported from Cameroon explain why the 
demands of Duala consumers differed from those of the Efik at Calabar. The ivory 
market required a very different mix of goods, one reliant on salt, neptunes and iron 
bars. Slaves, by contrast were paid for in the first instance with cowries, and then with 
a bundle of other goods—especially beads and metals. The less developed Cameroon 
slaving market provides an additional explanation for the differing consumer patterns 
in the two regions. At Old Calabar, European and Indian textiles comprised a small 
percentage of seventeenth century cargoes, as they instead purchased mostly copper 
rods and iron bars. Over the course of the eighteenth century, however, Efik traders 
gained market power and purchased broader assortments of high-quality consumer 
goods, including East Indian luxury textiles.
62
 Given that the 1760s and 1770s marked 
the formative period of the Cameroon slave trade, it is not surprising to find that they 
too desired small quantities of consumer goods, and instead sought items that could be 
traded as currency such as cowries, beads, and metal bars, or put to use in 
manufacturing, such as neptunes.  
* 
 In 2007 Stephen Behrendt argued that differing African market conditions 
dictated in large part the type of men who officered slaving vessels. In particular, 
Behrendt emphasised the importance of captains in the ‗ship trade‘ markets, such as 
Old Calabar and Cameroon, where experienced and knowledgeable officers formed 
―buyer-seller relationships‖ that ―formed the nexus of cross-cultural trade‖ between 
Europeans and African.
63
 For a merchant such as Davenport seeking to capture 
market share in these regions securing the services of ―captain princes‖ was critical. 
We can hence understand the differences between markets at Old Calabar and 
                                               
61
 John Adams, Remarks on the Country Extending from Cape Palmas to the River Congo, (London: 
1966), p. 251 
62 Behrendt, Latham, and Northrup, Diary of Antera Duke, chapter two; Similarly, Curtin found in his 
study of the Senegambia slave trade that between the 1680s and 1730s there was a marked move away 
from iron and bead imports towards textiles and firearms (Philip Curtin, Economic Change in 
Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade, (Madison: 1975), p.318). 
63 Stephen D. Behrendt, "Human Capital in the British Slave Trade," in Liverpool and Transatlantic 
Slavery, ed. David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz, and Anthony Tibbles, (Liverpool: 2007), p.67 
59 
Cameroon further—seen before by analysing cargo assortments—by examining how 
Davenport chose ships and captains.  
 At Old Calabar, Davenport employed a ship and tender system that he had 
learnt in the Gambia trade during the 1750s.
64
 The factory vessel, commanded by an 
experienced captain and carrying a large cargo, purchased a sufficient number of 
slaves to fill the tender —a smaller accompanying craft. Once the tender was full it 
sailed for the Americas, leaving in the hands of the factory vessel its assortment of 
trade goods. The factory vessel then continued to slave in the river until it too was 
loaded. The system enabled a swift turn around for the tender; gave the factory vessel 
a large supply of trade goods; and reduced the mortality of the enslaved cargo, as 
African captives purchased shortly after the factory ship‘s arrival at Calabar would 
spend less time chained below deck, waiting for the vessel to be loaded.
65
  
 The ship and tender system had an additional advantage: inexperienced 
captains could be trained on board tenders in the manner of trade at Old Calabar. At 
Old Calabar the two-ship system paired a senior, experienced captain with his junior 
protégé—referred to by Efik trader Antera Duke as the captain‘s ―tender.‖ The age 
gradation between senior captain and junior ―tender‖ mirrored Efik age sets, creating 
personal relationships that formed the nexus of trade at Old Calabar.
66
 A Cameroon 
captain, by contrast, almost always operated alone from single vessels.
67
 Given the 
lower number of slaves exported from Cameroon River, it is likely that the river did 
not necessitate the two ship system. As a result, the Cameroon took fewer vessels, and 
presented fewer opportunities for new captains to gain experience in the region. 
 Crucial to Davenport‘s ―human capital‖ at Old Calabar was Patrick 
Fairweather, a young man in his twenties when he first sailed to the Cross River in the 
1750s who went on to become the senior ship captain, and honorary member of Efik 
                                               
64 Davenport had used the system when he combined the voyages of the Charming Nancy (Voyages 
Database 90480) and her tender James (Voyages Database 90552). 
65 Behrendt, Latham, and Northrup, Diary of Antera Duke, chapter two 
66
 Ibid/ 
67 An exception was when Liverpool vessels began to open up the Cameroon in the 1750s and 1760s. 
Then, a number of vessels went to the river in pairs in order to make use of the experience of the few 
captains who had visited the river. The Henry, for instance, appears to have acted as the tender to the 
larger vessels Union and King of Prussia throughout her five years trading at Cameroon. After 1769, 
the practice ceased and Cameroon vessels invariably sailed/traded as single ships (Trading Accounts of 
the Henry 1765-1767, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the Henry 1767-1769, ODAV; and Trading 
Accounts of the King of Prussia 1767-1779, ODAV). 
60 
society by the 1780s.
68
 Fairweather probably joined Davenport‘s company in 1762 as 
second mate on the Dalrymple, captained by James Berry.
69
 After Berry‘s death on 
the Dalrymple’s third voyage in 1765, Fairweather received a promotion to first mate 
under Captain Alexander Allason.
70
 When Allason himself died during the 
Dalrymple’s fifth voyage, Fairweather received command of the vessel, a position he 
held until 1777.
71
  
 During Patrick Fairweather‘s tenure as the Dalrymple’s captain he trained no 
less than six Calabar captains who later entered Davenport‘s employ. James Sharpe, 
William Seaton and John Sime each served as tenders to Fairweather before earning a 
command of their own Calabar factory vessels.
72 
Three other future commanders—
William Brighouse, John Cooper and William Begg—served on board the Dalrymple 
itself, Brighouse and Cooper as mates, and Begg as a surgeon.
73
 This pool of captains 
sprung directly from James Berry, Davenport‘s first Calabar captain, through Allason 
and, most importantly, Patrick Fairweather, who became perhaps the most valuable 
asset in Davenport‘s Calabar firm.74 
 We can further explore the importance of human capital by examining how 
William Davenport organized merchant partnerships to trade for slaves and ivory at 
Old Calabar. Davenport‘s Old Calabar firm was remarkably stable during the period 
1765-1777, the peak years of his Old Calabar trading. At the heart of the company 
                                               
68 For a detailed account of Fairweather‘s career see Behrendt, "Human Capital," pp.84-85. Patrick 
Fairweather is also mentioned in a brief study of his son Robert Fairweather, a Liverpool banker in the 
early nineteenth century (Hughes, Liverpool Banks & Bankers, pp.220-222).  
69 We cannot know for certain when Fairweather first joined the Dalrymple because he doesn‘t appear 
in the Trading Accounts of the vessel until 1765. Behrendt suggests that Fairweather may have sailed 
―as a teenage apprentice on the Chesterfield captained by Patrick Black‖ in 1755 (Behrendt, "Human 
Capital," p.84; Voyages Database 90541). 
70 Trading Accounts of the Dalrymple 1766-1771, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the Swift, Dreadnaught 
and Dalrymple, 1772-1777, ODAV; Also the captain information in the Voyages Database 
71 Voyages Database 91220 
72 John Sime aided Davenport further by training John Bailie. Bailie then went on to apprentice 
Thomas Cooper, who served Davenport for one voyage in 1784 (Voyages Database 91576, 83267). 
73 Trading Accounts of the Dalrymple 1766-1771, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the Swift, Dreadnaught 
and Dalrymple, 1772-1777, ODAV; Also the captain information in the Voyages Database 
74 When Davenport lost Fairweather to rival firm Tarleton & Backhouse in 1778, he wound down his 
investment in the Old Calabar region. From 1778 until 1781 he held shares in just two Old Calabar 
vessels, one of which was the William, a produce vessel, and the other the Liverpool Hero (Voyages 
Database 82325). Davenport briefly returned to the region in 1783-1785 and invested in seven 
voyages, by which time he had to rely on former Cameroon captains John Smale and Peter Potter to 
command his vessels because so many Old Calabar captains had left his employ (Voyages Database 
83063, 81312).  
61 
was William Davenport and three former Calabar captains: William Earle, Patrick 
Black and Ambrose Lace.
75
   
 Earle, Black and Lace were ostensibly ―sleeping partners‖, men who invested 
capital but took no part in outfitting the vessel.
76
 The Davenport accounts show, 
however, that the three men lent their experience and knowledge of the Old Calabar 
markets and therefore played an active part in the partnership. Crucially, they had 
established ties with Efik traders from the Old Calabar villages Creek Town, Duke 
Town and Old Town. A series of surviving letters show that a relationship clearly 
existed between Davenport and partners and Ephraim Robin John of Old Town; and 
Duke Abashy and Duke Ephraim of Duke Town. Ephraim Robin John, ―Grandy King 
George,‖ considered both Lace and Patrick Black to be ―good‖ men, and in one letter 
to Lace passed on his regards to ―Mr Devenport Marchant Black … [and] allso Mr 
Erll‖.77 Robin John‘s detailed requests for goods that Efik desired also highlights the 
valuable trading intelligence that Lace possessed, and must have passed on to his 
partners. The relationship between Lace and Ephraim Robin John extended beyond 
trade, as Lace brought young Otto Ephraim Robin John to Liverpool, ―and had him at 
School near two years, then sent him out [to Calabar;] he cost me above sixty 
pounds.‖78 
William Earle also remained in contact with Efik merchants after his 
retirement as ship captain in 1752. Earle sent a letter to Duke Abashey of Old Town 
on 16
 
February 1761, clearly part of a frequent correspondence, assuring the Efik 
trader that he ―loved all Calabar [and did] not want to wrong, nor I never did wrong 
any man one copper [rod]‖. Passing on news of the Earle family, he concluded with a 
message from his wife who ―sends her love‖.79 Although no further letters from Efik 
merchants are extant, it is probable that Patrick Black also corresponded with men 
from Creek Town, Old Town or Duke Town, given his longstanding history with Old 
Calabar. There are no recorded instances of Davenport corresponding with the 
                                               
75 Of the thirty-nine Old Calabar ventures Davenport financed in the period 1765-1777, Ambrose Lace 
co-financed twenty-five, William Earle twenty-four, and Patrick Black eighteen. Earle had made two 
voyages to Calabar, Black four, and Lace three. Davenport‘s other Calabar traders in this period were 
John Parker, Robert Jennings and Edward Chaffers, each of whom co-financed between fifteen and 
twenty ventures (based on the ownership data in the Voyages Database). 
76 Richardson, "The Accounts of William Davenport," p.68 
77 Grandy King George to Ambrose Lace, undated Letters [c.1773], [Old Calabar], in Lovejoy and 
Richardson, "Letters of the Old Calabar Slave Trade," pp.106-107 
78 Ambrose Lace to Thomas Jones, Liverpool, 11 November 1773, in Ibid, p.107 
79 William Earle to Duke Abashey, Liverpool, 16 February 1761 in William Earle‘s Letterbook, 23 Jan 
1760- 23 Sept 1761, Earle Papers, MMM, Liverpool 
62 
Calabar traders, but it is probable that he met some of the Efik men during their 
education in Liverpool.
80
 The Calabar traders certainly had the means to stay in 
contact with Davenport and his partners: Calabar assortments included writing 
implements, as in the Hector’s outfit in 1776, which included letter books and 
journals, reams of foolscap paper, ink powder and quills.
81
  
Davenport and his partners earmarked specific goods to win the favour of 
Calabar traders. On the ship Dobson, in 1767, Captain John Potter transported twelve 
brass basins engraved ―Antera Duke‖; in 1771 Creek Town merchant Willy Honesty 
received two coils of cordage addressed to him; the next year the Dalrymple loaded 
thirty basins inscribed ―WH.‖82 Davenport and other British merchants also paid 
workmen to engrave Efik trade names on firearms, bells and canes.
83
 In European 
ports, workers likely loaded crates marked with the names or initials of Calabar 
businessmen; as Old Town merchant Ephraim Robin John stated to Ambrose Lace 
―Please to have my name put on Everything that you send for me.‖84  
Efik traders reciprocated by sending slave children and ivory tusks as gifts to 
the Liverpool merchants. In July 1773, Robin John Otto Ephraim of Old Town wrote 
to Lace that he had sent ―Joshua 1 Little Boy By Captain Cooper‖ of the Dreadnaught 
and ―one Boy By Captain Fairweather‖ of the Dalrymple.85 Not wanting the trouble of 
training the children as household servants, Lace had them sold in the West Indies. 
Robin John‘s mother also sent Lace‘s wife ―one Teeth by Captain Sharp,‖86 and in 
1777, Lace received another tooth marked ―AL‖ weighing 48lb.87 Given their size, 
these ornaments must have been prized tusks, engraved with a greeting from the Efik 
traders and used as ornaments in Davenport and his partner‘s counting houses. 
                                               
80 Lovejoy and Richardson suggest that ―Duke Abashey may have been to Liverpool‖ prior to 1760. If 
so, he probably met Davenport (Lovejoy and Richardson, "Letters of the Old Calabar Slave Trade," 
pp.94-95). Moreover, Robin John Otto Ephraim probably met Davenport during his education in 
Liverpool 1767-1769, as evinced by his father‘s salutation to ―Devonport‖ in 1773 (Ibid., p.96). 
81 Trading Accounts of the Andromache and Hector 1769-1776, ODAV, f.170; Similarly, in 1771 the 
owners of the Lord Cassils loaded two boxes containing eight reams ―Pot Paper‖ and ―60 Books 1 Q:re 
[quire] ea[ch] with Marble Covers,‖ and the May shipped two reams writing paper, two books, four 
quires each, half-bound and lettered, and six books, three quires each, half-bound and lettered (Trading 
Accounts of the Lord Cassils and May 1771-1776, ODAV, f. 20). 
82
 Trading Accounts of the Dalrymple 1766-1771, ODAV, f.45 
83 Davenport and partners paid an engraver for ―Cutting Names on 2 Guns‖ (Trading Accounts of the 
Lord Cassils and May 1771-1776, ODAV, f.6). For silver canes, see Lovejoy and Richardson, "Letters 
of the Old Calabar Slave Trade," p. 103. 
84 Grandy King George to Ambrose Lace, Undated [c.1773], Old Calabar, in Ibid. p.106 
85 Robin John Otto Ephraim to Ambrose Lace, Old Calabar, 19 July 1773, in Ibid., p.105  
86 Ibid. 
87
 Captain William Brighouse to William Davenport, Barbados, 23 March 1777, D/DAV/11 
63 
The Efik letters show precisely why Davenport, Earle, Black, and Lace all 
invested so heavily and consistently in Old Calabar: their personal relationships with 
Efik enabled them to dispatch vessels properly assorted with goods in demand in the 
Cross River Region. Such commercial information gave the firm of Davenport and 
Company a competitive advantage in the Old Calabar market, enabling them to 
entrench their position there.  
 
Davenport‘s Cameroon partnerships, though also dominated by a small core of 
investors, included different combinations of traders but few captains. From 1765 to 
1785, almost every voyage to Cameroon was financed by a group of just ten closely 
tied Liverpool merchants (Table 5). William Davenport, Alexander Nottingham, and 
Thomas Staniforth co-ordinated this small cohort by acting as ship‘s husbands for the 
Cameroon ventures.
88
 
 Nottingham began trading at the Cameroon independently of Davenport 
when, in 1763, he bought a share in the Henry, commanded by Samuel Richardson.
89
 
The venture was Nottingham‘s first as a slaving merchant, probably because at 
twenty-six years of age he had only recently completed an apprenticeship. 
Nottingham did not manage the vessel until its third voyage in 1765, when Davenport 
bought into the venture, at which point the two men must have come to some 
agreement to combine their resources and exploit the Cameroon because, from 1765 
onwards Nottingham and Davenport never parted their investments in the region.
90
 
Thomas Staniforth came to the Cameroon trade after flitting between various 
slaving regions. After finishing his seven year apprenticeship with his father-in-law 
Charles Goore, a slaving merchant from 1749 until 1757, Staniforth invested in 
Guineamen trading to Angola, the Windward Coast, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and 
Benin.
91
 In 1768 he made his first investment in the Cameroon when he fitted out and 
managed the King of Prussia in partnership with Davenport and Alexander 
Nottingham. Staniforth‘s knowledge of Cameroon could not have been particularly 
great because he had not invested there before. However, his ship went on a ―joint 
                                               
88 Ship accounts list the vessels‘ husband either by referring to the name of the company (for example, 
William Davenport & Co.), or by the member of the partnership who made the ―disbursements‖ (cash 
purchases) of the cargo. 
89 Voyages Database 91079 
90 Based on the ownership information in the Voyages Database 
91
 Ibid. 
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venture‖ with the Henry in which ―each owner of [the] vessel is equally concerned in 
both,‖ and experienced captain Samuel Richardson took the helm of the King of 
Prussia.
92
 As investors in the King of Prussia venture, Davenport and Nottingham 
must have inducted Staniforth into their small clique of merchants because the three 
men formed a small group that dominated the slave trade at Cameroon until the end of 
the American War. 
 
Table 5: William Davenport’s Merchant Partners in the Cameroon Region, 
1765-1785 
 
 Investments As Manager 
Davenport, William 45 20 
Staniforth, Thomas 21 10 
Doran, Felix 20 0 
Martin, Charles 20 0 
Nottingham, Alex 20 11 
Pole, William 20 0 
Taylor, Joseph 20 0 
Case, Thomas 17 0 
Watts, George Warren 17 0 
Case, Clayton 16 0 
Hughes, Thomas* 15 0 
Middleton, Richard 11 0 
 * Former Cameroon captain 
Sample: Davenport‘s partners who invested in ten or more Cameroon ventures. 
Source: Based on the ownership data in Voyages Database 
Note: Three ventures were managed by Thomas & William Earle Junior, and one by John 
Copeland. All of these ventures occurred in the period 1779-1785. 
 
As the ship‘s husbands of the Cameroon ventures, Davenport, Staniforth and 
Nottingham brought other partners into the market on the basis of friendship or 
previous business connections. Based on the ownership records, Nottingham brought 
Felix Doran, Charles Martin, and Joseph Taylor to the firm; Davenport added Thomas 
Hughes, George Warren Watts and William Pole to the trade;
93
 and Thomas 
                                               
92 Thomas Staniforth & Co. to Captain Samuel Richardson, Liverpool, 11 October 1767, in Trading 
Accounts of the King of Prussia 1767-1779¸ ODAV 
93 George Warren Watts was Davenport‘s neighbour on Drury Lane, and seems to have operated a 
large insurance office (Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV, f.14). It is not clear what 
Davenport‘s connection with William Pole was, but he was clearly an important member of 
Liverpool‘s elite. Brooke writes that Pole was ―Mayor in 1778… and [held] the office of stamp 
distributor for Liverpool‖ (Brooke, Liverpool as It Was, pp.295-296). 
65 
Staniforth consistently invested alongside Thomas and Clayton Case.
94
 There is 
nothing in the ownership patterns of these men to suggest that they were anything 
more than minor speculators in the Liverpool slave trade and appear instead, to have 
simply been friends of the three ―gate-keepers‖ of the Cameroon region: Davenport, 
Nottingham and Staniforth.  
The Davenport group controlled a small pool of experienced Cameroon 
captains, that began with Samuel Richardson and Thomas Hughes, the two pioneering 
slaving captains in the region. Hughes made ten voyages to Cameroon between 1757 
and 1770, including the first in the Racoon, during which time he trained John Peers 
and John Eccles as captains.
95
 Peers‘ first mate on the Badger, Peter Potter, went on to 
become Davenport‘s key Cameroon captain throughout the American War. Samuel 
Richardson commanded seven voyages to Cameroon and trained Joseph White, John 
Hollingsworth and John Smale as captains.
96
 By rewarding these men with commands 
of their own ships, Davenport and his small group of partners kept a tight reign on 
Cameroon, successfully preventing any of their captains from joining other slaving 
firms who had an eye to pushing into the region.
97
 
Of the Cameroon captains, only Thomas Hughes joined Davenport‘s firm as 
an established slaving merchant. It is possible that Hughes engendered the same 
relationship with the Duala people that Lace enjoyed with the Efik. In addition, 
Hughes probably consulted with Davenport on the assortments desired at Cameroon. 
This would explain his longevity in the Cameroon trade, and the leading position that 
Davenport, with whom he invariably invested, enjoyed in that market. Apart from 
Hughes, only three other Cameroon captains subsequently invested there: John Bury, 
who co-financed six voyages, acting as husband for two; John Smale, who held shares 
in five ventures, but never managed any; and Thomas Rymer, who husbanded five 
voyages from 1771 until 1775.
98
 Calabar surgeon and captain William Begg invested 
                                               
94 Based on the ownership information in the Voyages Database 
95
 Based on the captains information in the Voyages Database 
96 Based on the ownership information in the Voyages Database and the Cameroon Trading Accounts 
in the Davenport papers 
97 A single exception was Captain John Eccles who commanded Davenport‘s ship William to 
Cameroon 1767-1770 (Voyages Database: 91214, 91215, 91585), before attempting to form his own 
Cameroon firm in October 1772. Eccles died in command of the firm‘s only ship Peggy in 1772 
(Voyages Database: 91810), ending any hope of challenging Davenport‘s stranglehold on the region. 
98
 Based on the ownership data in the Voyages Database 
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in Cameroon with the firm Gregson, Case & Aspinall from 1785 to 1792, but had 
never visited the estuary.
99
  
Few Cameroon captains became resident ship-owners because Liverpool 
merchants did not utilize their connections to the Duala. In contrast to the outfitting 
records for Davenport‘s Calabar ventures, those to the Cameroon give no evidence of 
close personal trading relationships between Britons and Duala. The absence of 
writing implements from all extant trading assortments outfitted for Cameroon tells us 
that the Duala did not correspond with Liverpool merchants via captains.
100
 Neither 
did Duala traders receive specific trading goods, engraved or labelled for their own 
use; no single Duala trader is mentioned in the Davenport accounts. As such, it is 
likely that the Duala did not develop relationships with the Liverpool traders through 
experienced Cameroon captains. 
* 
If Davenport did not maintain ties with individual Duala merchants, how did 
he maintain his market share at Cameroon? To answer this question we must examine 
his other business concerns.  
In 1766, Davenport established a bead company in partnership with Peter 
Holme, Thomas Hodgson, the Earle brothers Ralph, Thomas, and William, and John 
Copeland. The partnership combined Davenport, William Earle and Copeland‘s 
experience in the Guinea trade with Livorno residents Thomas Earle and Thomas 
Hodgson‘s connections to the Mediterranean bead market. Each of the partners were 
―Gentlemen of property‖, with substantial business concerns in Liverpool and 
numerous investments in the slave trade.
101
 Davenport seems to have been the 
instigator of the bead company project as he ―was appointed the manager, and 
bookeeper for the Bead Company, and he kept the books … and paid, and received all 
the moneys, and did employ Jos[eph] Wimpey of London Banker for the 
Company.‖102 Moreover, Davenport‘s ―large Credit with Wimpey supported the 
                                               
99 Begg possessed experience as an African produce trader after commanding Davenport‘s brig 
William, which traded for ivory and palm oil at Old Calabar in 1780-1781. It may be that he applied his 
knowledge of the produce trade to the ivory rich Cameroon market. See chapter three for further 
information on Davenport‘s produce trading. 
100 Based on an analysis of the outfitting records in the Trading Accounts for Davenport‘s Cameroon 
ventures. 
101 William Davenport to Charles Ford, Liverpool, 23 March 1779, D/DAV/1 
102 ―A Case No. 5‖, Liverpool, 21 January 1791, 920CHA/10/9, in Edward Chaffers papers, MMM, 
Liverpool, England 
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Credit of the Company.‖103 Using their Mediterranean trading vessel Polly, the firm 
imported beads and cowries, and supplied both the partner‘s vessels and those of the 
other Liverpool slavers.
104
  
Establishing the bead company was a remarkable piece of enterprise on the 
part of Davenport, made in response to changes in the structure of the Liverpool slave 
trade. Prior to 1766 Liverpool slaving merchants had sourced much of their trading 
cargo, including beads, from Holland, and shipped them to the Isle of Man for 
collection by outgoing Guineamen. The Isle of Man enjoyed tax-free status under the 
feudal right granted to the Dukes of Atholl, the ―Lords of Man‖, allowing Liverpool 
merchants to circumvent the often prohibitory customs imposed on foreign goods by 
the mercantilist British Parliament. As Kenneth Morgan has noted, ―The scale of the 
trade was substantial‖ with Dutch vessels bringing ―goods valued at nearly £224,000 
to the Isle of Man‖ between 1718 and 1764.105 This lucrative commerce ended in 
1765 when the British Government incorporated the island into the British customs 
system with the passage of the Isle of Man Purchase Act.
106
  
Davenport seized the opportunity to bring beads directly to Liverpool and 
established the bead company in July 1766. The articles of partnership declared the 
company would ―[carry] on the Business or Trade of Vending and disposing of Beads, 
Arrangoes, Cowries, Corral,‖ and that the ―company stock… shall be upwards of ten 
thousand pounds but not to exceed the sum of twenty thousand pounds.‖107 As start up 
capital, each of the seven partners paid £331, providing £2,317 in cash to purchase 
stocks of beads.
108
 However, the main finance for the bead company came from the 
wider Liverpool merchant community who lent £24,350 to the company in the first 
three years of its operation, at an interest rate of 4.5 percent.
109
 The ready availability 
of money ―on bond‖ indicates that Liverpool‘s merchants possessed ample capital to 
invest in local ventures, of which Davenport and his associates took full advantage. 
                                               
103 William Davenport to Edward Chaffers, Liverpool, 27 June 1790, 920CHA/10/9, in Edward 
Chaffers papers, MMM, Liverpool, England 
104 ―Owners Polly 1768-1769‖ in Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; Bead Cash Book 
1766-1776, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; Beads Ledger 1766-1770, Liverpool, ODAV 
105 Morgan, "Liverpool's Dominance in the British Slave Trade, 1740-1807," p.21 
106 The Isle of Man purchase act is also known as ―Revestment.‖ (Geo 3, cap 26) 
107 ―Articles of Partnership, 1766 re. selling of beads, arrangoes etc‖ in Earle Papers, MMM, Liverpool; 
Bead Cash Book 1766-1776, Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
108 Bead Cash Book 1766-1776, Liverpool, D/DAV/2, f.1 
109 The loans are notified throughout the Bead Cash Book 1766-1776, Liverpool, D/DAV/2, including 
the frequent interest payments made by the company. 
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With substantial financial backing, the company rapidly expanded, and by 1770 had 
vended £39,048 worth of beads to Liverpool slaving ships.
110
 
 The establishment of Davenport‘s bead company coincided with his 
specialization in the Cameroon market. With a reliable and steady supply of beads and 
cowries—two items that formed from a third to a half of the total cargo by value—
Davenport could fit out Cameroon vessels supplied by his own company. As a result, 
Davenport massively increased his investment in the Cameroon region. Prior to 1766 
Davenport had dispatched four small experimental vessels to the Cameroon, costing 
him in total just £1,372. From 1766 onwards Davenport invested in, on average, three 
vessels per annum to the region; an outlay on his part of £25,699 in the period 1766-
1777.
111
  
In addition to his bead concern, Davenport supplied substantial quantities of 
iron bars and hoops to his Cameroon vessels. He imported iron bars from Germany, 
Scandinavia and London, and iron hoops, for the manufacture of barrels, from 
London.
112
 Davenport supplied bars to slaving firms outfitting to all regions in Africa, 
as well as to his own vessels trading at Old Calabar and Cameroon.
113
 The iron hoops 
were primarily sold to his own ships, but also to Thomas Huntington, a cooper who 
supplied Davenport‘s vessels with finished barrels and hogsheads.114  
Davenport maximised the efficiency of his Africa company further by buying 
and selling ivory, sourced mostly from Cameroon. Davenport operated an ivory 
trading company that bought approximately four tons of ivory per annum and resold it 
to a network of customers throughout England, Scotland, and Ireland. Using his 
network of contacts Davenport could quickly and efficiently dispose of the large 
quantities of ivory brought back to Liverpool by his Cameroon and Old Calabar 
vessels. In this way, Davenport‘s ivory dealings acted as valuable link in his Bight of 
Biafra business chain.
115
 
                                               
110 Account Book for Beads and Cowries 1766-1770, Liverpool, ODAV, f.153 
111
 Based on the Trading Accounts for Davenport‘s Cameroon ventures, the estimates of Davenport‘s 
capital expenditure made in chapter one, and the ownership information in the Voyages Database.  
112 Waste Book 1766-1780, Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
113 Ibid. 
114 ―Iron Hoops Bought and Sold 1768-1777‖, in Ivory Book 1763-1785, Liverpool D/DAV/1, ff.68-
70; Thomas Huntington was described as a ―cooper and victualler‖ in 1777 (Gore, Gore's Liverpool 
Directory for the Year 1777, p.44). 
115
 We discuss Davenport‘s ivory business in detail in chapter three. 
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 To illustrate how Davenport operated his Cameroon concern, consider the 
voyage of the Henry in 1769.
116
 Davenport took a one eighth share in the voyage 
alongside his usual cohort of Cameroon partners: the Case brothers, Thomas and 
Clayton; Felix Doran; William Taylor; Thomas Staniforth; Charles Martin; William 
Pole; George Warren Watts; and Alexander Nottingham, the ship‘s husband for the 
voyage. Davenport supplied £723 of the vessel‘s £1,911 cargo: beads, cowries, 
ironware and brandy—items making up forty percent of the cargo by value. At the 
completion of the Henry’s voyage, Davenport also purchased the vessel‘s £166 of 
ivory, later to be on sold to his customers.  
 The Henry’s voyage demonstrates the highly specialised supply chain that 
Davenport had developed for the Cameroon market. Through his bead company and 
iron concern, Davenport could supply three trade goods that comprised up to a half of 
the cargo at the Cameroon market: beads, cowries and iron bars. It follows, therefore, 
that Davenport became such a large investor in the Cameroon market because he had 
geared his other business concerns towards that trade. At the same time, though, 
Davenport‘s other businesses did not lend themselves well to the Old Calabar trade. 
Davenport supplied his Old Calabar vessels with iron bars, hoops and the small 
quantities of beads desired by that market; together they formed just ten percent of the 
cargo by value. Furthermore, Davenport made little effort to try and supply high 
demand Calabar goods such as copper rods to his vessels. Davenport even abandoned 
his wine business in 1773, through which he had formally supplied liquor to Calabar 
vessels (see chapter three). It is curious, then, that Davenport moved away from 
integrating his Calabar supply chain, just as he began specializing in the Cameroon 
market.  
Perhaps other slaving trading merchants, operating like Davenport, controlled 
the supply of high-demand Calabar goods.
117
 The slaving firms Brown, Birch & Leay 
and Clowes & Harding, both operated by friends of Davenport, supplied brass and 
copper rods to the majority of Davenport‘s vessels. Similarly, the Warrington Copper 
& Brass Company, in which William Boats invested, supplied metals to numerous 
Bonny ventures, and a number of Davenport‘s Calabar ships. William James, also 
                                               
116 Voyages Database 91083; The following is based on the Trading Accounts of the Henry 1767-1769, 
ODAV 
117 The following is based upon an analysis of suppliers in the Trading Accounts of thirty of 
Davenport‘s Old Calabar ventures. 
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sold large quantities of brass neptunes to Davenport.
118
 Even Manchester‘s textile 
merchants possessed shares in slaving vessels. Charles Ford and Folliot Powell both 
invested in the Liverpool slave trade whilst simultaneously supplying Davenport‘s 
Manchester goods.
119
 It appears, then, that Davenport could not develop the same 
vertically integrated company for his Calabar ventures as he could at Cameroon—
other Lancashire merchants had already captured markets for key trading goods, such 
as textiles and copper, demanded in the Cross River Region. 
The organizational advantage of Davenport‘s Old Calabar ventures lay not in 
an efficient supply chain, like he possessed for his Cameroon trades, but in the select 
group of experienced captain and merchant investors, with their developed ties to the 
Efik traders who consistently invested alongside him. Whilst less tangible, these 
personal links clearly benefited Davenport‘s company because he managed to remain 
the pre-eminent Liverpool slaving merchant in the Cross River Region for a 
generation. Moreover, he maintained market share throughout the wartime period, and 
in a region that, each year, required outfitters to organize varied assortments of 
trading goods based on the changing desires of Efik consumers. His investors at 
Cameroon, by contrast, included mostly men who could bring capital, but little else, 
to the organisation. In a market where connections to the African traders mattered less 
than the ability to maintain a consistent supply of trade goods, this structure seems to 
have worked perfectly well. Thus, it is clear how William Davenport could operate 
successfully in two diverse African markets. By specialising each arm of his firm 
according to African market realities, Davenport ensured that he held a competitive 
advantage in both regions. 
* 
 Focusing on Davenport‘s marketing strategies at Old Calabar and Cameroon 
has illuminated how he managed his slaving business, enabling him to become one of 
Liverpool‘s largest Guinea merchants. Crucial to Davenport‘s success was his 
enterprise. In shifting away from the Gambia, and into the Old Calabar market, 
Davenport showed a willingness to adapt to changes in the structure of the African 
slave trade. Moreover, by opening up Cameroon to the slave trade, Davenport was 
                                               
118 Based on the Trading Accounts of Davenport‘s Cameroon ventures. 
119 Folliot Powell invested in fourteen slaving ventures between 1765 and 1783. Charles Ford was a 
much larger investor and took shares in thirty ventures from 1760 until 1772. He appears to have been 
linked to William James as the two men frequently invested alongside each other (based on the 
ownership information in the Voyages Database). 
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able to gain an early advantage in the region, allowing him to monopolize the 
employment of captains, and the supply of the goods needed to trade there. As part of 
this strategy Davenport established his bead company, taking full advantage of a 
unique change in the British customs system, and making Liverpool a centre of the 
bead trade. How Davenport financially profited from these changes he wrought in the 
Liverpool slave trade will be explored in the next chapter. 
 
 Chapter 3: William Davenport’s Business Profits 
 
We saw in the previous chapter how William Davenport organised his 
merchant house to suit two unique African markets. Constructing this highly 
specialised company was a complicated and time consuming task: fitting out ships, 
and cultivating business associates, captains, African middlemen, and suppliers 
required commitment from Davenport at the expense of marriage and politics. 
Financial profit drove Davenport to devote himself entirely to business; after all, he 
had come to Liverpool as a young man to ―make his fortune.‖ Davenport was clearly 
successful in this endeavour. Upon his death bed he held a fortune of £34,000, making 
him one of Liverpool‘s richest slaving merchants. Was the slave trade, though, the 
root of his prosperity?  
 We can trace the slave trade‘s contribution to Davenport‘s wealth by 
examining a range of information contained in the Old and New Davenport Papers. 
Davenport kept detailed records for each aspect of his businesses. In particular, he 
recorded his slaving ventures in ship accounts, and ledger books, using double-entry 
bookkeeping with debit and credit columns to calculate his profits.
1
 For his other 
businesses, Davenport kept accounts of his purchases and sales of goods such as 
ivory, beads, and wine in his waste books and ledgers.
2
 Most of these records are 
extant in the Davenport papers allowing us to calculate his profits from a variety of 
concerns, an exercise performed by no other historian.  
This chapter will determine William Davenport‘s profits in his range of 
business ventures and demonstrate how he maintained liquidity over a forty-year 
career that bridged two major European/Atlantic wars and several credit crises.  We 
will begin our analysis by examining how Davenport financially organised his 
company, identifying how and why he blended his slaving and non-slaving 
businesses. We will then calculate Davenport‘s slave trading profits using a large 
sample of his ventures, analysing his returns by time period and African region. In the 
third section, we will consider Davenport‘s non-slaving profits, including his 
speculation in financial instruments. Finally, we will ask which of the three ventures 
                                               
1 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV; Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV 
2 Personal Ledger 1763-1772, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; Bead Cash Book 1766-1776, Liverpool, 
D/DAV/2; Waste Book 1766-1780, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; Ivory Book 1763-1785, Liverpool, 
D/DAV/1; Waste Book 1745-1766, Liverpool, ODAV 
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—slaving, non-slaving, and financial securities— contributed to Davenport‘s financial 
success. 
* 
At present, remarkably little is known about how Liverpool merchants 
organised their companies to finance and manage slaving voyages. When David 
Richardson considered the way in which Davenport organised slaving voyages in 
1976, for example, he noted that ―our knowledge of the internal workings of [slaving] 
partnerships is… very incomplete.‖3 Although research into the use of credit in the 
Atlantic economy—most notably by Jacob Price, B.L. Anderson and, more recently, 
Peter Mathias—has advanced our knowledge of how slaving merchants used credit to 
finance their voyages, Richardson‘s statement still holds true.4 Thus, in order to 
understand how William Davenport profited from the slave trade we will first have to 
consider how he structured his company to reap those profits.  
We can best understand the financial organisation of Davenport‘s slaving 
merchant house through the peculiar way in which slaving ventures were organised. 
The slave trade was unique because its investors owned both a Guineaman‘s hull and 
its cargo.
5
 The ship, stores and cargoes were purchased by the ship‘s husband (often 
with the guidance and assistance of current or former slaving captains), a role adopted 
by Davenport for most of his career.
6
 The ship‘s husband made purchases in two 
different ways. Firstly, he bought items using ―Tradesman‘s notes‖—bills of credit 
with terms ranging, according to the type of goods purchased, from two months to a 
year, and comprising between half to two thirds of the total outlay on the voyage. 
Secondly, the husband purchased items with cash, usually at a discount of 10-20 
percent from the credit price.
7
 After drawing up the voyage accounts, he notified each 
                                               
3 Richardson, "The Accounts of William Davenport," p.67 
4 Anderson, "The Lancashire Bill System," pp.59-97; Anderson, "Financial Institutions on 
Merseyside," , pp.26-53; Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade: The View from the 
Chesapeake, 1700-1776, ; Jacob M. Price, "Credit in the Slave Trade and Plantation Economies," in 
Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System, ed. Barbara L. Solow, (Cambridge: 1994), pp.293-339; 
Peter Mathias, "Risk, Credit and Kinship in Early Modern Enterprise," in The Early Modern Atlantic 
Economy, ed. John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, (Cambridge: 2000), pp.15-35. 
5 In other overseas trades, such as the West India or Mediterranean trades, ship-owners charged freight 
to carry goods in the hulls of their vessels.  
6 Davenport managed seventy-four ventures from 1753-1785 (Based on the Trading Accounts in the 
Davenport papers, and the ownership data in the Voyages Database). 
7
 Richardson, "The Accounts of William Davenport," pp.71-72 
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partner of their ―division‖ of the ship by giving them a list of the tradesmen‘s notes to 
remit, and a portion of the disbursements according to their share in the vessel.
8
  
Although the ship‘s husband had expended large sums of money on the 
disbursements, he did not expect the partners to immediately reimburse him. Instead 
he placed the amount owed by each partner into his accounts ledger. These accounts 
were ongoing affairs, rarely balanced off to settle outstanding debts, as large balances 
offset against each other as partners transacted business.
9
 Investments in slaving 
ventures went into the accounts alongside other transactions, and hence remained 
outstanding for a year or more. In the mean time the slaving vessel would have made 
its voyage and returned with the remittances from the slave sale.  
Bills of exchange were the most common form of remittance in the Liverpool 
slave trade. The bill of exchange involved three different parties: the drawer, the 
payee, and the guarantor. The drawer instigated the bill of exchange by writing out a 
pro-forma that instructed the guarantee to pay an amount to the payee after a certain 
period of time had elapsed. In a slave sale, the drawer was the American factor who 
had sold the enslaved Africans; the payee the managing partner of the slaving voyage; 
and the guarantor was typically a London banker.
10
 When carried back to Liverpool, 
the bills were sent either to London or a local banking house to be accepted by the 
guarantor. If accepted, the bills then became ―good‖ and could be either kept until 
their maturity, by which time they were realised for their full value, discounted for 
cash at a rate of five percent or transferred, also at a discount.  
 The main advantage to the ―bills in the bottom‖ system was that it removed 
the need to bring remittances home in the form of produce as barter.
11
 Loading sugar 
in the Americas and selling the commodity in Liverpool took time, and slaving ships 
had to compete with West Indiamen to freight the plantation produce home to 
England. Given that ―dispatch is the life of every thing‖ in a slaving voyage, as 
                                               
8 Based upon the Trading Accounts in the Davenport papers; On the Dreadnaught’s 1776 voyage, for 
example, the total cost of the voyage was £3,425, of which £1,761 was purchased using tradesmen‘s 
notes and £1,664 using cash. As one eighth share holder in the Dreadnaught, John Parker received 
from Davenport (the ship‘s husband) seven tradesman‘s to pay, and a bill for £208 as his one eighth 
share of the cash disbursements (Voyages Database 91839; Trading Accounts of the Dreadnaught 
1776-1777, Liverpool, ODAV). 
9 Three of Davenport‘s ledgers are extant: Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV; Personal 
Ledger 1763-1772, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; and Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV. From the 
opening and closing balances in the Ledger Book 1763-1775, it is clear that he originally kept other 
ledgers which are now lost. 
10 Price, "Credit in the Slave Trade and Plantation Economies," pp.311-312 
11 ―Bills in the bottom‖ was an eighteenth century term used to describe the system. It is alternatively 
known as the ―immediate remittance‖ system. (Ibid., p.311) 
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William Earle reminded his former apprentice Isaac Dove, lingering in the West 
Indies was undesirable.
12
 Moreover sugar prices could decrease while slaving vessels 
were at sea, and therefore the slaving merchant had no guarantee that his remittances 
would maintain their value. As a result, the bills in the bottom system became the 
preferred method to bring slave sales home when compared to the unwieldy and 
unpredictable produce trade.
13
 
A major disadvantage to the bills remittance system was the length of time the 
bills took to mature. Factors remitted slave sales in three tranches of bills, each with a 
progressively higher date later until maturity. In peace time, for example, Davenport 
received credit terms of three, six and nine months. In war time these terms could 
reach two years or more.
14
 Because banking houses discounted bills based on the 
length of time remaining until maturity, it was in the interest of slaving merchants to 
let their bills reach maturity rather than reduce their value through discount. Guinea 
merchants were particularly loath to discount their bills because of the high value of 
remittances from slave sales. For example, a relatively small cargo of two hundred 
captives could be sold for £6,000 in the Americas, remitted in three bills valued at 
£2,000 each. Taking a five percent discount from these bills would sink the profits of 
the voyage by £300, a substantial sum that could make the difference between a 
voyage profit or loss. Moreover, these bills were of little use in the purchase of 
trading goods because no single item in a slavers cargo cost more than £1,000.
15
 As a 
result, as Anderson states, Davenport ―retained quite long-dated bills of exchange 
                                               
12 William Earle to Isaac Dove, Liverpool, 22 April 1761, in William Earle‘s Letterbook, 23 Jan 1760- 
23 Sept 1761, Earle Papers, MMM, Liverpool, England 
13 The shift from the produce trade to the bills in the bottom system is evident in Davenport‘s career. In 
Davenport‘s first letter book (1747-1759) he exhorted his captains to bring back produce, or at the very 
least a freight of produce because ―tis a great Loss to have a ship come home in ballast‖ (William 
Davenport & Co. to Captain John Maddocks, Liverpool, 10 July 1755, in Letter and Bill Book 1747-
1761, ODAV). From 1758 onwards, however, Davenport‘s captains always brought remittances home 
in bills of exchange. Exceptions to this rule sometimes occurred during the credit crisis of 1772, the 
Seven Years‘ War and the American Wars, when factors were forced to make their remittances in 
produce, or alternatively Spanish silver dollars (Based upon an analysis of the insets of the ventures 
documented in the Trading Accounts within the Davenport papers). 
14 Credit was also stretched during credit crises, such as in 1772, when many of Davenport‘s vessels 
returned with bills ranging from fifteen to twenty-four months (Ibid). 
15 In Davenport‘s ventures the most expensive category of trading goods was textiles for the Old 
Calabar market. Although the overall cost of textiles for a vessel may be £1,500-£2,500, purchases 
were invariably made from two or three suppliers, and the cost split between several of the voyage 
investors. On the Dobson’s 1769 voyage, for example, Christopher Hassel bought £517 worth of India 
textiles from Bostock & Bainbridge of London for the outfit. He split the cost between five of the 
voyage investors, each of whom had to pay a tradesman‘s note of £134 or less. (Trading Accounts of 
the Dobson & Fox 1769-1771, ODAV).    
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even when trade was poor, and only when his own financial position became pressing 
did he have them discounted.‖16 
When the bills of exchange reached maturity, the ship‘s husband received the 
proceeds of the slave sale into his London bank account. After taking account of the 
costs of clearing the vessel into Liverpool, he calculated the share owed to each 
partner in the ―inset‖ account.17 Exactly like the outward cost of the slaving vessel, 
the husband placed the inset to the credit of the partner account, an amount that 
usually cleared the obligation for the cash disbursements and left a surplus. In this 
way money rarely changed hands for a partner‘s obligations towards slaving vessels. 
This was particularly the case between ship‘s husbands. Take, for example, 
Davenport‘s account with William Earle. In the late 1760s, Davenport held 
investments in Earle‘s ships Sisters, Friendship and Little Britain. At the same time, 
Earle possessed a share in Davenport‘s ships Dalrymple and Neptune. All told, the 
two men transacted £4,769 in business between November 1766 and June 1768. Of 
these transactions just £882 was actual money changing hands.
18
  
Even the ―money‖ changing hands was not necessarily hard currency because, 
as Anderson asserts, we must ―adopt the widest possible definition of money for the 
eighteenth century.‖19 Merchants carried out most of their transactions with short 
dated bills of exchange, not with bags of coins, so that even the ―cash‖ disbursements 
were rarely paid with specie: only the small, incidental items of expenditure costing 
no more than £5 were paid with coinage.
20
 All other obligations were cleared through 
either the accounts ledgers, or paid with short dated inland bills of exchange. The use 
of bills was necessitated by the government‘s reluctance to mint sufficient coinage to 
meet the demands of Britain‘s rapidly expanding economy. As a provincial town, at a 
three-day journey‘s remove from London, Britain‘s financial hub, Liverpool suffered 
acutely from a lack of coinage, to the extent that local tradesmen often issued tokens 
                                               
16 Anderson, "The Lancashire Bill System," p.78 
17 Based upon an analysis of the insets of the Trading Accounts within the Davenport papers 
18 Personal Accounts Ledger 1763-1772, Liverpool, D/DAV/2, ff.28,52,84,123,185  
19
 B.L. Anderson, "Money and the Structure of Credit in the Eighteenth Century", Business History, 
vol. 12, no. 2, (1970), p.86 
20 The major exception tended to be the advance wages paid to the slave ship sailors who were 
exceptional in receiving two months of their wages in advance pay, rather than the one customary in 
other trades. Moreover, slave ships took large crews compared to other trades as extra men were 
needed to guard and feed the slaves, and offset the inevitable mortality on the African coast. As a result 
the ship‘s husband had to pay out between £150 and £300 to the sailors before the ship sailed, a large 
proportion of the actual cash changing hands during a voyage (Behrendt, "Human Capital," p.73). 
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in place of cash.
21
 In the absence of specie, bills acted as paper currency throughout 
the eighteenth century, a transferable note backed by the London banks. Nonetheless, 
the bills were still instruments of credit, not coinage, and hence the entire system of 
finance rested upon trust and confidence in the banks and the merchant community to 
honour them.  
Thus, the Liverpool slave trade was financed almost entirely by credit 
transactions in one form or another. Credit between partners paid for the outfitting 
costs of slave ships; tradesmen‘s notes paid for the hull and the cargoes; short dated 
bills paid for ―cash‖ disbursements; and bills of exchange drawn on London banks 
returned slave sales. Such was the reliance upon bills of credit that a slaving voyage 
may involve less than £250 of actual specie changing hands. To illustrate the ubiquity 
of credit transactions, consider the voyage of Davenport‘s ship William, a small vessel 
trading to Cameroon in 1769. The William cost £2,141 to fit out of which £429 were 
tradesmen‘s notes and £1,363 cash disbursements. The actual amount of ―cash‖ 
expended on the disbursements was, however, just £119. The rest of the William’s 
disbursements were cleared through the accounts ledger, later to be paid with bills of 
exchange. The William’s inset also involved little cash changing hands. When the 
vessel returned to Liverpool, Davenport had to issue £108 in specie to clear the 
seamen‘s wages and other miscellaneous expenses. The rest of the William’s inset 
consisted of three £621 bills of exchange that Davenport sent to his London banker 
and, upon their acceptance, placed to the credit of his partner‘s accounts. In total, 
then, the William’s venture involved just £227 of actual cash changing hands out of 
nearly £4,000 in transactions.
22
  
To pay for the cash disbursements, the ship‘s husband still required a large 
supply of small bills on hand. Davenport sourced bills locally by trading in goods 
with short terms of credit. We can establish what lines of trade Davenport dealt in 
thanks to the existence of two waste books—small memorandum books recording 
sales—covering the concurrent periods 1745-1765 and 1766-1780.23 Although David 
Richardson scanned the first waste book in his study of Davenport‘s profits, no 
                                               
21 Anderson, "Financial Institutions on Merseyside," p.28 
22 Trading Accounts of the William 1766-1773, ODAV  
23
 Waste Book 1745-1766, Liverpool, ODAV; Waste Book 1766-1780, Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
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historian has examined either waste book in detail.
24
 For the purpose of this study the 
waste books have been entered into a database to provide as complete a picture as 
possible of Davenport‘s trading concerns.  In total the two waste books record 4,167 
transactions, the majority of which occurred locally, and typically recorded the sale of 
goods to other Liverpool merchants. Other transactions record business with a 
network of British and Irish customers, most of whom were concentrated in London 
and the counties of Northern England. There is also a small amount of business with 
European merchants, although these are almost all with William and James Manson, a 
firm of Scottish émigré merchants fixed in Rotterdam, and Earle and Hodgson, 
Davenport‘s bead supplier.    
The first waste book shows Davenport acting very much as a general merchant 
for the first years of his career. Throughout the 1740s and 1750s he imported produce, 
such as sugar, wine, sweet meats and ginger, and vended them in his capacity as a 
grocer. He was joined in this endeavour with George Clowes, a Cheshire gentleman 
who had apprenticed with Whaley, and with whom Davenport sold £600 worth of 
produce in their first three years of trade, 1748-1750. Davenport and Clowes also 
traded for ivory by sending ―small private adventures‖ to Africa to ―barter for Teeth 
of ye best kind.‖25 From 1751, Davenport also shipped Irish linen and glue in 
company with his relative Thomas Egerton.
26
 They sold the majority of the wares in 
northwest England, but some may have been shipped to the West Indies in exchange 
for groceries, as Davenport traded ―a few pieces of … wide Irish linens‖ to Jamaica in 
exchange for ―good Muscovado Sugar, Ginger and Pimineto‖ in April 1755.27 In the 
same year Davenport abandoned the Irish linen trade because ―there seems to be little, 
or no demand‖ for linen in Liverpool.28 
By 1760, Davenport had also left the grocery trade as he specialised his 
business in Africa. For the remainder of his career, the vast majority of Davenport‘s 
dealings concerned the sale of goods to, or the purchase of items from, slaving 
vessels. As we saw in chapter two, Davenport vended beads, iron bars, iron hoops, 
                                               
24 David Richardson, ―A Brief Introduction to the Microfilm Edition of the William Davenport Papers,‖ 
British Online Archives, 1998, available from 
http://www.britishonlinearchives.co.uk/9781851171767.php, p.4 
25 William Davenport to Captain John Simmons, Liverpool, 12 August 1748, in Letter and Bill Book 
1747-1761, ODAV 
26 Thomas Egerton is presumably related to Davenport‘s aunt Christina Egerton. 
27 William Davenport to Messrs Southwark & Case, Liverpool, 21 April 1755, in Letter and Bill Book 
1747-1761, ODAV 
28
 Ibid. 
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and wine to slaving vessels. Aside from selling goods to slavers, Davenport‘s other 
major business was brokering ivory. Purchasing ivory in Africa was very much an 
adjunct to slave trading in that ―elephant‘s teeth‖ were bartered on the African coast 
and carried in slaving vessels. However, Davenport‘s ivory business was in many 
senses operated as a separate concern from his slaving house. Only a quarter of the 
ivory Davenport purchased between 1763 and 1785 came from his own vessels.
29
 
Moreover, from 1748 until 1769 Davenport operated his ivory company as a 
partnership, first with George Clowes, and then with Elizabeth Roughsedge, a local 
ironmonger who did not invest in the slave trade.
30
 We can hence consider 
Davenport‘s slaving and ivory trading as different branches of his merchant house.  
Davenport‘s ivory business occupied a large amount of his capital and time. 
From 1748 until 1762, Davenport‘s ivory company sold £9,500 of ivory, of which he 
contributed £5,000-£7,000, a sum equivalent to roughly half to two thirds of the 
money he invested in slaving vessels in the same period.
31
 From 1763 until his 
retirement in 1786, Davenport sold a further £26,555 worth of ivory, roughly a quarter 
of his slaving investments in this latter period.
32
 Some idea of the effort Davenport 
required to vend these large quantities of ―teeth‖ is revealed within the Ivory Book, 
which contains copies of his outward letters from February 1779 to January 1784.
33
  
In the five year period, Davenport sold ninety-three lots of ivory to a group of 
Liverpool, Sheffield, Dublin and Glasgow cutlers, comb makers, cabinet 
manufacturers and brokers. Each sale required Davenport to correspond with his 
purchaser, weigh and package the lot, and arrange shipment to their various 
destinations, in addition to purchasing the ivory at auctions and private sales.  
Davenport purchased ivory from incoming slaving vessels in large lots 
typically weighing half a ton or more, and costing at least £100. If purchased from 
                                               
29 For the purpose of this study, Davenport‘s ivory transactions have been entered into a spreadsheet. 
Any analysis of the Ivory Book has been derived from interpretations of that spreadsheet (Ivory Book 
1763-1785, Liverpool, D/DAV/1).  
30 Ibid; Waste Book 1745-1766, Liverpool, ODAV; Elizabeth Roughsedge was probably the widow of 
Edward Roughsedge, who invested in the slaver Cumberland with William Whaley five times in 1748-
1753 (Based on the ownership data in the Voyages Database). In 1766, her business is listed as 
―Elizabeth Roughsedge & Son, ironmongers‖ (Gore, Liverpool Directory 1766, p.26). 
31 Waste Book 1745-1766, Liverpool, ODAV. Davenport‘s level of investment in the Liverpool slave 
trade has been taken from the calculations made in chapter one. 
32 Ivory Book 1763-1785, Liverpool, D/DAV/1 
33 There are a total of 447 letters in the Ivory Book for the entire four year period. They have all been 
transcribed for the purpose of this thesis. In the letters concerning ivory trading, Davenport typically 
gives news of the market, details any ivory lots sent, and requests remittances for previous orders 
(Ivory Book 1763-1785, Liverpool, D/DAV/1). 
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other slaving merchants, Davenport paid for these lots using bills of exchange; if 
purchased from his own vessels the cost of the ivory was deducted from his share of 
the venture‘s proceeds.34 Davenport brokered these large lots down into small orders 
of, on average, £50, sold on credit terms ranging from six weeks to two months, and 
remitted in short dated bills.
35
 In March 1780, for example, Davenport wrote 
Broomhead & Ward, a Sheffield cutler: 
Sirs, I recvd yours this day enclosing three bills value one hundred & fifty two 
pounds nineteen shillings which are passed to your credit
36
 
 
As the letter shows, Davenport‘s customers often remitted the balances due for ivory 
sales in batches of small bills. These bills were of use to Davenport as he could pass 
them on to his own suppliers. In the same month as he corresponded with Broomhead 
& Ward, for example, Davenport wrote Charles Ford, a Manchester textile 
manufacturer: 
Sir, Inclosed Eight bills as under Value One hundred & Eighty Eight Pounds 
eleven shillings which discharges your bill for the Goods bought by Capt 
Begg for the Brig William
37
 
 
Davenport listed the eight bills that made up the balance at the bottom of the letter, 
only one of which exceeded £50. This pattern repeats throughout Davenport‘s letter 
book, confirming that he converted large sums of capital into smaller more 
manageable supplies of money through his dealings in ivory. 
The goods Davenport vended to slaving vessels also returned a steady supply 
of money. Iron bars and iron hoops, Davenport‘s second largest non-slaving concern, 
were vended at two months credit; beads returned either cash or bills at four months 
credit; wine was traded for cash.
38
 Like ivory, Davenport bought these goods in large 
batches, paid for out of his London account using bills of exchange. He then broke the 
bulk supplies down into smaller individual orders returning him small bills.  
The financial organisation of the slave trade thus explains exactly how 
Davenport organised his merchant house. Because extensive credit financed slaving 
vessels, and slave sales were remitted in large unwieldy bills of exchange, Davenport, 
                                               
34 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV; Personal Ledger 1763-1772, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; and 
the inset sections of the Trading Accounts in the Davenport papers. 
35 Ivory Book 1763-1785, Liverpool, D/DAV/1; Waste Book 1766-1780, Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
36 Davenport to Broomhead & Ward, Liverpool, 3 March 1780, D/DAV/1 
37 William Davenport to Charles Ford, Liverpool, 24 March 1780, D/DAV/1 
38
 Waste Book 1766-1780, Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
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as a ship‘s husband, needed to keep on hand a steady supply of money. He maintained 
that supply of money by dealing in ―non-slaving‖ commodities—ironware, beads, 
wine and ivory—that returned smaller, more manageable bills of exchange. Far from 
being ancillary to Davenport‘s business, these commodities maintained the liquidity 
of his trading house: only by dealing in non-slaving commodities could Davenport 
participate in the slave trade over a thirty-eight year period.  
* 
Having established how Davenport financially organised his company, we are 
now in a position to discuss his slaving profits. Davenport‘s slaving profits have been 
examined by David Richardson and Joseph Inikori, both of whom interpreted the ship 
accounts differently. The major difference between the two historian‘s methodologies 
was the discounting for credit transactions. Richardson argued that in order to arrive 
at ―real‖ profits, we must incorporate a discount for the tradesmen‘s notes in the 
outgoing expenses, and discount the bills of exchange in the inset. Inikori, by contrast, 
argued that we should follow Davenport‘s methodology and hence make no 
allowance for credit (see Appendix A for details). Because this thesis is interested in 
the influence profits had on Davenport‘s business decisions, we will adopt his own 
methodology—how Davenport reckoned his profits—and hence take no account of 
discounts for credit. 
Adopting Davenport‘s methodology has the major advantage that it allows us 
to extend our sample of slaving voyages from which to calculate profits. Using 
Richardson‘s methodology, we are restricted to only those voyages with accounts 
detailing the split between cash and credit transactions, of which there are seventy-
four in the Old Davenport papers and six in the New Davenport papers. Applying 
Davenport‘s methodology allows us to extend that sample to include a further thirty 
voyages documented in two accounts ledger within the Old papers.
39
 Including the six 
voyages in the New papers, we can consider voyage profits for 110 of William 
Davenport‘s slaving ventures, thirty-six more than Richardson‘s sample, and twenty-
four more than Inikori‘s. The first voyage in the extended sample was the 
Chesterfield, sailing to Calabar in July 1757; the last is the ship and tender voyage of 
the Perseverance and Oronoko, Davenport‘s penultimate venture which concluded in 
                                               
39
 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV; Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV 
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Liverpool on 8 August 1785.
40
 The Essex, Davenport‘s last venture, is not 
documented in sufficient detail to calculate profits.
41
 In the twenty-nine year period 
between the Chesterfield and Essex’s voyages, Davenport financed 142 ventures.42 
The sample of 110 voyages therefore encompasses three quarters of Davenport‘s 
investments in the period 1757-1786 (see Appendix B for a listing of each sampled 
voyage and their profits). 
The sample is most detailed for the years 1762-1778 when we can calculate 
profits for all but seven of Davenport‘s ninety-six voyages.43 From 1779 until 1786, 
the last years of Davenport‘s career, we have detail for fifteen of thirty-one ventures. 
The main gaps in our knowledge of Davenport‘s profits cover the beginning of his 
career. Prior to 1757, there are scattered clues within Davenport‘s correspondence 
regarding his profits on certain voyages, but no voyage accounts survive to calculate 
specific earnings.
44
 Even after 1757, there are only voyage accounts for six of the 
sixteen voyages he financed until 1762, when the ledger book commences.
45
  The lack 
of voyage accounts from 1748 to 1762 occurred during years when Davenport 
invested only twelve percent of his total career capital in the slave trade. In fact, 
thanks to the sample being concentrated on the peak years of Davenport‘s investment, 
1766-1779, we can calculate returns on seventy percent of the capital he invested in 
the slave trade, the most complete study of any Liverpool slaving merchant to date. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
40 Voyages Database 83063 (Perseverance) and 82973 (Oronoko) 
41 Voyages Database 81312 (Essex) and 80829 (Christopher) 
42 Based on the voyages documented in the Old and New Davenport Papers and the ownership data in 
the Voyages Database 
43 The missing seven voyages arises largely because of a lack of sources for the Charles, a vessel 
managed by Alexander Nottingham that made five voyages in the period 1770-1776 (Voyages 
Database 91635-91639). For the first four voyages the outward investment is recorded in the debit side 
of the Ledger Book 1763-1775, but the credit page is torn out. For the Charles’ final voyage in 1776 
there is no information in the ledger at all and no corresponding ship account. For the same reason, we 
cannot calculate profits for the Patty or the Fox (Voyages Database 91827, 91806).  
44
 In letters to his brother Davies, for example, Davenport asked for ―a small supply of money‖ because 
he had met ―misfortunes at sea.‖ (William Davenport to Davies Davenport, Liverpool, 20 June 1752, 
BDM). He later complained that after the Chesterfield’s third voyage (Voyages Database 90180) ―I 
veryly [sic] believe I shall be £50 or £60 clear into pocket for my 1/8th part,‖ implying a loss of at least 
ten percent on his capital (William Davenport to Davies Davenport, Liverpool, 20 July 1752, BDM).  
45 These six accounts are, in fact, separate from the original cache of ―Old‖ Davenport papers and are 
housed at the Liverpool Record Office, England. However, they clearly belonged to Davenport as the 
accounts are made out by him. 
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Table 6: Slaving Voyages Not Included In Richardson’s Davenport Venture 
Profit Calculations 
 
VID Name Year Source 
90906 Union 1762 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91016 Dalrymple 1762 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91066 Delight 1763 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91017 Dalrymple 1763 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91038 Friendship 1763 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
90907 Union 1764 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91067 Delight 1764 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91218 Dalrymple 1765 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91039 Friendship 1765 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91247 Union 1765 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91256 Active 1765 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91219 Dalrymple 1766 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91158 Little Britain 1766 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91313 Friendship 1766 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91354 Union 1767 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91360 Dobson 1767 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91395 Good Intent 1767 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91355 Union 1768 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
90958 Kildare 1770 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91356 Union 1770 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91694 Patty 1771 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91803 Fox 1771 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
92017 King George 1773 Ship Accounts 1768-1787,  Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
91936 Sam 1774 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91805 Fox 1774 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91576 Hector 1776 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
91794 Swift 1776 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV  
92589 Dalrymple 1777 Ship Accounts 1768-1787,  Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
92728 Swift 1777 Ship Accounts 1768-1787,  Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
92461 Mars 1779 Ship Accounts 1768-1787,  Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
92474 Ann 1779 Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV 
82482 Mars 1780 Ship Accounts 1768-1787,  Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
83413 Rover 1782 Ship Accounts 1768-1787,  Liverpool, D/DAV/2 
80251 Ann 1780 Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV 
83063 Perseverance 1784 Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV 
82973 Oronoko 1784 Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV 
 
Source: In 1976 David Richardson calculated profits for seventy-four of Davenport‘s slaving 
ventures (Richardson, ―Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade,‖ pp.82-87). Table 6 lists thirty 
additional voyages documented in three sources: Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV; 
Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV; Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, D/DAV/2. 
 
Davenport‘s total outlay on the 110 sampled slaving ships from 1757 to 1785 
was £79,237, and to this figure must be added £17,140 on insurances, and the outward 
cost of the vessel, giving a total investment of £94,399. On the inward side, 
Davenport received £106,895 in receipts. His total profit from 110 slaving ventures 
was thus £10,518, or a 10.9 percent return on his initial investment. We can gauge 
84 
Davenport‘s satisfaction with this level of profit from several eighteenth century 
sources. An oft quoted opinion is that offered by John Tarleton, a large slaving 
merchant who traded between 1783 and 1807. During his interrogation by 
Parliamentary Counsel in 1788, Tarleton was asked ―What is the Rate of Profit  
percent. On [the Slave Trade] Annually, at Liverpool?‖ He replied, ―We have always 
stated that Ten  percent. Ought to be the Net Profit in the African trade.‖46 During the 
same hearings Robert Norris, a former slave ship captain and merchant, stated that he 
would not ―risk‖ his capital to Africa ―under £10 [percent].‖47 These comments 
appear to be in line with contemporary expectations of business profits. Adam Smith 
wrote in 1775 that 
Double interest [10 percent] is in Great Britain reckoned what the merchants 
call a good, moderate, reasonable profit; terms which I apprehend mean no 
more than a common and usual profit
48
 
 
It would appear, then, that Davenport would have been pleased with his 10.9 percent 
overall rate of return from slave trading. 
 Davenport‘s average return masks, however, large variations between 
individual venture profits.  Earnings fluctuated considerably from substantial profits 
of seventy percent or more, to outright losses up to sixty percent. The best way to 
understand these fluctuations is to divide the sample into five distinctive periods, and 
within those periods examine the African regions to which the vessels traded (Table 
7).  
 
Table 7: Venture Profits On 110 of Davenport’s Slaving Ventures by Period of 
Investment, 1757-1785 
    Profits Profit 
 Ventures Out (£) In (£) (£)  (%) 
1757-1767 31 16,986 18,392 1,407 8.3 % 
1768-1771 30 20,261 24,165 3,904 19.3 % 
1772-1774 22 21,202 22,906 1,704 8.0 % 
1775-1777 12 18,346 18,487 141 0.8 % 
1778-1785 15 19,583 22,946 3,363 17.2 % 
 110 96,377 106,895 10,519 10.9 % 
 
Source: Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV; Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, 
ODAV; Trading Accounts, Liverpool, ODAV; Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, 
D/DAV/2; Voyages Database. 
 
                                               
46 Testimony of John Tarleton, PP  68, p.50 
47 Testimony of Robert Norris, PP 68, p.8 
48
 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p.200 
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In the first period of analysis, 1757-1767, Davenport made poor returns 
primarily because he speculated in African regions outside the eastern Bight of Biafra. 
Davenport expended £5,875 on eleven of these slaving ventures, and received just £45 
in profits. His twelve Calabar ventures in the same period also performed badly, due 
in large measure to heavy losses sustained on the voyages of the Tyrell in 1761 and 
the Dobson in 1767.
49
 The Tyrell suffered from the rising outfitting costs caused by 
the Seven Years War as the captain had been advised that ―Industry, and frugality 
must go hand in hand, or twill be impossible to get a penny [in] these times.‖50 The 
Dobson’s voyage, by contrast, lost money probably because of a violent dispute 
between the Efik traders in the rival Old Calabar villages Old Town and New Town. 
Merchants in these two Efik villages had long been in competition for European 
business and, by 1767, the quarrel between the two began to impinge on the supply of 
slaves. In August 1767 a captain of a slaver lying alongside the Dobson at Calabar, 
wrote to his owners that he ―never saw a worse prospect in my life of making a 
voyage than at present.‖51 As a result of the feud, Dobson lost her owners fifty-three 
percent of their capital. Davenport‘s pioneering forays into the Cameroon market 
offset some of these losses as all of the sampled voyages returned a profit, with the 
Union making particularly good returns of £732 on a £2,317 investment over three 
voyages.  
The period of slave trading, 1768-1771, proved to be one of the most 
financially rewarding in Davenport‘s career. The run of success continued at 
Cameroon as six of the eight vessels trading there cleared a profit, including the 
William in 1768 and the King of Prussia in 1771, both of which made fifty percent 
returns.
52
 Only the Henry and King of Prussia’s 1769 voyages to scout the markets 
around Cameroon lost their owners money, and that was less than one percent.
53
 The 
great success of Davenport‘s Cameroon ventures was exceeded only by his Calabar 
ventures: all but one of his voyages made profits in excess of twenty percent, perhaps 
aided by the resolution of the conflict between the Efik. The only blot on Davenport‘s 
run of success was his £1,253 investment in the Benin ship True Blue. On the middle 
                                               
49 Voyages Database 90858 (Tyrell), 91360 (Dobson), 91395 (her tender, Good Intent) 
50 John Maine & Co. to Captain William Hindle, Liverpool, 7 February 1761, in Trading Accounts of 
the Tyrell 1761-1762,ODAV 
51 Williams, Liverpool Privateers, p.535 
52 Voyages Database 91215 (William) and 91410 (King of Prussia) 
53
 Voyages Database 91082 (Henry) and 91408 (King of Prussia) 
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passage, the True Blue had lost 156 of her enslaved Africans, from an original cargo 
of 365, an event that produced a loss of twenty-one percent to her owners.
54
  
The profits Davenport earned in the late 1760s stemmed in part from changes 
in the British Atlantic economy. At the Peace of Paris in February 1763 Britain had 
received nearly all of France‘s American possessions including a small group of 
islands in the Caribbean: the Grenadines, Tobago, St. Vincent, and Dominica. The 
Ceded Islands, as they were collectively known, belied their small size—measuring 
just 674 square miles—with their potential, having been largely untapped by their 
French former owners.
55
 As a result, the Ceded Islands appealed to ambitious Britons 
who sought fortunes by converting the islands to sugar and coffee production. 
Elsewhere in the Caribbean, the planters on Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbados also 
wanted to convert their islands to specialist sugar production, hoping to meet a rapidly 
increasing domestic demand during the ―silver age‖ of sugar 1763-1775.56  
Beginning in 1767, Davenport exploited the expansion of the British Atlantic 
economy by sending his Guineamen to Dominica, Grenada, and Barbados. Dominica, 
in particular, provided a ready market for Old Calabar slaves, explaining in part the 
healthy returns Davenport received from his ventures in the period 1768-1771.
57
 By 
contrast, Davenport used Grenada and Barbados as an outlet for his Cameroon slaves, 
a decision perhaps based on the planters‘ desires for the correct ―type‖ of slave.58 
Using this Cameroon to Grenada/Barbados, Calabar to Dominica marketing strategy, 
Davenport shifted his focus away from the more settled and established islands to the 
frontier colonies.   
                                               
54 Voyages Database 91643 
55 R.B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the West Indies, 1623-1775, 2nd ed., 
(Kingston: 1974), p.454 
56 Richard Pares coined the term ―silver age‖ to refer to the boom years prior to the American War. He 
defined the ―golden age‖ of sugar as the 1640s (Richard Pares, "A London West India Merchant House 
1740-1769," in Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier, ed. Richard Pares, AJP Taylor, and Lewis 
Namier, (London: 1956), p.99) 
57 Davenport landed his first cargo of slaves at Dominica in 1769 when the Fox arrived there from Old 
Calabar (Voyages Database 91553). The enslaved cargo ―averaged‖ £30 per person, a substantial 
improvement on the £25-27 per person Davenport received from Barbados and Grenada at the same 
time (Trading Accounts of the Dobson and Fox 1769-1771, ODAV). After this initial success, 
Davenport dispatched a further three vessels to Dominica in the period 1769-1770, and then six vessels 
there in 1771 (based upon American markets documented in the Voyages Database). 
58 Davenport did not send a cargo of Cameroon Africans to Dominica until the voyage of Charles in 
1769 (Voyages Database 91635). The venture must have achieved a low average slave price there, 
because Davenport‘s Cameroon traders did not return to the island until 1774. This would strongly 
indicate that Dominica planters had a marked preference for Old Calabar, rather than Cameroon slaves, 
until the mid 1770s.  
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Despite establishing an Africa/ America marketing strategy, Davenport had 
mixed returns from his slaving investments in our third period of study, 1772-1774. 
The Cameroon market continued to give consistent and high returns of, on average, 
thirty-five percent venture profits but these successes were balanced by losses 
averaging twelve percent at Old Calabar. The availability and price of captive 
Africans was the main reason for the disparity between the regions. Between 1772 
and 1774, Davenport‘s eleven Calabar slavers—totalling 1,900 tons of shipping and 
costing £50,000 to fit out—landed 1,609 Africans in the Americas, a cost of £31 
sterling per person. The ten Cameroon vessels trading in the same period—also 
measuring 1,900 tons and also costing £50,000 to fit out—landed 2,050 captives, a 
cost of just £24. Cameroon captains paid less for their slaves in Africa.
59
  
In America, Davenport‘s Cameroon captains also sold their enslaved Africans 
for £34 sterling, compared to £31 averaged by their Calabar counterparts.
60
 The 
disparity in slave prices arose because Davenport‘s Cameroon captains were more 
successful at purchasing higher ―quality‖ captive Africans than their Old Calabar 
equivalents.
61
 The main decider of ―quality‖ was the age and sex of the enslaved 
cargo. Planters sought ―prime‖ adult male slaves, and paid a premium for them over 
women and children. In the period 1772-1774, Davenport‘s Cameroon cargoes 
consisted of seventy-three percent male slaves and just twelve percent children. Old 
Calabar cargoes, by comparison, consisted of just fifty-eight percent men, and thirty-
three percent children. Cameroon captains‘ therefore purchased lower priced, but 
higher quality captives, explaining the large disparity between Davenport‘s regional 
profits in the period 1772-1774.  
 Davenport‘s Cameroon captains could purchase better quality, but low priced 
captives because they faced less competition than Old Calabar traders. In 1765, when 
Davenport first pushed his investments firmly into the eastern Bight of Biafra, ten 
slavers traded at Calabar, of which he held shares in just one—the Dalrymple; in 1774 
there were eleven European slavers visiting the river, of which Davenport co-owned 
four. At Cameroon, by contrast, just two slavers traded at the river in 1765, both of 
                                               
59 Based upon the outfitting records, and slave sales documented in the Trading Accounts for 
Davenport‘s Old Calabar and Cameroon ventures, in combination with the tonnage and slave data in 
the Voyages Database  
60 Ibid. 
61  The following is based upon the age/ sex ratios of enslaved cargoes taken from the Voyages 
Database 
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them owned by Davenport; in 1774 eight vessels purchased slaves from the Duala, six 
of them owned by Davenport.
62
 Davenport‘s Old Calabar captains consequently had 
to compete with a large number of vessels, resulting in increasing prices and a falling 
―quality‖ of enslaved Africans. At Cameroon, Davenport and his small coterie of 
partners enjoyed a near monopoly over the small number of vessels visiting the river, 
allowing him to keep slave prices low. As a result, Cameroon returned profits in the 
first three time periods under consideration, and was only outperformed by Old 
Calabar in 1768-1771. In fact, between 1757 and 1774, seventy-six percent of his 
slaving profits came from the region (Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Profits on Davenport’s Slaving Ventures by Region, 1757-1774 
Region No of  Out In Profit Profit 
 Ventures   (£) (%) 
Cameroon 26 19,337 24,766 5,429 28.1 % 
Calabar 40 28,262 29,900 1,638 5.8 % 
Other 17 10,850 10,796 36 0.3 % 
 83 58,449 65,463 7,104 12.2 % 
 
Source: Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV; Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, 
ODAV; Trading Accounts, Liverpool, ODAV; Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, 
D/DAV/2; Voyages Database 
 
Despite the outbreak of the American rebellion in April 1775, Davenport 
hoped to build on his previous successes by fitting out further slaving vessels in the 
period 1775-1777. This proved to be the worst possible decision. By the time 
Davenport‘s slavers arrived in the West Indies, American privateers roved the sea, 
capturing hundreds of the freighting vessels that formed the life blood of planter 
credit in London. Moreover, the French were soon to enter the war.
63
 As a result of 
the crisis in confidence produced by the war, Davenport received his slaving receipts 
in either bills of exchange with terms of credit stretching to two or more years; or 
planter‘s bonds—promissory notes that established a balance with Davenport to be 
paid off by shipments of produce.
64
  
Without reliable and prompt remittances, seven of Davenport‘s eleven 
Guineamen trading between 1775 and 1778 made losses. Even the formerly fruitful 
Cameroon produced deficits, with the vessels Sam, Favourite, and Badger costing 
                                               
62 Based upon the ownership data in the Voyages Database  
63 The French signed an alliance with the Americans on 4 February 1778. 
64
 Based on an analysis of the inset sections of the Trading Accounts in the Davenport papers 
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their owners more than twenty-five percent of their capital, in each case because the 
planters could not honour their obligations from the slave sales.
65
 Worst of all, 
recovering the receipts from these voyages took between five and fifteen years, 
placing a considerable financial burden on Davenport and his partners.
66
 Davenport‘s 
finances were slightly redeemed by the Dalrymple’s two voyages to Old Calabar in 
1776 and 1777, both of which managed to turn a profit by bartering ivory on the 
African Coast.
67
 However, even these voyages returned, like Davenport‘s other 
ventures, with their slave sales in long dated bills of exchange, doing little to alleviate 
his acute lack of West Indian receipts.
68
  
 Davenport looked to the slave trade to redeem his finances. He knew well that 
the lack of Guineamen visiting Africa had created a glut of captives on the Coast, so 
that, in March 1779 he wrote ―Negroes may now be bought 50 percent less than they 
were 12 months ago.‖69 Moreover he could expect a ready market for the slaves in the 
West Indies because, as he wrote in the same month, ―from the very few vessells gone 
this last year, & none fitting out, Negroes must be in great demand & sell well.‖70  
These favourable market conditions enabled his captains to secure sizeable 
returns for Davenport and his partners: five of the ten vessels sampled between 1779 
and 1783 made extraordinary profits (Table 9). Only the Ann in 1780, the Hawke in 
1781, and the Rover in 1782, lost their owners money, in each case because of ill 
luck: the Hawke and Rover were both captured by the enemy and Davenport could not 
claim the full value of the ship on insurance; and the Ann was ―detained for some 
months‖ at Sierra Leone by an African war in the interior, preventing her from 
                                               
65 Voyages Database 91937 (Sam), 91978 (Favourite), 92536 (Badger)  
66 As a result of the evaporation of slaving receipts Davenport‘s long time associates Patrick Black, 
Robert Jennings, Thomas Hughes, Alexander Nottingham and Christopher Davenport all quit the trade 
(based on the ownership data in the Voyages Database). 
67 On the Dalrymple’s first voyage, Captain Fairweather and his tender William Seaton purchased 
£1,771 worth of ivory, compared to slave sales of £10,349 redeemed in bills at fifteen, eighteen and 
twenty-four months (Voyages Database 91988 and 91793; Trading Accounts of the Dalrymple 1772-
1777, ODAV; ―Inset Account of the Dalrymple and Swift‖ in Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, 
D/DAV/2). On her second voyage in 1777, Fairweather and his tender Captain Brighouse loaded 
£3,237 worth of ivory, compared to slave sales of £11,221. The slave sales were paid for with bills at 
twelve, eighteen and twenty-four months (Voyages Database 92589 and 92728; Ibid.).  
68 In 1779, for example, Davenport wrote to one of his London creditors that he was ―really ashamed to 
draw [bills] at such a long date, but the West India bills I have in Denisons [his London banker] hands 
are at such long credit I could not possibly avoid it, and the Bankers wont discount a bill now that has 
above six months to run‖ (William Davenport to John Sowerby, Liverpool, 30 March 1779, D/DAV/1). 
69 William Davenport to Charles Ford, Liverpool, 23 March 1779, D/DAV/1 
70
 William Davenport to William & John Thompson, Liverpool, 1 March 1779, D/DAV/1 
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loading a sufficient number of captives.
71
 These voyages apart, Davenport earned the 
most impressive returns of his career from the Hawke who on her first voyage 
returned eighty-five percent profits, and on her second voyage 173 percent profits.
72
 
The Mars, sailing to the Windward Coast at the same times as the Hawke, also made 
her owners substantial returns of seventy-one percent and thirty-five percent.
73
 If 
these windfalls occurred also on the remaining eleven wartime ventures Davenport 
financed during the period 1779-1783, then they confirm Thomas Clarkson‘s 
contention that ―During the American war… the adventurer, who escaped the ship of 
the enemy, made his fortune.‖74 
 
Table 9: William Davenport’s Slaving Vessels, 1779-1783 
          Yr of   Yr of 
VID Name Deprt Market Arv WI £ Out In Profit  Profit 
       (£)  (%) 
92461 Mars 1779 Sierra Leone 1780 621 1,063 442 71.2% 
92462 Hawke 1779 Cameroons 1780 741 1,371 630 85.0% 
92474 Ann 1779 Windward Coast 1780 1,219 1,437 218 17.9% 
83174 Preston 1780 Cameroons 1781 963 1,087 124 12.9% 
82482 Mars 1780 Sierra Leone 1782 1,209 1,638 429 35.5% 
81753 Hawke 1780 Cameroons 1781 1,234 3,368 2,134 172.9 % 
80251 Ann 1780 Windward Coast 1782 2,811 2,665 -146 -5.2 % 
81754 Hawke 1781 Cameroons Captured 1,731 1,096 -635 -36.7 % 
83175 Preston 1781 Cameroons 1782 1,121 1,529 408 36 .4% 
83413 Rover 1782 Cameroons Captured 746 654 -91 -12.2 % 
     12,396 15,908 3,512 28.3% 
 
Source: Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the Hawke 1779-
1783, ODAV; Trading Accounts of the Preston 1780-1784, ODAV; ―Trading Accounts of the 
Mars 1779-1781‖, in Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; ―Trading Accounts of 
the Rover 1782-1786‖, in Ship Accounts 1768-1787, Liverpool, D/DAV/2; Voyages 
Database.  
Note: WI= West Indies 
 
 The three extant voyage accounts for Davenport‘s ventures after 1783 indicate 
that the favourable market conditions generated by the war did not continue after the 
Treaty of Paris was signed in September 1783. The Preston and Perseverance, two of 
the documented post-war ventures, both made losses of fourteen percent, and the 
                                               
71 Testimony of Peter Whitfield Brancker before the House of Lords, 2HL1/90, PRO, Kew Gardens, 
London, England, pp.26-27; Voyages Database 80251 
72 Voyages Database 92462, 81753 
73 Voyages Database 92461, 82482 
74
 Clarkson, An Essay on the Impolicy of the African Slave Trade : In Two Parts, p.29 
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Quixote made a slim profit of just seven percent.
75
 The upsurge in the slave trade after 
1783 probably explains the lack of success in these voyages. Slave prices seem to 
have quickly recovered on the African coast as vessels rushed to fill the increasing 
post-war demand for captives in the West Indies. Faced with this competitive market, 
Davenport took his capital out of slaving and retired (see chapter one where we 
consider Davenport‘s reasons for retirement).  
* 
The voyages of the Badger and the Hawke highlight the fortunes that could be 
made and lost through speculation on the slave trade.
76
 Both vessels traded during the 
war and both purchased their slaves at Cameroon. However, Badger made a loss of 
twenty-six percent, and Hawke a profit of eight-five percent. Examining what caused 
the vast disparity in profits between these voyages will identify the factors that 
dictated the fortunes of Davenport‘s slaving voyages.  
 Acting as ship‘s husband and taking a third share in the venture, in early 1776 
William Davenport fitted out the Badger with his brother Christopher, former 
Cameroon captain Thomas Hughes, ship builder John Galley, and long time associate 
Robert Jennings. Measuring 272 tons and costing £10,647, the Badger was both the 
largest and most expensive vessel sent to the Cameroon by Davenport.
77
 Moreover, 
Davenport‘s own £3,956 stake in the voyage was the single largest slaving investment 
of his career (see Appendix B). During her six months at Cameroon, Badger’s captain 
Peter Potter managed to purchase 415 enslaved Africans and three tons of ivory, of 
which he ―had the misfortune to bury 16 slaves & loose [sic] two overboard in the 
River.‖78 
Potter arrived at Dominica in the West Indies in May 1777, and placed his 
large and healthy cargo of 399 Africans in the hands of Vance Caldwell & Vance 
(VCV), a group of prominent slave factors with connections throughout the 
                                               
75 Voyages Database 83176 (Preston), 80829 (Perseverance) and 82973 (her tender Oronoko), 83267 
(Quixote) 
76
 Voyages Database 92536 (Badger) and 81753 (Hawke) 
77 Based upon the ship and ownership information within the Voyages Database and Trading Accounts 
of the Badger and Fox 1772-1778, Liverpool, ODAV  
78 One of the Africans committed suicide while the Badger lay at Douala. Potter described his death: 
―[He] was one of ye Doctors Guests which had just recovered a fit of sickness & as we let them [the 
slaves] up in the Morning he ran immediately to ye gangway & jumped straight over board & tho‘ we 
were instantly in both boats after him yet before either could reach him he went down & we saw him 
no more‖ (Peter Potter to William Davenport, Cameroons, 15 October 1776, D/DAV/10). 
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Americas.
79
 Despite their best endeavours VCV wrote to Davenport that they ―never 
had so much trouble in a Sale,‖ due to the ready availability of prize slaves in the 
Islands—slaves captured from Guineamen, or kidnapped from plantations by 
privateers and sold cheaply in the French Caribbean Islands.
80
 As a result, VCV 
managed ―so low an Average‖ of £26 sterling per slave, a significant drop from the 
£33 Potter averaged during the Badger’s previous voyage to Dominica in 1775.81 
More alarmingly, VCV made their remittances in promissory notes, rather than bills 
of exchange drawn on London banks, ―payable at two years thirty months & three 
years after ye Ships arrival at home.‖82 The promissory notes, unlike bills of 
exchange, had no value in of themselves and so, as Davenport wrote in February 
1779, ―no use can be made of them.‖83 Worse of all the notes tied up a large portion 
of Davenport and his partner‘s capital so that ―it will be morally impossible to raise 
money to fit out ships.‖84 Even with these setbacks, the Badger ostensibly made a 
profit of thirty-three percent when she arrived in Liverpool albeit with a long wait 
before the partners would see any returns.
85
  
The prospects of reaping the Badger’s profit took a blow when the French 
captured Dominica in September 1778. Now Davenport would have to draw his 
Dominican remittances as sugar and coffee sent in neutral ships via Holland.
86
 In 
1780 Davenport received another setback with the death of James Caldwell, an event 
that broke up the partnership of VCV.
87
 Now Davenport had to deal with the 
                                               
79 For example, Davenport wrote in 1781 that the firm was speculating in tobacco and ―sending Goods 
to Philadelphia‖ (William Davenport to Mr James Morson, Liverpool, 30 December 1781, D/DAV/1). 
80 Vance, Caldwell & Vance to William Davenport, Dominica, 23 July 1777, D/DAV/10 
81 Peter Potter to William Davenport, Dominica, 5 November 1775, D/DAV/7 
82 Peter Potter to William Davenport, at Sea, 10 August 1777, D/DAV/10 
83 William Davenport to Vance, Caldwell & Vance, Liverpool, 28 February 1779, D/DAV/1 
84 Ibid  
85 Most of the profits on the voyages came from the sale of the Badger’s hull, three tons of ivory, and a 
government subsidy on iron and cowry exports (Trading Accounts of the Badger and Fox 1772-1778, 
ODAV). 
86 In 1777 VCV sent the Prince George to Londonderry where she was to sell her cargo of sugar and 
hogsheads staves, with the proceeds going to Davenport as a first payment against their debts. John 
Caldwell sailed with the vessel, presumably as an emissary from VCV to soothe the Liverpool 
merchants over their outstanding debts (Letters, Bills etc. Voyage of Barque Prince George from 
Dominica 1777-1778, Liverpool, D/DAV/12). Davenport‘s attempts to recover his debts via the 
Netherlands are detailed in a lengthy series of correspondence with VCV in the New Davenport papers 
(see letters on 27/3/1780, 26/6/1780, 16/9/1780, 29/9/1780, 1/7/1781, 2/9/1781, 30/3/1782 in the Ivory 
Book, D/DAV/1; and letters on 5/1/1781, 20/4/1781, 4/5/1781, 5/7/1781 in James Morson, Vance 
Caldwell & Vance 1775-1781, Liverpool, D/DAV/8). 
87 Robert Vance informed Davenport that ―my Partner Mr Caldwell was attacked by a Hot & Violent 
Fever & the Worthy man went off after a short illness. This accident falls very heavy on me in the 
present distressing times but Ill support myself as well as I can‖ (Robert Vance to William Davenport, 
Dominica, 17 January 1780, D/DAV/11). 
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administrators of Caldwell‘s estate, and the Vance brothers to recover his debts. As a 
result of this series of calamities, the proceeds of the Badger’s slaves trickled in over 
the next ten years. Between 1780 and 1788, Davenport received just £2,000 of the 
£9,800 promised for the Badger’s slaves; in 1791, the investors received a final 
dividend on the outstanding debt from the then bankrupted Robert Vance‘s estate of 
£820 on £6,000.
88
 Assuming that no further receipts would come from the voyage, 
Davenport finally wrote up the account for the Badger’s voyage in May 1792, fifteen 
years after the ship sailed. The ledger revealed that Davenport‘s personal loss from 
the voyage was £1,039, on an initial investment of £3,956, the largest venture loss of 
his career.
89
 
In March 1779, when the wrangling with VCV over the Badger’s remittances 
still continued, Davenport fitted out the 218 ton ship Hawke for her first voyage. 
Davenport placed John Smale, a captain with ―many years experience‖ in the 
Cameroon trade, in command and, on 1 June 1779 Davenport advised him that: 
as this river [Cameroon] has had very little trade for sometime past, we are of 
opinion you might break with them on very low terms both for slaves & 
ivory… and as you'll have no competitors you'll have an opportunity of 
purchasing the very best of both
90
 
 
Smale clearly had the pick of Cameroon captives: he loaded four hundred slaves into 
his ship‘s hold, one hundred more than Davenport had expected.91 Moreover, Smale 
managed to barter six tons of ivory from the Duala, tightly packing his small vessel 
for the passage to Jamaica.
92
 In spring 1780 the Hawke sailed into Old Harbour, 
Jamaica with 348 enslaved Africans chained in her hold. The Hawke’s voyage was a 
financial success, reaping Davenport £1,371 on an outlay of £741, almost a doubling 
of the initial capital. The only blot on the voyage was the ―monstrous long dates‖ of 
                                               
88 Ledger Book 1788-1787, Liverpool, ODAV, f.20 
89 Ibid. 
90 William Davenport to Captain John Smale, Liverpool, 1 June 1779, D/DAV/1 
91 Davenport wrote to his West Indian factors that ―We have a vessel call'd the Hawke Capt Smale 
gone to the Bite the 3rd June last for 300 grown Negroes‖ (William Davenport to Messrs James & 
Evan Baillie, Liverpool, 1 November 1779). In the same letter Davenport states that ―you may have a 
demand for Negroes at St Eustatia for the Spaniards,‖ indicating that he was happy to trade with 
Spaniards, even though they had entered the war against Britain on 16 June 1779. 
92 Davenport advised Smale on the Hawke’s second voyage that ―you will have room for 400 slaves or 
perhaps only 370 but we woud have a preference paid to Ivory and the Number of Slaves reduced to 
350 provided the price of Ivory is reasonable‖ (William Davenport to Captain John Smale, Liverpool, 
25 October 1780, D/DAV/1). Given that Smale packed four hundred slaves into his vessel alongside 
six tons of ivory, the Hawke must have been fully laden when she left Africa.  
94 
the bills of exchange drawn for the slave sales at ―two[,] two and a half & three 
years.‖93  
 Transatlantic slave prices were the primary reason for the disparity in profits 
between the Badger and the Hawke’s voyages. In 1776 Peter Potter‘s ship had cost 
£10,647 and he had managed to purchase 415 slaves so that each enslaved person had 
cost, on average, £25.7 sterling in Africa.
94
 Given that VCV sold the enslaved cargo 
for £26 sterling Badger’s owners hence received a net profit of less than £1 per slave. 
Even though the Hawke sailed with a ―high premium of insurance, high wages, & 
most extravagant outfits,‖ the net cost of the captives in Africa was just £15.3.95 
Moreover, Smale achieved a much higher average in the West Indies, £33.8, giving 
his owners a £18.1 gross profit on each enslaved African sold. The differences in 
slave prices between Africa and the Americas—less than £1 per slave on the Badger’s 
voyage and over £18 on the Hawke’s voyage—when multiplied by a cargo of four 
hundred enslaved Africans, dictated in large part the profits derived in each of the 
voyages (Table 10).  
  
Table 10: Badger and Hawke to Cameroon, 1776 and 1779 
 
Year of 
Departur
e 
Outfit 
(£) 
No. of 
Slaves 
Embarke
d 
Africa 
 
No of 
Slaves 
Landed 
Americ
a 
Averag
e 
slave 
price 
Africa 
(£) 
Average  
slave 
price 
Americ
a (£) 
Profit 
per Slave 
(£) 
Badger 1776 10,647 415 399 25.7 26.0 0.3 
Hawke 1779 6,164 402 368 15.3 33.4 18.1 
 
Source: Trading Accounts of the Badger and Fox 1772-1778, Liverpool, ODAV; Trading 
Accounts of the Hawke 1779-1784, Liverpool, ODAV; Voyages Database  
 
A second factor driving the profitability of Davenport‘s ventures was his 
ability to recoup slave remittances in Liverpool. Had Potter returned to Liverpool 
with the Badger’s remittances in safe bills of exchange Davenport could have banked 
the meagre profits from the slave sales and recovered his capital from the voyage. 
Instead Davenport received promissory notes that gave no guarantee of payment and 
ultimately paid out just a third of their face value over fifteen years. The lack of 
                                               
93 William Davenport to William Thompson & Company, Liverpool, 1 August 1780, D/DAV/1 
94 Trading Accounts of the Badger and Fox 1772-1778, Liverpool, ODAV 
95 William Davenport to Captain John Smale, Liverpool, 1 June 1779, D/DAV/1; Trading Accounts of 
the Hawke 1779-1784, Liverpool, ODAV 
95 
secure remittances thus sunk the venture profits from a healthy thirty-three percent, to 
a loss of twenty-six percent. Learning from his mistakes in the Badger’s voyage, 
Davenport ensured that the Hawke would receive her remittances in bills of exchange 
by writing to the factors before hand to establish ―the terms of payment‖ as that was 
―the only objection we have in fitting out ships to Africa‖.96 Although Davenport 
received the Hawke’s slave sale in lengthy bills of exchange, they were guaranteed by 
a London bank and hence the remittances were safe.  Had the Hawke’s remittances 
been made, like the Badger’s, in unreliable promissory notes returning just a third of 
their value, its profits would have sunk substantially. The case of the Badger and 
Hawke’s voyages, thus highlights the crucial importance of slave prices and safe 
remittances to Davenport‘s slaving venture profits. 
David Richardson has identified the need to purchase, and then keep alive a 
healthy cargo of captive Africans as a third factor dictating Davenport‘s venture 
profits. Using Davenport‘s ship accounts, Richardson demonstrated that vessels ―that 
failed to deliver more than fifty-five percent of their originally intended complement 
of slaves to the New World almost invariably made losses.‖97 Whilst Potter and 
Smale both managed to purchase their full complement of slaves, and then kept 
mortality below ten percent, some of Davenport‘s other captains were not so lucky. 
The 182 ton William, for example, made a forty-two percent loss because she only 
carried seventy-seven Africans of her intended 120 captives to the Americas.
98
 
Similarly the Lord Cassils and King George, two vessels intending to purchase 650 
slaves in total, made a fifty percent loss because they only managed to land 202 
slaves in the West Indies.
99
  
 Attempting to achieve the three criteria necessary for a successful voyage —
delivering a full complement of low priced captives, selling them in the Americas for 
high prices, and securing safe remittances—dictated Davenport‘s business strategy. In 
the search for large cargoes of low priced captives, Davenport exploited the untapped 
Cameroon market and invested heavily in the Old Calabar region, shifting his trade 
away from the competitive and glutted markets in Upper Guinea. In the Americas, 
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Davenport sought high slave prices by pushing into the small, un-established, but 
potentially lucrative Ceded Islands. For much of Davenport‘s career this business 
strategy paid rich dividends. His speculation in Cameroon proved to be particularly 
profitable, providing nearly two thirds of all his sampled slaving profits. However, in 
marketing slaves in the Ceded Islands—the frontiers of the British Atlantic 
economy—Davenport increased his risks in securing safe bills of exchange. Once the 
system of remittance collapsed during the American War, the Ceded Islands boom 
became a bust, turning Davenport‘s slaving profits into a loss.  
* 
We can cast further light on Davenport‘s slaving profits by examining his 
returns from non-slaving lines of trades. The Davenport papers are sufficiently 
detailed to concretely analyse profits from several of Davenport‘s non-slaving 
businesses: ivory, wine, iron hoops, stockfish, and his investment in financial 
securities. Records are also extant, although less complete, for Davenport‘s trade in 
African produce, beads, iron bars, and his privateering speculation. By examining 
each of these concerns we will see how profits in non-slaving businesses compared to 
those in the slave trade, and therefore establish how crucial they were to Davenport‘s 
prosperity and success as a merchant.  
The ivory trade was Davenport‘s largest non-slaving business. The Ivory Book 
details Davenport‘s trading from 1 January 1763 to 25 January 1785, at which time he 
quit the trade as he wound down his merchant house. Records for this twenty two year 
period are comprehensive and detail the date of transaction; the name of the buyer or 
seller; and the number weight and price of ivory bought and sold. Davenport also 
calculated his profits within the Ivory Book by comparing his purchases to his sales 
towards the end of a year, giving a sterling profit figure that he then converted into a 
percentage return. On 4 November 1766, for example, Davenport totalled up his ivory 
account and noted: 
£1415,,6,,6 was appropriated for this concern [his purchases] from the 
19/11/1765 to the 4/11/1766 is 11 Months & 16 Days the Profits whereof 
appears to be £105.14.6 which is 7.25 percent
100
 
 
Using Davenport‘s calculations in the Ivory Book, we can summarise his ivory 
investments and profits for the entire twenty-two year period (Table 11).  
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  The Ivory Book shows that Davenport reaped small but consistent profits from 
the ivory trade throughout the period 1763-1785. In 1763, when records commence 
Davenport was earning a 6.6 percent profit on his ivory sales, a margin that barely 
changed for the next eight years. However, a sharp increase in the cost of ivory 
impinged on Davenport‘s profits throughout the early 1770s, so that by 1775 he was 
forced to introduce a 2.5 percent commission on sales. This charge rescued 
Davenport‘s ivory profits from a further price increase during the American War, 
when the lack of slavers visiting the African coast severely limited supply. Despite the 
escalating price of ivory, Davenport maintained an average profit margin of 5.6 
percent on his sales throughout his twenty-two years trading in the commodity, nearly 
half of the 10.9 percent average profit earned in slaving.  
 
Table 11: William Davenport’s Ivory Profits January 1763- January 1785  
Period 
Length of 
Period 
(Months) 
Weight of 
Ivory 
Sold  
(Lbs) 
Ivory 
Bought 
(£) 
Ivory 
Sold  
(£) 
Profit 
(£) 
Profit  
(%) 
 
Ivory 
Price 
(Shgs 
per Lb) 
Jan 1763- Nov 1765 34 16,593 1,871 1,994 123 6.6 % 2.3 
Dec 1765- Oct 1768 32 16,922 2,141 2,300 158 7.4 % 2.5 
Nov 1768 - Nov 1771 33 23,868 3,147 3,364 216 6.9 % 2.6 
Dec 1771 - Dec 1774 35 27,680 3,962 4,197 234 5.9 % 2.9 
Jan 1775 - Sept 1779 56 52,032 8,512 8,934 422 5.0 % 3.3 
Oct 1779 – Jan 1785 63 37,887 6,921 7,259 338 4.9 % 3.7 
 253 174,981 26,555 28,046 1,491 5.6 %  
 
 Source: Ivory Book 1763-1785, Liverpool, D/DAV/1 
   
In addition to ivory, Davenport also dealt in ironware. From 1757 until 1779, 
the two waste books record Davenport vending £10,500 worth of iron bars —―voyage 
iron‖—to Liverpool slaving vessels, approximately a tenth of his slaving investment 
in the same period.
101
 The waste books are less illuminating for Davenport‘s 
purchases of bars, as they detail only a handful of the consignments he brought in 
from London and Europe. These few entries record Davenport purchasing his iron 
bars for approximately ten percent less than the sale price. Using this figure, we can 
approximate Davenport‘s returns from his bar business at £955, ten percent more than 
his purchases. A much more detailed account of Davenport‘s iron hoops trading is 
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extant in the Ivory Book. The account shows that he purchased over the nine year 
period 1768-1777 fifty-two tons of hoops from London ironmongers for £1,039.
102
 
After on selling these hoops in Liverpool, and deducting freighting charges, 
Davenport earned £1,245—a hefty profit margin of twenty-three percent.  
Compared to ironware, Davenport‘s wine trading business proved to be a poor 
investment. He set up the ―Wine, Rum & Brandy Concern‖ with his brother 
Christopher in July 1764 and rented vaults in Harrington Street, Liverpool.
103
 The 
Davenport brothers imported £2,800 worth of European spirits in the first year of 
operation but did not make any profits until January 1769. When the business finally 
closed its doors in December 1773, Davenport had put £2,144 into the wine concern, 
returning him £166 in profits, or 7.8 percent.
104
 From 1767 to 1774 Davenport 
managed a second wine business with local brewer Thomas Gaskell. This concern 
achieved less impressive returns: for the first two years of operation the business 
turned a small profit, but by November 1774, when the partnership dissolved, the 
wine business recorded a loss of £111.
105
 Looking at Davenport‘s two wine 
businesses together they made a somewhat paltry return of just £50 on an investment 
of £3,150. 
 Davenport‘s attempts to vend other commodities also gave poor returns. In 
1769 and 1770, for example, Davenport attempted to diversify his business by selling 
seventeen tons of salted fish to Liverpool ships. After selling forty-three orders of fish 
for £667, Davenport found himself out of pocket by £10.
106
 Although a minor 
financial loss, stockfish was a doubly poor investment because of the time involved in 
buying and selling the commodity, causing him to drop the fish trade. Davenport also 
lost money consigning goods to his network of associates. Between September 1759 
and October 1769 he sent £526 worth of ginger, wax, ivory and crystal to European 
merchants who he hoped would on sell the items at a profit. His ―adventure‖ made a 
loss of £72, and hence he gave up on the trade.
107
 Only Davenport‘s sale of four tons 
of pease and beef, purchased for £100, turned a £10 profit, although the slim return 
seems to have put him off any further speculation in that line of trade.
108
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 Examining Davenport‘s trade in ivory, ironware, wine and various goods, 
together, none of the concerns gave particularly healthy returns compared to slaving. 
Ivory averaged a profit of 5.6 percent, wine made a negligible profit of 1.8 percent, 
and consigning and trading goods were time consuming and ultimately fruitless 
endeavours. Only his trade in ironware gave a profit exceeding that earned slave 
trade. We should remember, however, that iron bars and hoops—and indeed other 
items such as ivory and wine—were a low cost and high volume item. As such they 
required a large amount of time and effort in order to return a profit. For example, 
realising the £275 profit from his £1,039 speculation on iron hoops required 
Davenport to, over the course of nine years, make seventeen large purchases from his 
London suppliers and 148 small sales to Liverpool customers. A similar investment of 
£1,039 in the slave trade could, in unexceptional circumstances, make the same return 
in one to two years, and with much less effort.  
 
 Calculating Davenport‘s profits from beads, privateering and African produce, 
is more difficult than his other lines of business because of a paucity of sources. In 
each of these cases we have to draw from either incomplete accounts, or from scraps 
of information within Davenport‘s waste book and correspondence. However, if we 
are to build a complete picture of Davenport‘s trading concerns, we cannot afford to 
ignore his investment or profits from these businesses. As such, we will have to 
speculate on Davenport‘s profits using the best available evidence. 
Beginning with Davenport‘s bead company, there is a cash book and ledger of 
sales extant for the firm. The latter volume records sales of £39,048 worth of beads in 
the period 1766-1770.
109
 It is reasonable to assume that the company sold the same 
volume of beads from 1770 until 1774, and perhaps half as many during the American 
War due to the drop off in the slave trade. If so, the company vended approximately 
£100,000 worth of beads to Liverpool‘s slaving fleet in the period 1766-1783. As a 
1/7
th
 partner in the firm, Davenport‘s personal share of the sales would have been 
£11,428. What his share of the overheads was for these sales is unclear because of the 
lack of sources. However, if we use the eighteenth century merchant‘s benchmark of a 
ten percent profit margin, then Davenport‘s returns were £1,038 from the bead 
company. 
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Davenport‘s bead trading profits were offset by losses arising from the 
collapse of the company‘s banker in 1772. Davenport had passed all of the bead 
company‘s bills through Joseph Wimpey until 20 June 1772 when he ―stopt payment, 
and afterwards became a Bankrupt.‖110 After Wimpey‘s collapse, Davenport was 
forced to honor bills of exchange worth £2,853 on behalf of the company.
111
 As a 
result of Wimpey‘s collapse, Davenport sold the bead company to John Copeland by 
paying over to him £6,426—the company‘s cash assets—from 1772 until 1774.112 
Davenport appears to have remained as a share holder after the transfer as he wrote 
two letters in 1779 referring to ―our Bead Company.‖113 In the meantime, Davenport 
set about recovering his £2,853 outstanding debt through Wimpey‘s estate. After 
fifteen years, Davenport managed to recoup £1,284 of the debt, leaving him with a 
loss of £1,569.
114
 When deducted from Davenport‘s imputed profits of £1,298, he 
therefore lost money from the bead company.  
Davenport‘s investments in privateering during the latter years of the 
American War 1779-1781 are documented in his letters within the Ivory Book. In 
fitting out privateers, he hoped to profit from the capture of French, Spanish and 
Dutch prizes, the latter of which offered ―fine pickings on the Seas as they are carriers 
for all the World.‖115 In an attempt to take a share of the ―pickings,‖ Davenport 
equipped the Sturdy Beggar, a 160 ton privateer armed with sixteen cannon and 
crewed by one hundred men.
116
 In 1780 and 1781, his correspondence shows that he 
also took shares in five other privateers: Enterprize, Hector, Bee, Fly and Essex.
117
 
Based upon Davenport‘s correspondence, in which he details his privateering shares, 
his investment in this small flotilla of ―licensed pirates‖ came to approximately 
£2,305 (Table 12).
118
  
                                               
110 ―A Case No 5‖, Liverpool, 21 January 1791, 920CHA/10/9 in Edward Chaffers Papers, MMM, 
Liverpool, England 
111 Ibid. 
112 The payments are noted in Bead Cash Book 1766-1776, Liverpool, D/DAV/2. The first payment 
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115 William Davenport to Charles Ford, Liverpool, 27 January 1781, D/DAV/1 
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Liverpool 25 February 1781, D/DAV/1 
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Begg, Liverpool, 16 March 1781, D/DAV/1). 
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Table 12: Estimated Profits on Davenport’s Privateering Ventures, 1779 to 1781 
Name Year Share Cost (£) Prizes (£) Profits (£) Profits (%) 
Sturdy Beggar 1779   1/24 250 1,242  992  397% 
Enterprize 1780   1/24 350 1,035  685  195% 
Hector 1781   1/32 280 0  -280  -100% 
Bee 1781   1/16 160 0  -160  -100% 
Fly 1781   1/16 100 0  -100  -100% 
Essex  1781   1/4  1,165 1,800  635  54% 
   2,305 4,077  1,772  77% 
 
Sources: William Davenport to Anthony Kirwan, Liverpool, 22 July 1780, D/DAV/1; William 
Davenport to Charles Ford, Liverpool, 13 January 1781, D/DAV/1; William Davenport to 
Messrs Fletcher & Goff, Liverpool 25 February 1781, D/DAV/1; Williams, Liverpool 
Privateers, pp.253-258 
 
Davenport‘s privateers had mixed luck on their cruises. The Fly was captured, 
and because Davenport had not ―insured a penny‖ on her, he lost his £100 
investment.
119
 Both the Hector and Bee also returned empty handed to Liverpool 
despite Davenport‘s hopes of ―better success‖ than the Fly, and, as a result, his 
investment in these three vessels proved fruitless.
120
 His three other privateers 
achieved much better results. The Sturdy Beggar took three rich prizes laden with 
West India produce, before she ―parted both cables in a gale of wind, drove on shore, 
and in ten minutes went entirely to pieces.‖121 The Enterprize also took three Spanish 
prizes, one of which was shared with another privateer.
122
 And on her cruise, the 
Essex captured 
two Dutch Ships from St. Eustatia to Holland value at £25,000. The one a brig 
calld the Gouden Thee Boom Capt Harkout is arrived safe here worth £10,000 
but the other called the Zee Fortune, Capn Wm Mitts, was dashd to pieces on 
the 19th Ulto, on the Rocks near Waxford & all the crew perished
123
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Calculating Davenport‘s profits from these prizes is difficult because the 
ledger for his privateering investments in the period 1776-1787 is lost. However, there 
are scattered clues in the Davenport papers detailing some of his proceeds from 
privateering. We do know, for example, that the St. Michael, one of the Sturdy 
Beggar’s prizes yielded William Davenport £414 as a 1/24th shareholder in the vessel 
because there is an entry for it in the waste book.
124
 If the proceeds of the Sturdy 
Beggar’s and Enterprize’s other five captures matched those of the St. Michael, then 
Davenport‘s return from the two privateers was £2,277.125 In the case of the Essex’s 
prizes, the Gouden Thee Boom’s cargo sold for £6,000 at auction.126 Davenport 
subsequently had to pay a London merchant who had shipped sugar on her £1,613, 
leaving just £4,387 to the Essex’s investors.127 A letter from 1781 also reveals that the 
Essex’s second prize Zee Fortuyn returned £6,400, as the underwriters disputed the 
original valuation of £10,000.
128
 After deducting the captain and crew‘s third share, 
Davenport‘s share of the two prizes was probably around £1,800, a decent sum, but a 
fraction of their £25,000 value. Nevertheless, if the indicators in the Davenport papers 
are correct, then Davenport may have earned as much as £4,077 back from his initial 
investment of £2,305 in privateering, a clear profit of seventy-seven percent. 
Like his privateering investments, we have to impute Davenport‘s profits from 
the African produce trade using his letters. Davenport does not state why he entered 
the produce trade in 1779, but the most likely explanation is that he hoped to take 
advantage of a sharp increase in the price of ivory in Britain caused by the drop off in 
the slave trade. Moreover, African produce could be sold for short dated bills of 
exchange, relieving the acute liquidity crisis caused by the war. As a result, he 
purchased in September 1779 ―a Brig call'd the William… burthern about 100 tons,‖ 
and placed Captain William Begg, former surgeon of the Dalrymple, in command, 
who he instructed to sail to the Windward Coast and Old Calabar to barter his cargo 
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for ―Ivory & as much Palm Oil as you can get‖129 In the same month, Davenport sent 
the Hope, captained by Peter Potter, to purchase ivory and cam wood at Cameroon.  
A July 1780 letter to Davenport‘s London insurance broker shows that the 
William’s first voyage made a hefty profit of £1,600, of which Davenport received 
£300. The Hope, by contrast, was captured and as a result Davenport lost ―£400 
profits on the voyage.‖130 Given the potential profits to be made in produce trading, 
Davenport had the William swiftly re-fitted for a second trip to Old Calabar. In 
September 1781, Davenport wrote to Peter Potter, at sea in the privateer Essex, to 
inform him that Begg had arrived in Liverpool with  
a very fine Cargo Consisting of upwards of 12 ton of Teeth 51 Punch of Palm 
Oyle & 6 fine Negroes which is a very great Purchase for a Cargo of only 
£1403,,5,,1 and will clear the Owners above £2000 Sterling
131
 
 
After reaping a £375 profit on the William’s second voyage, Davenport once again 
fitted out the vessel with a ―very choice‖ cargo worth £1,393.132 Although there are no 
further records of this third voyage, it is reasonable to assume that the venture also 
turned a profit given the William’s previous success. If this was the case, Davenport‘s 
four produce ventures gave sizeable returns, with all but the Hope reaping exceptional 
profits (Table 13).  
 
Table 13: Estimated Profits on Davenport’s African Produce ventures, 1780 to 
1782 
 
Vessel Captain’s Date of Date of 
Name Name Departure Return Out (£) In (£) Profit (£) 
William Begg, William 5/1/1780 10/10/1780 400 700 300 
Hope Potter, Peter 30/1/1780 Lost 900 900 0 
William Begg, William 16/12/1780 9/9/1781 400 775 375 
William Comberbach, Peter 27/12/1781 c.26/9/1782 400 775 375 
    2,100 3,150 1,050 
 
Source: William Davenport to Anthony Kirwan, Liverpool, 6 October 1779, D/DAV/1; William 
Davenport to Captain William Begg, Liverpool, 5 January 1780, D/DAV/1; William Davenport to John 
Sowerby, Liverpool, 28 July 1780, D/DAV/1; William Davenport to Peter Potter, Liverpool, 4 October 
1781, D/DAV/1; William Davenport to Captain Peter Comberbach, Liverpool, 27 December 1781, 
D/DAV/1; William Davenport to Peter Potter, Liverpool, 30 December 1781, D/DAV/1. 
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William Davenport to Peter Potter, Liverpool, 30 December 1781, D/DAV/1 
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It would appear, then, that Davenport‘s produce and privateering ventures in 
the period 1778-1782 both earned exceptional profits. Moreover, both trades brought 
in much needed liquidity, as prize cargoes and ivory traded for short dated bills of 
exchange, an important consideration compared to the long dated remittances that 
Davenport‘s slavers returned in the same period. However, these profits could only be 
made because of the unique trading conditions generated by the American War. 
Whilst a welcome windfall to Davenport, privateering and produce trading were short 
term investments made to take advantage of a fleeting opportunity.  
 
After his retirement in 1786 Davenport shifted his trading capital into financial 
securities. A ledger book covering the period 1788-1797, shows that his pensions 
consisted of three different securities. Firstly, he owned government consols issued at 
£22,500 giving a three percent interest rate. Secondly, he earned four percent interest 
on his bank deposits. Thirdly, he lent £14,000 to a friend ―on bond‖ at five percent, 
the legal maximum interest rate.
133
 Over the eight year period from 1 January 1788 
until 1 January 1798 these assets netted him £8,057, a healthy 19.6 percent return on 
his original investment. This would seem to indicate that financial securities were 
much more fruitful investments than the slave trade. 
There is, however, an important caveat that must be attached to the returns 
made in financial securities. Firstly, given the low interest rates of 3-5 percent in the 
eighteenth century, large profits could only be made on financial speculation with 
large sums of capital. If, upon his arrival in Liverpool, Davenport had placed his 
£1,000 start up capital in the bank, for example, he would have received an annual 
income of £40, barely more than an average working man‘s wages. Moreover, 
Davenport could not influence this rate of return. At least in slave trading, Davenport 
could manipulate his market share and profits by associating with experienced 
partners and captains, cultivating African contacts, and developing efficient supply 
chains. No effort on Davenport‘s part could influence the interest he received on his 
financial securities.  
In addition, money held in the bank was not safe from fluctuations in the 
market. Because the eighteenth century economy was built almost entirely on credit, 
the system was highly susceptible to cycles of boom and bust, resulting in the periodic 
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credit crises Britain suffered in 1720, 1772 and 1793. As the guarantees of bills of 
exchange, the life blood of the system, banks were particularly susceptible to these 
financial panics. As we saw when we considered Davenport‘s bead trading, he had 
himself lost several thousand pounds when, during the crisis of 1772, his London 
banker Joseph Wimpey became bankrupt. The same may have happened had 
Davenport placed his carefully accrued fortune in Charles Caldwell‘s hands, a 
prominent Liverpool banker whose firm collapsed in the credit crisis of 1793.
134
  
Eighteenth century consols were also susceptible to the market economy‘s 
vagaries because, as transferable instruments, they were traded on the open market. 
As a result, their value rose and fell based on the British government‘s fortunes, 
especially during wartime. Davenport, for example, purchased two tranches of 
consols, the first before 1788, and the second in 1790, a total investment of 
£15,445.
135
 When Davenport died in 1797, consols had plunged to forty-eight percent 
of their value, —the lowest in their history.136 As a result, Davenport‘s consols lost 
£4,645 of their value. Only the £6,900 he earned in interest on the securities saved 
them from producing a financial loss. 
 Davenport‘s financial investment portfolio, whilst far from being as safe and 
secure as it first appeared, still provided him with a sizeable pension, substantially 
bolstering his wealth between retirement and death. The £8,057 earned in financial 
speculation nearly matched his earnings from the sampled slaving voyages, and had 
Davenport not died in 1797, his wealth would have continued to increase 
proportionately. It would be easy to assume, then, that Davenport‘s wealth derived in 
large part from speculation on financial markets, not from the African slave trade. 
However, Davenport only had the capital to invest in securities because he had spent 
thirty-eight years accumulating capital as a slaving merchant. His profits from 
financial securities can thus be considered extensions of his slaving wealth, not 
independent earnings in of themselves. 
 
                                               
134 Hughes, Liverpool Banks & Bankers, pp.86-87 
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 We cannot know for certain, but it would appear reasonable that he purchased government consols 
after drawing his capital out of the slave trade in 1785. In that year, consols were trading at 63 percent 
of their face value (―par‖), and thus Davenport would have paid £9,135 for them (Ledger Book 1788-
1797, Liverpool, ODAV, f.2). In January 1790, Davenport purchased a second tranche of consols for 
£6,310, with a par value of £8,000 (Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV, f.3). He held onto the 
consols until his death, when they passed to his relatives. 
136 Sidney Homer and Richard Eugene Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, (Hoboken: 2005), p.196; 
Residuary Settlement of William Davenport, c.1797, Liverpool, BDM 
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Table 14: William Davenport’s business investments and profits, 1757-1797 
Trade From To Yrs 
Purchases 
(£) Sales (£) Profit (£) 
Profit  
(%) 
Slaving 1757 1784 27 96,377 106,895 10,518 10.9 % 
Ivory 1763 1785 22 26,555 28,046 1,491 5.6 % 
Bonds 1785 1796 11 15,445 17,700 2,155 14.0 % 
Beads 1766 1783 17 14,025 14,285 -260* -1.8 % 
Mortgage 1788 1796 2 14,000 15,050 1,050 7.5 % 
Bank Interest 1788 1796 8 13,051 17,867 4,816 36.9 % 
Iron Bars 1757 1779 22 9,545 10,500 955* 10.0 % 
Wine 1764 1774 10 3,150 3,204 54 1.7 % 
Privateering 1779 1781 2 2,305 4,077 1,722* 74.7 % 
African produce 1780 1781 2 2,100 3,150 1,050* 50.0 % 
Iron Hoops 1768 1777 9 1,046 1,337 291 27.8 % 
Stockfish 1769 1770 1 657 667 -10 -1.5 % 
Goods 1759 1769 10 526 453 -73 -13.9 % 
Pease and beef 1769 1770 1 127 136 9 7.1 % 
    156,413 172,750 16,377 10.4 % 
*Approximation 
Source: ―Old‖ Davenport Papers, ―New‖ Davenport Papers, Voyages Database 
* 
 This chapter has examined William Davenport‘s business profits by focusing 
on the financial structure of his merchant house. We have seen that the ubiquity of 
credit transactions in the slave trade made necessary Davenport‘s participation in 
several other businesses. By dealing in non-slaving commodities, Davenport sourced 
a steady supply of small bills of exchange and broke down larger, more unwieldy bills 
sourced from slave sales. After demonstrating which commodities Davenport dealt in, 
we analysed profits from these various businesses.  
Examining Davenport‘s investments from 1757 until his death in 1797 reveals 
that nearly two thirds of all his capital went into the slave trade, making it the 
backbone of his business (Table 14). It is clear that Davenport made such a heavy 
investment in the slave trade because it offered financial returns far in excess of 
alternative trades. Our extended sample of slaving ventures demonstrated that 
Davenport earned profits averaging 10.9 percent during his slaving career, and even 
higher returns averaging seventeen percent in the Cameroon region. By comparison, 
non-slaving businesses such as ivory, beads, wine and ironware either gave small, but 
consistent, returns, or could only turn a large profit margin on small sums of capital.  
Slaving offered large profits because it was, by its nature, a high risk business. 
In venturing large sums of capital to Africa, Davenport hoped to earn a risk premium 
on his investment. For much of his career Davenport received that reward. Returns 
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from Cameroon often exceeded twenty-five percent on the initial outlay and, as we 
saw with the voyage of the Hawke, could in exceptional circumstances more than 
double his capital. However, the slave trade had the potential to both make, and the 
break fortunes of its adventurers, as Davenport found with his voyages during the 
early years of the American War, such as that of the Badger. Davenport‘s career is 
therefore a good example of why eighteenth century commentators, such as former 
slaving captain John Newton, described the slave trade as ―a game of chance,‖ or even 
―a lottery.‖137 
Compared to the slave trade, trading in non-slaving commodities gave small 
but steady returns precisely because they involved very little risk on the part of their 
investors. Ivory and ironware never lost money and proved to be fruitful investments 
for twenty years. Similarly, Davenport‘s bank deposits and his money lending earned   
four or five percent interest because the chance of them being defaulted upon was 
slim. Only the bond market, privateering and African produce trading offered similar 
rewards to the slave trade, precisely because they were risky investments. 
The correlation between risk and reward in Davenport‘s various investments 
explains why he chose to continue pursuing marginally profitable trades throughout 
his career. Because slaving returns fluctuated so wildly, Davenport needed a 
guaranteed stream of income to give his firm stability and maintain the liquidity of his 
company. In this way, Davenport‘s non-slaving businesses complemented his slaving 
business—the central hub of his merchant house. After his retirement, Davenport 
further built on his slaving profits by investing them in financial securities. Over the 
course of his career, then, the slave trade was central to Davenport‘s business and, 
therefore, his prosperity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
137
 Testimony of John Newton (PP 73 (1790), p.145) 
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has investigated the business history of William Davenport, 
Liverpool slave trading merchant. It has shown that over a thirty-eight year career, 
Davenport invested £127,000 in slaving vessels, making him the seventh largest slave 
trading merchant of his generation. However, Davenport‘s real importance stemmed 
from the changes he wrought in the structure of the slave trade. In Africa, Davenport 
opened up the Cameroon market to slavers for the first time, extending the trade into a 
previously unexploited area of the Guinea coast. In America, Davenport marketed 
slaves to the Ceded Islands, principally Dominica and Grenada, former backwaters in 
the Atlantic economy turned productive sugar islands by the labour of enslaved 
Africans. In Liverpool, Davenport exploited the closing of the Isle of Man customs 
loop to make the town a centre of bead exports for the first time. Davenport was 
therefore both a specialist and an innovator, a merchant who extended and altered the 
character of the Liverpool slave trade. 
 As we saw in Chapter one, Davenport‘s highly specialised role marks him out 
as something of an oddity in the Liverpool merchant community. His singular 
concentration on the African slave trade kept him in obscurity within Liverpool‘s 
public sphere. Moreover, the long hours he spent in the counting house organising and 
financing slaving voyages came at the cost of marriage, children and ultimately a 
place in the annals of Liverpool history. Even amongst his fraternity of committed 
Africa men, he was a peculiarity. Slaving merchants such as William Gregson, and 
Thomas Leyland, managed to balance their commitment to the slave trade with a 
prominent place in the public sphere. Others, such as Davenport‘s good friend 
William Earle, turned the slave trade into a family business, with his sons taking over 
the helm of the company when the patriarch retired. Davenport, by contrast, eschewed 
all distractions from business. 
 Davenport‘s devotion to the slave trade sprung from his merchant 
apprenticeship to William Whaley. During his apprenticeship, Davenport developed a 
network of business contacts, and learned from Whaley how to fit out slaving vessels; 
esoteric knowledge reserved for only a select few merchants and captains. This 
training enabled Davenport to establish his own slaving firm at the age of just twenty-
seven, a feat achieved by few other merchants. Davenport‘s family background 
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played an important role in this rapid progression from apprentice to merchant. With 
the support of his rich family, Davenport could afford the large amounts of start up 
capital needed to finance slaving vessels during the latter years of his apprenticeship, 
giving him a capital base from which to build his trading career. Moreover, the 
backing of his family gave him financial security, allowing him to ride out his early 
losses in the Gambia trade that would have crippled other merchants.  
 Perhaps it was this financial security that gave Davenport his enterprising 
character. When Davenport was finishing his apprenticeship there existed under-
explored and under-exploited areas of the Guinea Coast such as Cameroon and 
Gabon. Chapter two showed how Davenport attempted to profit by these 
opportunities, by fitting out experimental ships to these regions. Once an opportunity 
presented itself at Cameroon, Davenport developed a complicated supply chain for 
beads, cowries and ironware to ensure that he stood to maximise his benefits from the 
region. Paralleling his Cameroon trading, Davenport simultaneously built a market 
share in the Old Calabar region by associating with a group of experienced captains 
with strong ties to the Efik middlemen in the region. By committing himself fully to 
these two markets Davenport established himself as the pre-eminent European slaving 
merchant in the eastern Bight of Biafra during the late 1760s and 1770s. 
As we saw in Chapter three, Davenport committed himself to the slave trade 
because it offered profits in excess of his other businesses. Davenport‘s slaving 
ventures reaped an average 10.9 percent profit, a return that could be earned in other 
trades only on small sums of capital or in exceptional circumstances, such as the years 
1778 to 1783. Although non-slaving investments gave low returns relative to slaving, 
they were still of crucial importance to Davenport‘s company. Dealing in ivory, 
beads, wine, and ironware brought in a steady stream of small bills of exchange, made 
necessary by the prevalence of large bills of exchange in slave sales. Moreover, 
Davenport‘s other businesses acted as important parts of his slaving company, 
enabling him to supply goods to his own vessels, and secure a comparative advantage 
over his competitors. We should therefore not view Davenport‘s company as a 
number of separate businesses and concerns, but as a singular entity dedicated 
towards the slave trade, with each part of the business inter-connected to the other.  
This specialist slaving company reaped Davenport substantial rewards: upon 
his death bed he possessed £34,000—an estate greater than all but a handful of 
slaving merchants. Central to Davenport‘s financial success was the Cameroon 
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market, an area that returned three quarters of his slaving profits. Davenport reaped 
these substantial profits from the region because his near monopoly on slave exports 
enabled his captains to purchase low priced, yet high ―quality‖ enslaved Africans. 
Despite Davenport‘s best endeavours to cultivate a market share at Old Calabar, by 
comparison, his captains faced competition from too many other vessels and, as a 
result, his profits from that region were relatively poor. Davenport‘s returns from 
other markets on the Guinea Coast, where he possessed no market power at all, made 
negligible profits, or outright losses.  
The regional pattern of Davenport‘s profits indicates that the capture of a 
dominant market share in an African market was the key to financial success in the 
Liverpool slave trade. In Davenport‘s case, he secure market dominance through the 
exploitation of a new African market. He is therefore an exemplar of the enterprising 
Liverpool merchants of the early eighteenth century, who built the town‘s slave trade 
by sending Guineamen to those areas of the coast unfrequented by Bristol and London 
traders. However, Davenport is less illustrative of slaving magnates such as William 
Boats, William Gregson and John Dawson, who participated in the high volume and 
well established Gold Coast- Jamaica slave trade. These rich merchants built their 
market share not through enterprise, but by sinking hundreds of thousands of pounds 
into slaving vessels and factories, giving them a comparative advantage through the 
sheer size of their companies, and the number of slaves they exported. 
Davenport‘s slaving career therefore validates Joseph Inikori‘s thesis that the 
slave trade could be a profitable endeavour if a merchant gained a comparative 
advantage over his competitors. At the same time, though, Davenport‘s trading at 
regions outside Cameroon confirms that the slave trade was not an automatic road to 
riches. Davenport‘s 10.9 percent average slaving ventures profits conforms closely 
with Richardson (10.4 percent) and Anstey‘s (9.5 percent) estimates of slaving 
returns, demonstrating that nineteenth century historians and Eric Williams have 
probably overestimated the slave trade‘s profitability. Moreover, the losses Davenport 
suffered after the collapse in the bills of exchange system in 1775-1778 indicates that 
B.L. Anderson was right to highlight the importance of secure credit transactions to 
the profitability of the Liverpool slave trade. Although further research on Liverpool‘s 
slaving merchants is needed, Davenport‘s business history indicates that in order to 
profit by the slave trade, a merchant required commitment, large sums of money, and 
an acute business sense. 
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Davenport‘s biography is thus a perfect case study of a slaving merchant who 
used his guile and entrepreneurial skill to create a niche for himself on the frontiers of 
the African slave trade. By directing every aspect of his company towards the slave 
trade, and devoting all of his time and financial resources to his business, Davenport 
was able to profit by the slave trade. Once those profits began to dwindle after 1783, 
he pulled his capital out of slaving and invested instead in financial securities. 
Through this business strategy, Davenport made his fortune. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix A: Calculating Slaving Profit 
 
Calculating slave trading profits has been a contentious issue among 
historians. Two who have relied largely on the Davenport papers, David Richardson 
and Joseph Inikori, argue for different methods in calculating Davenport‘s profits. 
Therefore we must address the methodological difference in order to make our own 
venture profit calculations. Richardson published his methodology in his 1976 study 
―Profits in the Liverpool slave trade: the accounts of William Davenport, 1757-1784.‖ 
Using only the ship accounts in the Old Davenport papers, Richardson calculated 
venture profits for seventy-four slaving voyages.
1
 By venture profits, Richardson 
meant the profit, or loss, made on a single voyage, calculated through the inputs and 
returns documented in ship accounts.  He argued that in calculating venture profits, 
one could not simply take the figures in the Davenport papers at face value due to 
three important factors: the residual value of the slaving vessel; insurance premiums; 
and goods purchased on credit. 
Firstly, one had to take into account the value of the slave ship‘s hull. When 
Davenport‘s slaving partnerships initially purchased vessels they went into the outlay 
in the ship book alongside the cost of the cargo. If the ship returned from sea and was 
used in subsequent voyages, the partners for the second voyage ―bought‖ the vessel 
from the old partnership, factoring in depreciation. Because we do not know how 
eighteenth century slaving merchants assessed the residual value of the vessel, 
Richardson assumed a uniform write down of two-thirds of the vessel‘s initial 
outfitting cost, a not unreasonable assumption based on the sample of voyages 
available then.
2
  
Secondly, insurance premiums had to be included in voyage costs. The ship 
books rarely detail insurance because it was typically left to the individual partners to 
purchase their own cover. As a result, Richardson had to apply an estimated premium 
based upon eighteenth century marine insurance rates. Assuming that Davenport 
insured every vessel, Richardson calculated these rates as 7.5 percent for a Liverpool-
Africa-America voyage in peacetime, rising to fifteen percent in wartime. If a vessel 
returned to Liverpool, Richardson also applied a rebate on the policy of 12.5 percent. 
                                               
1 Richardson, "The Accounts of William Davenport," pp.82-87 
2
 Ibid., pp.70-71 
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If, on the other hand, the vessel was wrecked or captured, he gave a return on the 
initial outlay of ninety-five percent.
3
  
Thirdly, and most importantly, payments for goods on credit had to be 
discounted in the outlay and receipts in bills of exchange discounted in the inset to 
convert their values to ―cash or present values.‖4 Davenport and his partners paid for 
approximately a third to a half of the outfit in bills of exchange with credit terms of, 
Richardson argued, a typical length of twelve months. Whilst noting that the 
difference between cash and credit prices ranged from ―5 to 20 percent or more‖, 
Richardson assumed a standard rate of five percent, in both peacetime and wartime 
trade.
5
 Turning to the inset, Richardson reduced the value of bills of exchange brought 
as slave remittances by five percent per annum, the standard discounting rate applied 
by the banks in Davenport‘s period. 
 Introducing these three variables – the ship, insurance, and credit discounts - 
Richardson arrived at his ―adjusted‖ profits formula (Table A1).  
 
Table A1: David Richardson’s “discounted” venture profits formula 
Outlay/ Debit Inset/ Credit 
Original Outlay per Trading accounts  
 
Original Inset per Trading accounts  
 
+ Residual value of ship from previous 
voyage 
+ Residual value of ship at end of voyage @ 
1/3 of original Ship and Materials 
+ Insurance @ 5% in peace OR 15% in war + Insurance rebates or claims @ 12.5% of 
original premium OR 95 percent of ship 
value if lost 
– Discount of 5% on credit purchases - Discount of 5% per annum on remittances 
in bills of exchange 
= ADJUSTED OUTLAY = ADJUSTED INSET 
Net Profit = ADJUSTED INSET - 
ADJUSTED OUTLAY 
 
 
 Source:  Adapted from Richardson ―The Accounts of William Davenport,‖ pp.69-74 
 
                                               
3 Ibid., pp.71 
4 Ibid.,  
5
 Ibid., p.72 
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The effect of these adjustments was to increase net outlays on the seventy-four 
sampled voyages from £324,000 to £362,000; and increase the net returns from 
£375,000 to £400,000, producing an overall reduction in net profits of five percent. 
Based upon his calculation Richardson concluded that ―average venture profits on the 
seventy-four voyages covered by the Davenport accounts was 10.5 percent.‖6 Taking 
account of the length of Africa voyages, many of which lasted more than a year, 
Richardson narrowed these profits to an annual return of 8.1 percent. However, this 
figure came with an important caveat ―this rate of return was achieved largely as a 
result of two extraordinary voyages made by the Hawke in 1779 and 1780.‖7 With 
these two voyages removed, Davenport‘s slaving profits dropped to a rather less 
impressive 4.3 percent per annum.  
Joseph Inikori contended in 1981 that Richardson‘s discounted model was 
flawed because it ―introduced wide areas of possible inaccuracy.‖8 Inikori was correct 
to question the model, as Richardson makes several assumptions that are not borne 
out by Davenport‘s own method of calculating profits. The insurance rates he used, 
for example, were far too low in wartime. Whereas Richardson assumed a rate of 15 
percent, the Davenport accounts show a figure almost double that amount in some 
years of the Seven Years and American wars.
9
 Moreover, during the latter war, 
Davenport occasionally chose not to take insurance out on several vessels, deeming 
the premiums to be too great.
10
 Finally, there is no evidence within the Davenport 
accounts of insurance rebates being included within profit calculations.  
There are also problems with Richardson‘s write down on the ship. Table A2 
summarises Davenport and Richardson‘s treatment of the King of Prussia’s value for 
her seven voyages from 1767 to 1774. As the table shows, Richardson‘s two thirds 
write down is far too generous. After the first voyage Davenport reduced the value of 
the ship by fifty percent on the original outfitting cost; and on the second, third and 
fourth voyages by just over a third. After the fourth voyage, the value of the vessel 
                                               
6 Ibid., p.76 
7 Richardson, "The Accounts of William Davenport,"  
8 Inikori, "Market Structure and the Profits ", p 767 
9
 For example, on the Calveley’s 1758 voyage, it cost Davenport £91 to insure his £264 share in the 
vessel, a premium of 34.5 percent. Three years later, insuring his £509 share in the Eadith cost £161, a 
31.7 percent premium (Trading Accounts of the Calveley, and Eadith, LRO, Liverpool England). See 
Appendix B for other examples of premiums exceeding 15 percent. 
10 In 1781, Davenport wrote to a St. Lucia contact that ―The Underwriters askd 30Gs per ct on our Ship 
[Hawke] but we were determind to run our risque rather than be saddled with so such an extravagant 
premium & very fortunate for us she arrived safe, by which we have savd near £3000 Stg premiums,‖ 
(William Davenport to Messrs Craig & Robinson, Liverpool, 21 October 1781). 
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doubled, because she was upgraded to a ship rigged vessel, despite the outward cost 
of the vessel remaining the same.
11
  
 
Table A2: Residual values of the King of Prussia’s hull, 1767-1774 
 
 No. Ship Out 
per DR 
Ship Out per 
Dav 
Ship In 
per DR 
Ship In per Dav 
1767 1 Outfitting costs were 
£1,469 including £678 for the 
Hull 
490 750 
1769 2 490 750 447 600 
1771 3 447 600 472 600 
1772 4 472 600 427 480 
1773 5 427 480 443 960 
1774 6 443 960 458 960 
1776 
7 
458 960 - 
Ship was sold for 
£420 
 
Source: David Richardson, ―Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade,‖ pp.82-83; Trading 
Accounts of the King of Prussia 1767-1779, ODAV 
 
 In order to avoid the introduction of these errors, Inikori rightly argues that 
profit calculations be ―strictly adapted to the way the traders themselves computed 
their profits.‖12 Discovering Davenport‘s methodology is made easy by two ledger 
books within the Old Davenport papers for the periods 1763-1775 and 1788- 1795.
13
 
The ledgers contain accounts for Davenport‘s slaving partners, his suppliers and, most 
importantly for our purposes, his slaving voyages. Each vessel is devoted a single 
page, within which each individual voyage is given a section.  
 The 1769 voyage of the Dobson and her tender Fox’s voyages to Old Calabar 
will illustrate the methodology Davenport used to determine his slaving returns (Table 
A3). Davenport entered the outlays on the voyage in the Debit column in May 1769, 
when the vessel sailed. Fox returned to Liverpool in April 1770, and the Dobson on 
22 June 1770.
14
 The final returns on the voyage were not settled, however, until 
September 1770 when the bills of exchange were accepted for payment.
15
 Upon 
completing that last ledger entry and balancing the account, Davenport would see that 
                                               
11 The King of Prussia was a snow for her first three voyages (Voyages Database 91409-91410), and 
was then converted to ship sometime in 1772 (Voyages Database 91892). 
12 Inikori, "Market Structure and the Profits ", p.768 
13 Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV; Ledger Book 1788-1795, Liverpool, ODAV 
14 Voyages Database 91545 (Dobson) 91553 (Fox) 
15
 Trading Accounts of the Dobson and Fox 1769-1771, ODAV 
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in the sixteen months from May 1769 to September 1770 his ship Dobson had made 
him £103, a venture profit of twenty-nine percent. 
  
Table A3: “The Ship Dobson’s 3rd Voyage” 
Debit Credit 
20 May 
1769 
To 1/24 of the Dobsons & 
Foxes Hull Cargo & Outfit 
as by Ship Book 
337,0,9 17 Apr 1770 By 1/24 remittances 
on Foxes Cargo 
177,9,4 
 To £742,4,5 insurd on do to 
Africa & America & from 
Barbados 
21,11,7 28 Sepr 1770 By 1/24 on the 1st 
Inset 
165,15,9 
 To 1/24 of the Foxes Inset  1,16,5  By 1/24 of the 2
nd
 
Inset 
72,2,9 
 Balance Profits on this 
voyage 
103,8,2  By 1/24 of the Last 
accot 
48,9,1 
  £463,17   £463,17 
 
 Source: Ledger Book 1763-1775, Liverpool, ODAV, f.34 
 
Davenport‘s did not attempt to calculate an annual rate of return for each 
voyage. Nor did he do so elsewhere in the ship accounts, or in his business 
correspondence. Instead, Davenport considered only total venture, rather than annual 
rates of returns on his investments. He had good reason to do so. Although a slaving 
vessel might make a voyage in a year, the actual returns on the sale often took months 
to resolve, especially during wartime. Bills of exchange had to be taken to banks for 
acceptance, ivory and produce sold, and wages and fees settled. If there was 
wrangling over these transactions, the receipts might not clear until a year or more 
after the vessel‘s return. To give an extreme example, the Ann sailed in April 1779, 
but her account was not closed until nearly ten years later in January 1788.
16
 In 
reckoning profits, then, Davenport measured a voyage‘s length from when the ship 
sailed, until the receipts from the voyage were confirmed as good. 
In calculating profits Davenport did not consider the ―present‖ values of his 
credit transactions. As we saw when we examined the financial structure of 
Davenport‘s company, even the ―cash‖ disbursements made on slaving vessels were 
                                               
16
 Ledger Book 1788-1797, Liverpool, ODAV, f.8 
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paid through interpersonal credit, or with short dated bills of exchange. Similarly, the 
vessel‘s receipts were also cleared through ledger accounts rather than through 
payments of cash between partners; credit transactions were not as simple as the ship 
accounts would lead us to believe. Moreover, as Richardson admitted, cash discounts 
for goods bought on credit varied markedly between five percent, to as much as 
twenty percent. Inikori makes a compelling argument supported by primary sources 
that higher discount rates were given to larger and more frequent customers.
17
 
Assuming a uniform discount of five percent for cash could potentially ignore large 
differences in rates.  
Whilst the discounting of credit transactions should, in ideal circumstances in 
which all information is available be performed, the financial organisation of 
Davenport‘s slaving company, coupled with the incompleteness of many of the 
venture accounts makes it a difficult and potentially error strewn exercise. To avoid 
these errors Davenport‘s methodology—the undiscounted model of calculating profits 
advocated by Inikori—has been used throughout this thesis. No attempt has been 
made to take account of the discounting of credit transactions, and annual profits have 
not been considered when examining individual ventures.  
In order to maintain consistency with Davenport‘s methodology, informed 
assumptions have been made concerning the residual value of the slaving vessel at the 
end of the voyage, and the rates of insurance paid where they are not listed in the 
accounts. For the value of the ship, an initial write down of fifty percent from the 
outfitting cost has been given after the first voyage, followed by a thirty-three percent 
write down on the hull‘s residual value on every subsequent voyage. This rate has 
been taken from the average rates used by Davenport in the fully documented 
voyages. Insurance rates have been taken from Davenport‘s ledger book up to 1774, 
his insurance accounts, and from Davenport‘s correspondence with his broker from 
1775 to 1783. In keeping with Davenport‘s accounting treatment, only claims on 
insurances losses, rather than rebates on policies, have been considered. Using these 
criteria, an undiscounted venture profits formula has been used to calculate profits 
(Table A4). 
 
 
                                               
17
 Inikori, "Market Structure and the Profits ", pp.762-763 
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Table A4: Undiscounted venture profits formula 
Outlay/ Debit Inset/ Credit 
Original Outlay per Trading Accounts or 
Ledger 
Original Inset per Trading Accounts or 
Ledger 
+ Residual value of ship from previous 
voyage  
+ Residual value of ship at end of voyage @ 
½ Ship and materials (1
st
 Voyage); 2/3 value 
Ship at beginning of voyage (if subsequent 
voyage) 
+ Insurance per Davenport papers* + Insurance claims per Davenport papers* @ 
95% of value of ship and cargo 
= OUTLAY = INSET 
Net Profit = INSET - OUTLAY  
* Davenport papers includes the ship accounts, the accounts ledger, the bill book and Davenport‘s 
correspondence. 
 
Source: Ledger Book 1763-1775, ODAV; Ledger Book 1788-1797, ODAV; Trading 
Accounts, ODAV; Ship Accounts 1768-1787, D/DAV/2; Personal Ledger 1763-1772, 
D/DAV/2; Voyages Database 
 
 Although Joseph Inikori used Davenport‘s methodology in his assessment of 
slaving profits, he also made several errors because he did not have access to both sets 
of Davenport papers. Most importantly, Inikori would not have known that Davenport 
was unable to recoup many of his slaving remittances during the American War of 
Independence. To give one example, for the 1776 voyage of the Badger, Inikori 
calculated a healthy venture profit of 32.9 percent using the undiscounted method.
18
 
For the same voyage, Richardson calculated a less impressive 7.7 percent profit using 
his discounted model.
19
 However, calculating the profits using the undiscounted 
model, but with the benefit of the correspondence from the New papers, in 
combination with the ship book and the ledgers in the Old papers, gives a loss of 
twenty-six percent. It is thus clear that without using all of the available sources in the 
combined Old and New Davenport papers, any calculations of slaving profits are 
liable to errors. 
 
 
                                               
18 Ibid., p.771 n.86 
19
 Richardson, "The Accounts of William Davenport," pp.82-83 
 Appendix B: William Davenport’s slaving venture profits 
 
VID Name Yr Market Share Outfit 
WD's  
Outfit 
Ship  
Out Insurance 
Other
* 
Total 
OUT Inset 
Ship 
In 
Ins 
Loss 
Other
** 
Total 
# IN P/ L £ 
P/L  
% 
90542 Chesterfield 1757 Calabar   1/8  4,597 575 100 188 6 869 1,110 100  20 1,230 361  42 % 
90745 Calveley 1758 Cameroons   1/6  1,581 264  91  355 85  310  395 40  11 % 
90777 Chesterfield 1759 Calabar   1/16 4,605 288 50 69 35 442   439 34 473 31  7 % 
90873 Eadith 1760 Bassa   1/12 3,209 267  75  342 302 40  23 365 23  7 % 
90858 Tyrrell 1761 Calabar   1/16 6,276 392  65 61 518 317 66  3 386 -133  -26 % 
90874 Eadith 1761 Gambia   1/6  3,011 435 73 161  670 3  761  764 94  14 % 
90906 Union 1762 Bonny   1/6  4,980 830  196  1,026 691 117  32 840 -186  -18 % 
91016 Dalrymple 1762 Calabar   1/4  2,912 728  128 119 975 1,008 138  8 1,154 179  18 % 
90937 Plumper 1762 Windward Coast   1/8  3,802 475 111 199 13 798 621  392 17 1,030 232  29 % 
91066 Delight 1763 Sierra Leone   1/8  2,552 319 47 35 15 416 382 66  22 470 54  13 % 
91017 Dalrymple 1763 Calabar   3/16 2,592 486 138 72 51 747 816 84  40 940 193  26 % 
91038 Friendship 1763 Calabar   1/12 3,948 329 38 49 49 465 448 33   481 16  3 % 
90907 Union 1764 Cameroons   1/6  2,940 490 116 69  675 919 92  4 1,015 340  50 % 
91067 Delight 1764 Sierra Leone   1/8  2,984 373 66 41 27 507 452 50  8 510 3  1 % 
91157 Little Britain 1764 Porto Novo   3/16 2,233 407  61 40 508 435   14 449 -59  -12 % 
91213 William 1764 Gambia   1/6  2,281 366  42  408 235    235 -173  -42 % 
92315 Sisters 1764 Whydah   1/16 5,303 331  22  353 318    318 -35  -10 % 
91218 Dalrymple 1765 Calabar   1/8  5,096 637 84 51 1 773 570 88  28 686 -87  -11 % 
91039 Friendship 1765 New Calabar   1/12 4,680 390 33 33  456 487 33   520 64  14 % 
91247 Union 1765 Cameroons   1/6  3,546 591 92 41  724 930 67  9 1,006 282  39 % 
91256 Active 1765 Calabar   1/16 7,968 498  41  539 397 46   443 -96  -18 % 
91081 Henry 1765 Cameroons   1/8  2,241 280 30 40 6 356 396 38  8 442 86  24 % 
91219 Dalrymple 1766 Calabar   5/32 5,766 901 88 72 22 1,083 1,467     8 1,475 392  36 % 
91158 Little Britain 1766 Calabar   5/32                           
91313 Friendship 1766 New Calabar   1/12 4,140 345 33 13  391 329    329 -62  -16 % 
91214 William 1766 Cameroons   1/12 2,169 167  28  195 221   2 223 28  14 % 
91354 Union 1767 Cameroons   1/6  4,878 813 53 52  918 758 250  20 1,028 110  12 % 
91360 Dobson 1767 Calabar   3/32 7,104 666   66   732 239   106   345 -387  -53 % 
91395 Good Intent 1767 Calabar   3/32                           
91082 Henry 1767 Cameroons   1/8  1,700 213 38 14   265 136 38   16 190 -75  -28 % 
91408 King of Prussia 1767 Cameroons   1/8  3,610 451   29   480 551 94   6 651 171  36 % 
91427 Neptune 1768 Calabar   3/16 1,399                         
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91220 Dalrymple 1768 Calabar   3/16 4,672 1,138 94 112   1,344 1,758 60     1,818 474  35 % 
91428 Plumper 1768 Benin   1/8  5,833 729  77  806 872 100  46 1,018 212  26 % 
91215 William 1768 Cameroons   1/4  2,150 537  32  569 841   3 844 275  48 % 
91355 Union 1768 Cameroons   1/4  4,436 1,109 375 68  1,552 1,258 315  80 1,653 101  7 % 
91545 Dobson 1769 Calabar   1/24 6,407 337   22 2 361 464       464 103  29 % 
91553 Fox 1769 Calabar   1/24 1,682                         
91083 Henry 1769 Cameroons   1/8  2,476 309 38   347 344    344 -3  -1 % 
91409 King of Prussia 1769 Cameroons   1/8  3,649 456 94   550 448 75  26 549 -1  0 % 
91573 Hector 1769 Calabar   1/8  5,197 829   67   896 1,081 77     1,158 262  29 % 
91594 Andromache 1769 Calabar   1/8  1,435                         
91585 William 1769 Cameroons   1/4  2,142 535  36  571 673   7 680 109  19 % 
91429 Plumper 1769 Benin   1/8  5,716 715 100 119 89 1,023 909 88  14 1,011 -13  -1 % 
91221 Dalrymple 1770 Calabar   3/16 4,713 1,151 60 88   1,299 2,206       2,206 907  70 % 
91653 Swift 1770 Calabar   3/16 1,426                         
90958 Kildare 1770 Bonny   1/16 4,848 303 44   347 300    300 -47  -14 % 
91643 True Blue 1770 Benin   1/8  9,083 1,135  118  1,253 662 244  89 995 -258  -21 % 
91356 Union 1770 Cameroons   1/4  4,160 1,040 315 100  1,455 1,825   7 1,832 377  26 % 
91700 Dobson 1770 Calabar   1/24 7,384 374   33   407 373   83   456 49  12 % 
91621 Fox 1770 Calabar   1/24 1,633                         
91574 Hector 1771 Calabar   5/24 5,141 1,393 128 128   1,649 1,955 150   22 2,127 478  29 % 
91595 Andromache 1771 Calabar   5/24 1,547                         
91430 Plumper 1771 Bonny   1/8  6,680 835 88 41  964 981    981 17  2 % 
91694 Patty 1771 Windward Coast   1/8  3,640 455 100 24 3 582 562 100   662 80  14 % 
91702 Lord Cassils 1771 Calabar   1/8  6,270 1,044   73   1,117 867 188   8 1,063 -54  -5 % 
91743 May 1771 Calabar   1/8  2,082                         
91410 King of Prussia 1771 Cameroons   1/8  3,302 413 75 33  521 692 75  18 785 264  51 % 
91752 Dalrymple 1771 Calabar   3/16 6,629 1,687   86   1,773 1,803 375     2,178 405  23 % 
91790 Swift 1771 Calabar   3/16 2,368                         
91803 Fox 1771 Cameroons   1/8  6,504 813  62  875 1,041    1,041 166  19 % 
91892 King of Prussia 1772 Cameroons   1/8  3,320 402 75 33  510 860 60   920 410  80 % 
91864 May 1772 Calabar   1/8  4,589 574  11  585 369 -   369 -216  -37 % 
91791 Swift 1772 Calabar   1/8  2,643 1,757 250 114 3 2,124 1,684 160 500 27 2,371 247  12 % 
91753 Dalrymple 1772 Calabar   1/8  5,694                 
91837 Dreadnought 1772 Calabar   3/16 3,790                         
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91812 Badger 1772 Cameroons   1/4  4,187 1,880   122 5 2,007 2,940   -   2,940 933  46 % 
91804 Fox 1773 Cameroons   1/4  3,335               -         
91575 Hector 1773 Calabar   5/24 6,233 2,166 150 161   2,477 1,667 156   2 1,825 -652  -26 % 
91979 Andromache 1773 Calabar   5/24 4,195                         
91976 Favourite 1773 Cameroons   1/8  6,159 770  22  792 947 200   1,147 355  45 % 
91987 Dalrymple 1773 Calabar   1/4  7,567 2,488 140 137   2,765 2,346 418     2,764 -2  0 % 
91792 Swift 1773 Calabar   1/4  2,387   -                     
91893 King of Prussia 1773 Cameroons    1/8  3,607 451 60 16  527 808 120   928 401  76 % 
92017 King George 1773 Calabar  1/4 4,536 1,134 - 72  1,206 472 -   472 -734  -61 % 
91936 Sam 1774 Cameroons   1/8  5,344 668 - 47  715 556 113   669 -47  -7 % 
91805 Fox 1774 Cameroons   1/3  3,579 1,193 - 77  1,270 1,410 133   1,543 273  22 % 
91813 Badger 1774 Cameroons   1/3  4,659 1,553 - 100  1,653 1,749 -   1,749 96  6 % 
91977 Favourite 1774 Cameroons   1/8  4,844 606 200 37  843 1,139 200   1,339 496  59 % 
92543 Lord Cassils 1774 Calabar   1/8  5,158 1,051 188 77 6 1,322 608 -     608 -714  -54 % 
91865 May 1774 Calabar   1/8  3,247   -         -           
91838 Dreadnought 1774 Calabar   5/16 3,915 1,224 150 90 330 1,794 2,297 112   2,409 615  34 % 
91894 King of Prussia 1774 Cameroons   1/8  3,720 465 120 26 1 612 763 90   853 241  39 % 
91814 Badger 1775 Cameroons   1/3  5,012 1,671 - 177  1,848 2,192 -   2,192 344  19 % 
91937 Sam 1775 Cameroons  1/8 6,393 799 113 83  995 146  594  740 -255  -26 % 
91978 Favourite 1775 Cameroons   1/8  5,574 697 200 73   970 614 -    614 -356  -37 % 
91988 Dalrymple 1775 Calabar   1/4  6,349 2,163 418 229  2,810 3,016 340    3,356 547  19 % 
91793 Swift 1775 Calabar   1/4  2,305                         
91895 King of Prussia 1776 Cameroons   1/8  5,960 745 90 86  921 791 68   859 -63  -7 % 
91839 Dreadnought 1776 Calabar   3/8  3,425 1,284 112 190  1,586 1,367 -   1,367 -220  -14 % 
92536 Badger 1776 Cameroons    1/3  10,647 3,549 - 407  3,956 2,917 -   2,917 -1,040  -26 % 
91576 Hector 1776 Calabar   1/4  7,191 2,370 - 187   2,557 1,705 79 500   2,284 -352  -14 % 
91794 Swift 1776 Calabar   1/4  2,288   -                     
92589 Dalrymple 1777 Calabar   1/4  5,503 2,051 340 312   2,703 3,508 176 475  4,159 1,456  54 % 
92728 Swift 1777 Calabar   1/4  2,700                         
92461 Mars 1779 Sierra Leone   1/10 4,710 471 - 104 46 621 963 100   1,063 442  71 % 
92462 Hawke 1779 Cameroons    1/10 6,164 616 - 125  741 1,251 120   1,371 630  85 % 
92474 Ann 1779 Windward Coast   1/10 7,299 730   489 1,219 1,437    1,437 218  18 % 
83174 Preston 1780 Cameroons   1/5  3,984 797 - 166  963 961 126   1,087 124  13 % 
82482 Mars 1780 Sierra Leone   1/5  4,169 834 200 166 9 1,209 1,488 150   1,638 429  35 % 
81753 Hawke 1780 Cameroons   1/5  4,972 994 240 -  1,234 3,368 -   3,368 2,134  173 % 
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80251 Ann 1780 Windward Coast   1/5  7,299 1,460   1,351 2,811 2,665    2,665 -146  -5 % 
83175 Preston 1781 Cameroons   1/5  4,669 934 - 187  1,121 1,429 100   1,529 408  36 % 
81754 Hawke 1781 Cameroons   1/5  6,498 1,625 - 106  1,731 51  1,045  1,096 -635  -37 % 
83413 Rover 1782 Cameroons   1/6  4,037 673 - 73  746 15  639  654 -92  -12 % 
83266 Quixote 1783 Calabar   1/8  7,141 893 - 140  1,033 1,376 221   1,597 564  55 % 
83176 Preston 1783 Cameroons   1/5  7,969 1,519 100 234 10 1,863 1,505 75   1,580 -283  -15 % 
83267 Quixote 1784 Calabar   1/8  4,629 579 221 62  862 919 -   919 57  7 % 
83063 Perseverance 1784 Calabar   3/16 10,484 2,757     671 3,428 2,942       2,942 -486  -14 % 
82973 Oronoko 1784 Calabar   3/16 4,219                 
 No of Voyages 110    79,237 6,068  7,612  3,459 96,377  93,779 6,602 5,844  670  106,895 10,519  
10.9 
% 
 
Source: Ledger Book 1763-1775, ODAV; Ledger Book 1788-1797, ODAV; Trading Accounts, ODAV; Ship Accounts 1768-1787, D/DAV/2; Personal Ledger 1763-1772, 
D/DAV/2; Voyages Database. 
 
Note: Ventures grouped by a box are ship and tender voyages. In keeping with Davenport‘s methodology they have been treated as a single 
venture for the purpose of calculating profits. 
 
* For the outward investment other constitutes small items of expenditure incurred clearing vessels into port. The large ―other‖ balances showing 
for the Ann‘s two voyages, and the ship and tender voyage of the Perseverance and Oronoko stem from a lack of information in Davenport‘s 
ledger. The entry for the two vessels has only total inward and outward investment and, therefore, it  is impossible to ascertain what the charges 
were for insurance or the ship. The outfitting cost of the three ventures has been estimated using Anstey‘s per tonnage estimation. 
 
** For the inward return, other constitutes discounts received on trades goods not entered when the vessel sailed, and returned goods.
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